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Abstract 
 
The present work examines naval exclusion zones, with particular 
emphasis on the jus in bello applicable to such zones.  The issues 
presented by the establishment and use of naval exclusion relate to many 
aspects of the law of the sea and naval warfare.  Naval exclusion zones 
represent an important issue for national security policy makers, in that the 
use of such zones during armed conflicts at sea can limit the geographic 
scope of the conflict.  While such zones may promote the principles 
enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter and discourage belligerents 
from waging naval warfare on a global scale, the use of such zones have 
the potential for disaster, in that naval commanders who mistakenly 
operate under the assumption that such zones are “free-fire zones” run the 
risk of unlawfully sinking hospital ships or other protected vessels.  
Moreover, naval exclusion zones have become increasingly common 
during modern naval conflicts, including the Falklands, Iran-Iraq and 
Persian Gulf Wars.  Finally, even when used within the bounds of 
international law, naval exclusion zones still have the potential to disrupt 
commercial uses of the seas since they often cut across the claims of 
neutrals, potentially interfering with neutral commerce, oil exploration or 
fishing. 
 
This thesis traces the development of naval exclusion zones, with 
particular emphasis on the following: 
 
• The historical uses of such zones 
• The permissible threatres of naval operations under the 
modern law of the sea regime 
• The permissible scope of activity within such zones vis-à-
vis belligerent warships and merchant vessels 
• The rights of neutrals in and around naval exclusion 
zones 
• The legality of such zones as analysed through the 
traditional sources of international law 
 
The thesis then concludes with recommendations for clarifying and 
strengthening the rules concerning the scope of permissible activity within 
such zones. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
“On the basis of the history of the use of exclusion zones, it is 
reasonable to conclude that such zones will be used in some future 
conflicts.”1   
 
I. Purpose and Methodology 
 
 The purpose of the present work is to examine naval exclusion zones (“NEZs”),2 with 
particular emphasis on the jus in bello applicable to such zones.  The concept of the NEZ as 
such appears to be settled as a matter of law, although exclusion zones may not possess 
distinct juridical status, since the same body of law applies both inside and outside of the 
declared zone.  The central thesis of this dissertation is that notwithstanding the fact that the 
establishment of naval exclusion zones do not confer additional rights on belligerents, zones 
are a distinct method of naval warfare, which have defining characteristics derived, in part, 
from other means or methods of naval warfare.  Notwithstanding the fact that NEZs may not 
possess a distinct juridical status, there is a coherent body of law applicable to such zones, as 
well as valid policy reasons for establishing them. 
 As will be seen throughout the present study, the language used to describe NEZs may 
be characterised as “legal” language.  This fundamental reality, however, is insufficient to 
confer juridical status as such upon the concept of the NEZ.  Thus, if one defines the law as 
obligations imposing rights and duties both upon belligerent and non-belligerent parties, then 
it may not be said that there exists a unique “law of naval exclusion zones,” since the same 
body of law applies both inside and outside of declared NEZs.  At the same time, there are 
clear rules covering the jus in bello for NEZs.  Therein lies the problem: is there a “law of 
naval exclusion zones”?   
 This conundrum may be resolved by recognising that NEZs are a distinct method of 
naval warfare, even though the law that applies to such zones are not exclusive to this method 
of warfare.  As a distinct method of naval warfare, exclusion zones must be distinguished 
                                                
1
  Fenrick, p. 122. 
 
2
  Although generally referred to in the present work as NEZs or “exclusion zones,” the literature—
particularly older sources—makes use of a number of terms, including “war zones,” “barred zones (or 
areas),” “maritime security zones,” “blockade zones,” “maritime operational zones,” “areas subject to 
long distance blockade,” “areas dangerous to shipping” and simply “zones.” 
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from blockades (including long-distance blockades) and from mined areas.  Although these 
methods of naval warfare are similar in some aspects to NEZs, the differences are significant: 
in effect, NEZs are sui generis, as reflected in the fact that modern military manuals and 
restatements of the law of naval warfare consider zones as a specific method of modern naval 
warfare.   
 Naval exclusion zones merit attention for a number of reasons.  First, they represent an 
important issue for national security policy makers in that the use of such zones during armed 
conflicts at sea can limit the geographic scope of the conflict.  Thus, the use of NEZs may 
promote the underpinnings of Article 51 of the UN Charter and discourage belligerents from 
waging naval warfare on a global scale.3  Second, naval exclusion zones have become 
increasingly common during modern naval conflicts, including the Falklands, Iran-Iraq and 
Persian Gulf Wars.  Third, the use of such zones have the potential for disaster, in that naval 
commanders who mistakenly operate under the assumption that such zones are “free-fire 
zones” run the risk of unlawfully sinking hospital ships or other protected vessels.  Finally, 
even when used within the bounds of international law, NEZs still have the potential to 
disrupt commercial uses of the seas since they often cut across the claims of neutrals, 
potentially interfering with neutral commerce, oil exploration or fishing.  
Armed conflicts that include a maritime component have historically been waged by 
the belligerents on a global scale, reflecting at least in part, the fact that the naval forces of 
maritime powers typically operate at great distance from territorial waters.  Two examples 
from the 20th century, the 1914 Battle of the Falklands4 and the Graf Spee incident5 illustrate 
                                                
3
  In 1979, D.P. O’Connell suggested that a rule was emerging requiring the belligerents in an armed 
conflict at sea to confine naval hostilities to the territorial waters of the belligerents and the high seas 
adjacent to those territorial waters.  D.P. O’Connell, “Limited War at Sea Since 1945,” in Michael 
Howard, ed., Restraints on War, p. 123.  Christopher J. Greenwood, while apparently sympathetic to 
this view in general, has written that this notion is “plainly untenable today.”  Greenwood Bochumer 
Schriften, p. 155. 
 
4
  Shortly after the outbreak of the First World War, German Admiral Maximilian von Spee, commanding 
the German China Squadron, consisting of two heavy and three light cruisers, had crossed the Pacific to 
the Chilean coast.  A Royal Navy squadron, consisting of two elderly heavy cruisers, one light cruiser 
and a converted merchant ship auxiliary cruiser intercepted the German squadron off Coronel, Chile.  In 
the ensuing battle, the British lost the two heavy cruisers with all onboard.  Fearing that von Spee’s 
squadron was heading towards the South Atlantic, the Admiralty dispatched two battle cruisers, under 
the command of Vice Admiral Sir F.D. Sturdee, from home waters to seek out von Spee’s squadron.  
On 8 December 1914, von Spee attempted to raid the British wireless and coaling station in Port 
Stanley, Falklands Islands.  Sturdee’s ships were refueling in Port Stanley when von Spee’s forces 
arrived and after a brief chase, the Royal Navy destroyed four of the five vessels in von Spee’s 
squadron, resulting in the loss of more than 1,800 German sailors.  R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. 
Dupuy, The Collins Encyclopedia of Military History, 4th ed., 1993, pp. 1035-1036. 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Mundis 30 
this point.  By contrast, modern conflicts at sea are usually fought for limited objectives over 
a relatively short period of time, and in the absence of a global conflict, it is difficult to 
imagine how any useful purpose would be served in attacking “even legitimate targets in an 
area remote from that in which the conflict was being conducted.”6  This conclusion results 
from the direct application of the United Nations Charter to the conduct of warfare at sea.  
The right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter permits the use of force “only for the 
achievement of certain limited ends and only of such force as is reasonably necessary for the 
achievement of those ends.”7  The use of NEZs, assuming that the requirements of the jus in 
bello are fully complied with, mesh with the Charter requirements, in that they seek to limit 
the geographic scope of the armed conflict.  Naval exclusion zones can play an important role 
in ensuring that only that force necessary to achieve the military goal is expended.  As such, 
NEZs fit into the post-World War II trend in which naval conflicts generally have been 
“conducted in a much more restrained manner than were the naval conflicts of the world 
wars.”8 
 A number of military manuals, restatements and commentators have analysed NEZs, 
but there appears to be no full-length study of such zones.  This dissertation is an attempt to 
fill this gap.  As such, the present study seeks to accomplish two primary goals: (1) to restate 
the current state of the law relating to NEZs, to include all aspects of naval warfare, including 
the areas of the seas in which naval warfare can be conducted, the legal principles governing 
                                                                                                                                                   
5
  From September through December 1939, the German pocket battleship, Graf Spee, under the 
command of Captain Hans Langsdorff, undertook a cruise of the South Atlantic, venturing between 
Pernambuco, Brazil and Cape Town (and even entering the southern Indian Ocean east of South 
Africa).  During these manoeuvres, the Graf Spee captured and sank eleven British merchantmen 
between mid-September and early December 1939.  A small Allied armada, consisting of a Royal Navy 
aircraft carrier and six cruisers, two French cruisers and ten Allied destroyers, were searching for the 
German battleship.  Early in the morning of 13 December 1939, a Royal Navy squadron consisting of 
one heavy cruiser and two light cruisers caught up with the Graf Spee near the mouth of the Plate River, 
between Argentina and Uruguay.  In a battle lasting only 80 minutes, the German vessel was seriously 
damaged and made for the port of Montevideo, where Langsdorff expected the neutral Uruguayan 
authorities to permit him to land his wounded and make the necessary emergency repairs to the Graf 
Spee.  The Uruguayan authorities would only permit him sanctuary for 72 hours, however.  Realising 
that this amount of time would prove inadequate to make the necessary repairs, he scuttled the ship and 
was interned with his crew in Montevideo, where he committed suicide three days later.  See O’Connell 
Influence, pp. 27-39; R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Collins Encyclopedia of Military 
History, (4th ed., 1993), p. 1153.   
 
6
  Greenwood Bochumer Schriften, p. 155.  For a study on the law of naval warfare in the context of a 
limited conflict, see Fenrick Developments.  D.P. Connell was the major proponent of the concept of a 
law of limited naval conflict.  See especially O’Connell Influence. 
 
7
  Greenwood Bochumer Schriften, p. 175. 
 
8
  Fenrick Falklands, p. 30. 
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armed conflict at sea and the rights of neutrals; and (2) to analyse how various aspects of 
naval warfare have influenced the development of the zone as a distinct method of naval 
warfare.   
 Naval exclusion zones touch upon a large range of issues relevant to naval warfare, 
including the areas of the maritime environment in which belligerents may engage in armed 
conflict and interfere with commercial shipping.  In many respects, NEZs resemble other 
means and methods of naval warfare, such as the blockade and naval mine and submarine 
warfare.  Targeting is obviously a major issue of concern in any area in which armed conflict 
occurs and NEZs are certainly not an exception in this regard.  All of these topics are 
addressed, since, notwithstanding the primary argument that NEZs are sui generis, the 
concept of the exclusion zone did not develop in a vacuum.  The following sub-section of this 
chapter highlights mahny of the issues raised by NEZs. 
 Since NEZs slowly developed from State practice, and particularly the practices 
employed in the First and Second World Wars, commentators seized on the then-existing laws 
and principles in explaining and characterising zones as either lawful or unlawful when 
viewed from the perspective gained through observing State practice relating to barred areas 
or long-distance blockade, for example.  Consequently, while some of these analyses are 
dated or are so case-specific as to be of limited value, they are set forth herein both for what 
they bring to the subject, and also because they have had an impact upon the development of 
the NEZ. 
 In order to achieve the purpose of the present work, therefore, it is necessary to trace 
the development of the concept of the zone in naval warfare, commencing with the practices 
developed and employed in the First World War.  The second chapter defines naval exclusion 
zones and lays the groundwork for distinguishing such zones from blockades.  An historical 
survey of naval exclusion zones during the course of armed conflicts at sea during the 20th 
century is then undertaken.  This chapter briefly discusses the historical facts of naval 
exclusion zones as established during inter alia World War I, the Spanish Civil War, World 
War II, the Korean War and Vietnam, before examining, in greater detail, the use of exclusion 
zones in the 1980s and early 1990s, in the Falklands and Iran-Iraq Wars.   
Chapter 3 then analyses the legal requirements for establishing such zones from the 
perspective of the traditional sources of international law.  Treaty law, customary 
international law (including whether freedom of navigation is a customary rule of 
international law), general principles of international law, judicial decisions concerning naval 
exclusion zones, and the writings of publicists regarding naval exclusion zones will be 
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examined.  Of course, of these traditional sources of international law, custom plays the most 
important role with respect to the establishment of NEZs and this section draws upon the 
historical examples of State practice set forth in Chapter 2.  Other issues raised by exclusion 
zones and discussed in Chapter 3 include the rights of neutrals to legitimate uses of the seas, 
including in those areas designated as naval exclusion zones, during periods of armed 
conflict; whether there is a requirement for necessary safe passage for non-belligerents 
through naval exclusion zones under certain circumstances; and the requirements and scope of 
public declarations and notifications of the naval exclusion zone.   
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the law of the sea regime as it relates to ocean 
zones, freedom of navigation and naval warfare.  This may seem a curious subject for an 
examination into the jus in bello relating to naval exclusion zones, since the primary treaty 
governing the law of the sea, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“1982 
LOS Convention”), does not specifically address armed conflict at sea.  However, the 1982 
LOS Convention divides the sea into areas that are subject to different legal regimes and this 
necessarily has an impact on the law of war at sea, particularly the rules related to exclusion 
zones proclaimed by belligerents which cut across the divisions of the 1982 LOS Convention.  
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the 1982 LOS Convention does not have detailed 
provisions governing armed conflict, the divisions of the sea that it sets forth have relevance 
for an analysis of the jus in bello in naval warfare.  Consequently, this chapter will show how 
the evolution of the law of the sea has impacted on belligerent claims to control the seas 
during periods of armed conflict.  As Professor Oxman, an authority on the law of the sea has 
noted: 
[T]he Convention does contain rules for dividing the oceans into 
different jurisdictional zones.  Some of the rules of warfare and 
neutrality vary with the status of geographic areas.  The integration 
of the new regimes of the law of the sea with the rules of naval and 
air warfare is accordingly a subject that merits attention.9 
 
Moreover, as O’Connell, has written: 
The drafting of naval Rules of Engagement presupposes a clear 
understanding of the Law of the Sea on the part of naval staffs, and 
it is desirable that all operational commanders and their staffs have 
sufficient understanding of it to minimize the risk of 
misinterpreting the expressions of international legal significance 
which are employed.10 
                                                
9
  Oxman, p. 811. 
 
10
  O’Connell Contemporary Naval Operations, p. 82. 
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The fourth chapter, therefore, presents a brief analysis of the customary law of the sea, 
examines the three United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea, and analyses the 
divisions of the seas under the 1982 LOS Convention.  The status of the 1982 LOS 
Convention during periods of armed conflict is then considered and the chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the permissible regions for conducting naval operations under 
international law.  The main focus of this chapter is the effect of the new divisions of the 
oceans on the ability of belligerents to employ NEZs.  More detail concerning the legal 
divisions of the world’s oceans and superjacent airspace is set forth in the Appendix. 
 The fifth chapter focuses on naval warfare and neutrality.  The chapter commences 
with a brief discussion of the history of neutrality before examining whether the law of 
neutrality continues to form a part of international law and the applicability of neutrality in the 
absence of a formal declaration of war.   
The sixth chapter examines the law of armed conflict11 as it relates to war in a 
maritime environment, including distinction, proportionality, military necessity and the attack 
precautionary principle.  The law of armed conflict is not designed to thwart the conduct of 
hostilities, but rather to ensure that the violence inherent in conducting hostilities is not used 
to cause unnecessary human suffering or physical destruction.  This chapter also discusses 
targeting issues, including enemy and neutral merchantmen, as well as describing what types 
of vessels are immune from attack, provided that certain requirements are met.  The central 
issue presented concerns specific actions that may be taken against other ships and aircraft 
that enter the zone.  This chapter concludes with a note on belligerent reprisals. 
Having examined the historical circumstances of the establishment of naval exclusion 
zones, the law governing the environment where naval armed conflict occurs, and the general 
legal principles governing armed conflict at sea, the seventh chapter examines specific means 
and methods of naval warfare, in order to distinguish the NEZ from these other means and 
methods.  This chapter also discusses how belligerents may interfere lawfully with neutral 
shipping on the high seas, including visit, search, diversion and capture.  Although of limited 
value to the present study, these well-established principles demonstrate clearly that even on 
the high seas, merchant vessels are subject to a certain degree of belligerent control.  Based on 
the historical development of the NEZ, however, the primary thrust of this chapter is on those 
means and methods of naval warfare that are particularly germane to NEZs: the naval 
blockade (including the “long-distance” blockade), naval minefields and submarine warfare.   
                                                
11
  This term is used interchangeably with “international humanitarian law” in this study. 
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The eighth and final chapter then sets forth the conclusions reached and 
recommendations for clarifying and strengthening the rules concerning the scope of 
permissible activity within such zones.  It is likely that NEZs will feature in any future armed 
conflict—whether limited or general—at sea and thus naval commanders and policy-makers 
alike need to understand the limits of permissible activity in exclusion zones.  
 
 
II. Issues Presented by Zones 
 
 As will be clear from the following study, NEZs present a number of issues for policy-
makers, naval commanders and lawyers.  This section identifies a number of the more 
important issues, highlighting the some of the more salient discussions in the chapters that 
follow.  One recurring theme in virtually all of these issues concerns the location of the zone.  
Put simply, NEZs established in or near major sea lanes of communication raise significantly 
more problems than those that are situated away from such shipping lanes.  
 
A. May NEZs be Established in EEZs? 
 
Chapter 4 addresses the environment in which naval armed conflict is waged12 and the 
law that regulates the sea and those States that send vessels into that often harsh milieu.  The 
1982 LOS Convention, which restates and updates the law of the sea regime contains few 
provisions that address of the law of naval warfare.  While the world’s seas are generally 
divided into territorial waters and the high seas—with specific rules governing how these 
areas may be used (or not used) by belligerents—the 1982 LOS Convention introduced a new 
concept, the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”).   
As defined by the 1982 LOS Convention, the high seas comprise all parts of the 
oceans beyond the territorial seas of littoral States. There are three obligations that warships 
must meet in conducting their operations on the high seas: 1) the duty to refrain from the 
unlawful threat or use of force; 2) the duty to have “due regard” for the rights of other States 
to use the high seas; and 3) all other duties arising from treaties or other rules of international 
law.13  Historically, assuming that these obligations were met, belligerents were free to 
                                                
12
  The Appendix contains further background on the law of the sea under the 1982 LOS Convention. 
 
13
  Oxman, p. 837. 
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conduct naval warfare throughout the high seas without limitation based on where in the high 
seas such armed conflict was occurring.14   
With the introduction of contiguous zones, EEZs and continental shelves into the 
modern law of the sea regime, however, certain additional limitations on this unrestricted 
right have developed, based on the additional requirement that warships have “due regard to 
the rights and duties of the coastal State” in the EEZ.15  The relevant provision of the San 
Remo Manual provides: 
 
If hostile actions are conducted within the exclusive economic zone 
or on the continental shelf of a neutral State, belligerent States 
shall, in addition to observing the other applicable rules of the law 
of armed conflict at sea, have due regard for the rights and duties 
of the coastal State, inter alia, for the exploration and exploitation 
of the economic resources of the exclusive economic zone and the 
continental and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment.  They shall, in particular, have due regard for 
artificial islands, installations, structures and safety zones 
established by neutral States in the exclusive economic zone and 
on the continental shelf.16 
 
The 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook indicates that these requirements do not pose 
significant problems with respect to naval operations: 
 
Since all ships and aircraft, including warships and military 
aircraft, enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight 
and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those 
freedoms, in and over those waters, the existence of an exclusive 
economic zone in an area of naval operations need not, of itself, be 
of operational concern to the naval commander.17 
 
Similarly, the majority of writers take the position that the establishment of the EEZ 
regime does not significantly affect military operations in the high seas.18  For example, 
                                                
 
14
  German Manual, para. 1013.1, p. 414.  See also Oxman, pp. 835-841. 
 
15
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 2.4.2, 2.4.3; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.21-13.23; 
Canadian Manual, paras. 821, 823-824; San Remo Manual, para. 34; Oxman, pp. 837-838. 
 
16
  San Remo Manual, para. 34. 
 
17
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 2.4.2.  See also German Manual, para. 1011. 
 
18
  Robertson, pp. 24-26; Lowe July 1986, pp. 178-181; Christopher Greenwood, Comment No. 9 in 
Robertson Bochumer Schriften, pp. 105-106; Rauch, p. 38; Rose, p. 90; Francioni, pp. 368-370; and 
Boleslaw A. Boczek, “Peacetime Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Third 
Countries,” 19 Ocean Development and International Law, pp. 445-468 (No. 4, 1989).  Oxman, 
however, takes the position, based on Article 58(3) of the 1982 LOS Convention, that although naval 
operations are permissible in the EEZ in principle, if they prevent the lawful enjoyment of natural 
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Roach writes, “there is no basis for concluding from the terms of the [1982] LOS Convention 
that the EEZ is to be equated to the territorial sea in so far as the application of the rules of 
neutrality are concerned.”19 
During the UNCLOS III negotiations, there were unsuccessful attempts by some 
coastal States to introduce the principle of the coastal State’s consent prior to carrying out 
naval operations other than navigation in the EEZ.20  Notwithstanding the failure of these 
efforts, Brazil declared upon signing the 1982 LOS Convention that foreign States were not 
authorised to “carry out military exercises or manoeuvres within the Exclusive Economic 
Zone, particularly when these activities involve the use of weapons or explosives, without the 
prior knowledge and consent of the coastal State.”21  The United States opposed all attempts at 
hindering freedom of navigation through the EEZ.22  Notwithstanding the positions of these 
                                                                                                                                                   
resources by the coastal State, they may not necessarily be lawful.  See Oxman, pp. 835-841.  A 
Chinese participant in the San Remo Manual drafting process took a different view on EEZs and naval 
operations: 
 
Since the coastal Staes have the sovereign rights and management and 
protection of the natural resources and exploiting installations in their EEZ and 
the continental shelf, they must, by all means, eliminate any actions that infringe 
their lawful rights and are harmful to their normal exploiting activities.  Any 
tolerance shown to the belligerents conducting hostile operations in the said 
areas of the neutral States will certainly lead to conflicts between the neutral 
States and the parties of the hostile operations.  The logical result of the 
conflicts will be extension of armed conflicts, drawing the neutral States into the 
war or armed conflicts that already exist. 
 
 Jianye, Comment No. 12, in Robertson Bochumer Schriften, p. 121 (emphasis added). 
 
19
  Robertson Bochumer Schriften, p. 36. 
 
20
  Francioni, pp. 361-384, p. 369. 
 
21
  Statement of the Delegate of Brazil, Plenary, 187th meeting, UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. XVII, 
p. 40, para. 28.  Similar declarations were made by Cape Verde (Statement of the Representative of 
Cape Verde, Plenary, 188th meeting, 7 December 1982, UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. XVII, p. 
62, para. 124.) and Uruguay (Statement of the Representative of Uruguay, Plenary, 192nd meeting, 
UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. XVII, p. 120, para. 55.)  In addition, Brazil, Guyana, India, 
Maldives, Mauritius, Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia and the Seychelles made declarations and/or 
enacted legislation regulating the navigation of foreign vessels in the EEZ or designated parts thereof.  
See 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 2.4.2., footnote 58; p. 210, Table A2-7; and p. 211, 
Table A2-8.  Moreover, Brazil asserts that no State may place or operate any type of installation or 
structure in the EEZ or continental shelf without the consent of the coastal State.  Ibid., p. 21, para. 
1.5.2, footnote 50. 
 
22
  See, for example, “United States of America Statement in Right of Reply,” 8 March 1983, reprinted in 
1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, p. 27, Annex A1-1:  
 
[A]ll States continue to enjoy in the [Exclusive Economic] Zone traditional high 
seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and the laying of submarine cables 
and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these 
freedoms, which remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those 
freedoms when exercised seaward of the zone.  Military operations, exercises 
and activities have always been regarded as internationally lawful uses of the 
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coastal States, which are contrary to Articles 58 and 87 of the 1982 LOS Convention, the 
majority view has been summarised by Rear Admiral Robertson as follows:  
 
[I]t seems incontestable that, despite the assertions of a few States 
and publicists, the Exclusive Economic Zone may be equated to 
the high seas insofar as the law of neutrality is concerned.23   
 
Given the fact that the contiguous zone and continental shelf overlap the EEZ, it would follow 
that the same conclusion holds with respect to those areas.24 
The drafters of the San Remo Manual posed several interesting questions related to 
EEZs and naval warfare.  As an illustration of the limitations facing belligerents in conducting 
military operations in the EEZs or continental shelves of neutrals, consider the example cited 
in the San Remo Manual: the laying of naval mines.  In the event a belligerent opts to lay 
mines in a neutral State’s EEZ or continental shelf, the belligerent must notify the neutral 
State and ensure that such minefields do not interfere with the neutral State’s right to 
enjoyment of its EEZ or continental shelf.25  Moreover, belligerent States must have due 
regard for the protection and preservation of marine life in EEZs and on the continental 
shelf.26   
Other interesting (and unsettled) questions include the following: What is implied by 
the “due regard” requirement and how does that impact upon the conduct of naval operations 
in neutral EEZs?27  May a neutral State declare a NEZ in its own EEZ, in light of the fact that 
it has no general right to exclude warships from its EEZ?28  Does the answer change if the 
                                                                                                                                                   
sea.  The right to conduct such activities will continue to be enjoyed by all States 
in the Exclusive Economic Zone.  
 
See also, United States Oceans Policy, Statement by the President, 10 March 1983, 19 Compilation of 
Presidential Documents 10 (14 March 1983), pp. 383-385, reprinted in 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s 
Handbook, p. 43, Annex A1-3. 
 
23
  Robertson, p. 27.  See also Lowe July 1986, pp. 180-181 and Lowe July 1988, pp. 292-293. 
 
24
  Robertson, p. 23. 
 
25
  San Remo Manual, para. 35. 
 
26
  Ibid. 
 
27
  Christopher Greenwood, Comment No. 9 in Robertson Bochumer Schriften, p. 106.  Doswald-Beck 
argues that since a coastal State would have significant difficulties in fishing or otherwise exploiting the 
EEZ if naval battles are being fought there, “due regard” implies some “genuine restrictions on 
belligerent States wishing to use EEZs based on the coastal States’ genuine needs which belligerents 
ought to make an effort to find out about to the extent feasible.”  Louise Doswald-Beck, Comment No. 
3, in Robertson Bochumer Schriften, p. 75, para. 2. 
 
28
  Christopher Greenwood, Comment No. 9 in Robertson Bochumer Schriften, p. 106. 
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naval activity in the neutral State’s EEZ is threatening the safety of its fishing fleet, 
exploration vessels or fixed installations?29 
 In some respects, the EEZ regime does not adequately address certain technological 
advances that have implications for naval warfare, particularly those relating to the 
emplacement of military devices on the seabed of the continental shelf.30  For example, may 
naval powers deploy non-explosive military devices, such as submarine detection equipment, 
including sonabuoys on the surface, or sonar arrays on the seabed, of EEZs of other States?  
Although 1982 LOS Convention Article 60 vests in the coastal State the sole legal right to 
construct certain types of enumerated installations in the EEZ, that article, as indeed all of 
Part V of the 1982 LOS Convention, pertains to economic uses of the sea contained in the 
EEZ.  Several commentators have argued that the relevant provisions of the 1982 LOS 
Convention do not prohibit other States from deploying such devices on the grounds that such 
devices are both non-economic and do not interfere with the coastal State’s enjoyment of 
resource rights.31  
 Because the EEZ falls between territorial waters and the high seas in terms of the 
coastal State’s rights over the waters within the EEZ, some States and commentators take the 
view that NEZs may not be established in EEZs.  This approach is too conservative.  Since 
the EEZ may be treated as other areas of the high seas for military purposes, and based on the 
above analysis of State practice concerning the adoption of the 1982 LOS Convention and the 
positions taken by most commentators, there is no legal prohibition on the establishment of a 
NEZ in the EEZ of a neutral State, provided that the rights of neutrals with respect to 
exploration and the exploitation of marine resources.  Thus, the State seeking to establish an 
NEZ in an EEZ must exercise caution in terms of balancing the scope of the proposed zone 
with the rights of the coastal State to exploit the resources in the the EEZ.  In any event, 
adequate warning should be provided prior to the establishment of the NEZ to ensure that all 
vessels of the coastal State that are in the EEZ have time to depart the area safely. 
                                                
29
  Ibid. 
 
30
  Rose, p. 77; W. J. Fenrick, in Robertson Bochumer Schriften, Comment No. 4, p. 78.  
 
31
  Rose, p. 77.  Nevertheless, Rose acknowledges that his position takes advantage of the ambiguities that 
are present in the 1982 LOS Convention.  Ibid., pp. 77-78.  Robertson concurs with this analysis.  See 
Robertson, pp. 28-30.  See also Lowe July 1986, pp. 179-180.  
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B. What are the Applicable Legal Principles Within NEZs? 
 
 It cannot be stressed enough that NEZs are not free-fire zones.  The law on this point 
is absolutely clear: by proclaiming a NEZ, no State may escape from its legal obligations 
under the laws of naval warfare.  The same body of law applies both inside and outside the 
zone and thus the proclaiming State gains no legal rights by establishing the zone.  
Consequently, the decision to establish a NEZ must rest on other grounds, including 
operational requirements and policy considerations.   
 Because the same body of law applies regardless of the establishment of the zone, the 
present work includes chapters on the applicable legal principles of naval warfare in general 
and on naval targeting specifically. 
 
C. How do NEZs Affect Neutrals? 
 
 Zones established in major shipping lanes have the potential to significantly interfere 
with the rights of neutrals, notwithstanding the fact that the State establishing the zone must 
demonstrate due regard for neutral rights to legitimate uses of the seas.  Naval warfare 
obviously increases the risks that neutral shipping may be hit accidentally by missile, 
submarine or other naval weapons systems.  However, the mere existence of the zone may 
force neutral merchant shipping to divert course, leading to increased fuel costs and sailing 
times.   
 
D. How do NEZs Relate to Other Means and Methods of Naval 
Warfare? 
 
 Naval warfare has historically served as a means to deny enemy forces the resources 
required to wage war.  In order to fulfil this commerce denial role, navies employ the 
concepts of visit, search, diversion and capture.  The naval blockade is also an important tool 
to hinder the enemy’s ability to re-supply and further its war aims.  Although certain 
characteristics of NEZs resemble visit and search or blockade, it is important to recall that the 
purpose of NEZs is not confiscation or destruction of contraband.  The post-World War II 
revolution that has occurred in the field of merchant shipping—in terms of the immense size 
of modern merchant vessels and the use of standardised shipping containers—has had major 
effects on the ability of naval powers to rely upon visit and search, with the result that this 
form of naval practice is simply no longer feasible in most instances.   
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Nevertheless, certain elements from other means and methods of naval warfare have 
have been “borrowed” in developing the concept of the NEZ.  The notion of the naval 
exclusion zones did not develop in a vacuum.  Consequently, it is important to understand 
these other means and methods of naval warfare so that NEZs may be properly understood.  
Moreover, NEZs do not necessarily have to be relied upon in isoldation.  Rather, their 
establishment and use may be part of a broader naval strategy and NEZs may be used in 
conjunction with one or more of the more traditional means and methods of naval warfare. 
 
E. What are the Legal Requirements for Establishing NEZs? 
 
 Reflecting the rules governing blockades, there are certain legal requirements that 
States must comply with in order to establish a zone.  These include public declarations and 
notifications concerning the geographic and temporal dimensions of the zone and safe passage 
through the zone under certain conditions.  The establishing State must ensure that due regard 
is given to to the rights of neutrals to enjoy legitimate uses of the seas.   
 
F. How Do NEZs Impact on Targeting Decisions? 
 
 Although the same body of law—including the law of targeting—applies both within 
the zone as well as outside of it, it may be easier to reach targeting decisions with respect to 
vessels that have entered the zone, depending on the location of the zone and the effectiveness 
of the required warnings concerning the zone.  Zones that have effectively served as screening 
mechanisms should significantly reduce the number of vessels that are in the zone, with the 
result that the naval commander can focus his intelligence-gathering on a smaller number of 
vessels.  This should increase the likelihood that he will successfully distinguish between 
legitimate and other vessels in reaching his decision to engage the vessel in question.   
 This is not to suggest that the establishment of zones will lead to a presumption that all 
vessels entering the zone are legitimate targets.  However, within zones that are effectively 
noticed to the international community and which are far from busy sea lanes of 
communication, such as those employed by the Royal Navy in the Falklands, naval 
commanders should have a high degree of confidence in making targeting decisions within 
such zones. 
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G. What are the Policy Considerations in Establishing NEZs? 
 
 A number of policy considerations underlie the decision to establish NEZs, and the 
single most important policy reason to establish NEZs is to reduce the likelihood that a 
merchant vessel will be inadvertently attacked.  This aspect has two components: first, the 
NEZ serves as a screening or warning mechanism; second, it tends to contain the armed 
conflict to a limited geographic area, although of course, the belligerents are not confined to 
the NEZ in terms of their interaction vis-à-vis each other.  Thus, the establishment of NEZs 
may serve to advance the goals enshrined in international humanitarian law by reducing the 
threats to merchant shipping.    
 Operational requirements may also affect the decision to establish a NEZ.  For 
example, by reducing the number of vessels in the immediate area of naval operations, the 
local naval commander greatly reduces the opportunity for “innocent” vessels to gather 
intelligence on the whereabouts and activites of his forces.  A number of States employ what 
appear to be “innocent” fishing trawlers but which are actually highly sophisticated electronic 
intelligence-gathering platforms.  Admiral Woodward encountered and sunk one such 
Argentinian vessel, the Narwal, during the Falklands War.32  Naval exclusion zones are an 
effective way of ensuring that such vessels stay far away from and naval operations and the 
actual hostilities.  
 While the screening function that NEZs bring to naval warfare is important, the 
location of the zone with respect to busy international shipping lanes must be factored into the 
equation.  A zone established in or around major sea lanes of communication—particularly in 
narrow sea lanes like those in the Iraq-Iran War or a zone established near the Indonesian 
archipelago—is less likely to be successful in serving this purpose. 
 
 
III. Note on Terminology 
 
A. Armed Conflict at Sea 
 
 The definition of attack set forth in the 1977 Additional Protocol is used throughout 
the present work: “attacks” are acts of violence against the adversary, whether used in offence 
or defence.33  The use of the term “war,” as used herein does not necessarily imply the 
                                                
32
  Woodward, pp. 126-127, 191-197. 
 
33
  1977 Additional Protocol I, Article 49(1).  This definition has widely adopted by military manuals and 
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announcement of a formal declaration of war; rather that word and the term “armed conflict” 
are used interchangeably.   
It is important to note that unlike other forms of warfare, which tend to use the phrase, 
“armed attack,” the term “hostile act” is generally used in naval circles.34  Moreover, “hostile 
acts” must always be distinguished from “hostile intent.”  With respect to the latter term, 
O’Connell wrote (in 1970) that: 
In times of limited war ‘hostile intent’ is normally manifested only 
when a hostile act is actually committed, and operational orders 
may well limit the expression ‘hostile act’ to the actual 
employment of a weapon.  Naval thinking has not proceeded to the 
point of clarifying the ambiguous borderland between ‘hostile 
intent’ and ‘hostile act,’ and is dominated by the notion that no 
exercise of force against a foreign ship is legitimate unless in 
response to a hostile act, and is then to be restricted in scale to 
countering that hostile act.35 
 
O’Connell went on to state that it is important to attempt to specify precisely when “hostile 
intent” translates into a “hostile act,” so that the potential attacker does not gain the tactical 
advantage.36   
 
B. Warships and Military Aircraft 
 
Under the relevant treaties, and as used throughout the present work, “warships” are 
defined as being those vessels:  
Belonging to the armed forces of a State and bearing the external 
marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the 
command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of 
the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or 
its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed 
forces discipline.37 
                                                                                                                                                   
restatements, including the U.K. Manual (at para. 5.20) and the San Remo Manual (at para. 13[b]).  See 
Note on Military Manuals and Restatements, infra. 
  
34
  O’Connell Contemporary Naval Operations, p. 25.  The U.S. Navy defines “hostile intent” as being an 
“imminent threat to use force.”  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook (see Note on Military 
Manuals and Restatements, infra), para. 4.3.2, footnote 27.  See also Australian Manual, paras. 7.8, 7.11 
(the latter paragraph contains a list of factors to be considered in determining whether a vessel has the 
intention to attack). 
 
35
  O’Connell Contemporary Naval Operations, p. 25. 
 
36
  Ibid. 
 
37
  1982 LOS Convention Article 29; 1958 High Seas Convention, Article 8(2) contains a virtually 
identical definition.  See also 1907 Hague Convention VII, Articles 2-5 and the San Remo Manual, (see 
Note on Military Manuals and Restatements, infra), para. 13.  By contrast, the 1995 U.S. Navy 
Commander’s Handbook (see Note on Military Manuals and Restatements, infra), p. 112, para. 2.1.3, 
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Similarly, “military aircraft” are all aircraft belonging to the armed forces of a State and 
which bear external markings indicating their nationality.  A member of the armed forces 
must command such aircraft and the crew must be subject to military discipline.38   
 
IV. Note on Rules of Engagement  
 
 It is important not to underestimate the importance of Rules of Engagement (or 
“ROE”), since such guidelines establish “when armed force may be used and what methods 
and means of combat may be employed.”39  O’Connell dedicates an entire chapter to ROE, 
and states, “it is in the drafting of these that international law today most directly impinges 
upon naval planning.”40  The U.S. Department of Defence defines Rules of Engagement as: 
Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate 
the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces 
will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces 
encountered.41 
 
Although primarily drafted by lawyers, ROE take into consideration operational, 
political and diplomatic factors as well and thus ROE are more restrictive than international 
law dictates, since these other factors generally constrain the political and military leadership 
                                                                                                                                                   
defines “Auxiliaries” as “vessels, other than warships, that are owned by or under the exclusive control 
of the armed forces.”  The German Manual (see Note on Military Manuals and Restatements, infra), 
para. 1003, prefers the term “Support ships” to auxiliaries, and defines support ships as vessels crewed 
by civilians or operated by the government and which perform support services for naval forces without 
being warships. German Manual, para. 1006.  “Government ships” are those which are owned or 
operated by States and which are used in non-governmental commercial service, such as for customs or 
law enforcement purposes. “Merchant vessels” are ships other than warships or government ships and 
which are used exclusively for commercial purposes, such as fishing or freight or passenger transport.  
German Manual, para. 1004.  See also Australian Manual (see Note on Military Manuals and 
Restatements, infra), para.3.5. 
 
38
  German Manual (see Note on Military Manuals and Restatements, infra), para. 1007.  “State aircraft” 
are those planes belonging to or used by a State for non-military purposes, such as customs or law 
enforcement.  German Manual, para. 1008.  “Civilian aircraft” are all aircraft other than military or 
State aircraft and which are used exclusively for the transport of cargo or passengers.  German Manual, 
para. 1009. 
 
39
  Fenrick Falklands, p. 36. 
 
40
  O’Connell Influence, p. 169.  See also ibid., Chapter XIII.  For other discussions of ROE, see Australian 
Manual, paras. 7.27-7.31; Richard J. Grunawalt, “The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge 
Advocate’s Primer,” 42 Air Force Law Review 245-258 (1997); James C. Duncan, “The Commander’s 
Role in Developing Rules of Engagement,” 52 NWCR, pp. 76-89 (No. 3, Summer 1999); Dieter Fleck, 
“Rules of Engagement for Maritime Forces and the Limitation of the Use of Force under the UN 
Charter,” 31 German YBIL 165-186 (1988). 
 
41
  Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02, 23 March 1994, p. 
329. 
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when adopting the ROE.42  Typically, separate ROE are adopted for peacetime and wartime, 
and wartime ROE permit a wider range of uses of military force, but still represent constraints 
on the commander to ensure that force is employed to achieve the desired political goals.43  It 
is important to stress, however, that ROE do not constrain the commander’s right—and 
obligation—of self-defence to use force to protect his command.44 
Most militaries operate under Standard ROE, which can be modified when necessary 
for specific deployments or armed conflict.  Rules of Engagement are not generally 
publicised,45 making full discussion and analysis of such rules difficult.  To the extent such 
rules are within the public domain, the present study will make use of them in discussing the 
cases.46 
 
V. Note on Military Manuals and Restatements 
 
Military manuals may be evidence of customary international law,47 although since 
they are not enacted by legislatures they are not legal instruments that are binding upon courts 
or tribunals applying the rules of law.48  Nevertheless, insofar as such manuals are produced 
by the militaries of the States concerned and purport to state what the law is at the time they 
are adopted, these manuals are an important source for determining the opnio juris of the 
                                                
42
  See Roach ROE.  See also James C. Duncan, “The Commander’s Role in Developing Rules of 
Engagement,” 52 NWCR, pp. 76-89 (No. 3, Summer 1999). 
 
43
  Roach ROE, p. 877. 
 
44
  Ibid., pp. 877-878. 
 
45
  The U.S. has published the Standing ROE promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 1994.  
See 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, Annex A4-3, pp. 277-285.  These ROE are referred to 
hereinafter as “U.S. Standing ROE.” 
 
46
  For example, the commander of the Falklands Battle Group Commander, Admiral Sandy Woodward, 
refers on several occasions to the ROE in effect during the Falklands War in his memoirs.  See 
Woodward, pp. 100-102, 106-108, 126, 153, 155, 158.  For a discussion of the formulation of the ROE 
relating to Desert Shield/Desert Storm, see Dalton, pp. 77-80. 
 
47
  See The Hostages Case, pp. 51-52; The Peleus Trial, p. 19; The Belsen Trial, pp. 148-149; The Abbaye 
Ardenne Case, p. 110; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, p. xxxv and footnote 1 therein (see 
footnote 24, infra.); U.S. Army FM 27-10, para. 1 (see footnote 24, infra.); LRTWC, Digest of Law and 
Cases, pp. 21-22; W. Michael Reisman and William K. Leitzau, “Moving International Law from 
Theory to Practice: the Role of Military Manuals in Effectuating the Law of Armed Conflict,” in The 
Law of Naval Operations, pp. 1-18; Jane Gilliland Dalton, “A Comparison Between the San Remo 
Manual and the 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook” 36 Israel YB on Human Rights (2006), pp. 
71-87 at pp. 74-75; Brownlie, p. 6.   
 
48
  Military manuals may be binding as regulatory instruments on members of the armed forces of the State 
that promulgated the military manual. 
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promulgating States, thus reflecting State practice.  Perhaps more importantly for the present 
purposes, it must be borne in mind that military commanders rarely have formal legal training 
and although it is increasingly common for commanders to have access to professional judge 
advocates, military manuals play an important role in informing commanders of their legal 
obligations.  This is especially true in the case of naval commanders, who frequently operate 
across wide areas of the sea with little or no contact with judge advocates or other trained 
legal professionals.  Several important maritime States have adopted military manuals that are 
publicly available, including the United States,49 United Kingdom,50 Germany,51 Australia,52 
Canada,53 New Zealand54 and the Soviet Union.55  The ICRC has also produced a Model 
Manual for armed forces that may not have the resources to develop manuals themselves.56  
                                                
 
49
  In July 2007, the U.S. Navy promulgated The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations 
(NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A). Throughout the present work, this publication 
is referred to as the “U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook.”  The U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook 
replaced the October 1995 version and the 1997 Annotated Supplement to the 1995 U.S. Navy 
Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations.  The latter document has been reprinted as 
Volume 73 of the U.S. NWC International Law Series, 1999 (A.R. Thomas and James C. Duncan, 
editors).  The 1999 annotated version is cited herein as 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook.  The 
1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook updated the 1989 version (NWP 9 [Rev. A][/FMFM 1-10), 
which in turn had replaced the 1955 Law of Naval Warfare, which is reprinted in the Appendix to 
Tucker.  For a particularly insightful analysis of the 1989 version of the U.S. Navy Commander’s 
Handook, see A.V. Lowe, “The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations and the 
Contemporary Law of the Sea,” in Robertson, pp. 109-147.  Similarly, the U.S. Army has promulgated 
a field manual, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (1956), referred to hereinafter as “U.S. Army FM 
27-10.” 
 
50
  The U.K. MoD published a tri-service manual in 2004.  See The Law of Armed Conflict, UK Ministry 
of Defence, Oxford UP, 2003.  Throughout the present work, this publication is referred to as “U.K. 
Manual.” 
 
51
  In August 1992, the German Bundeswehr adopted Joint Service Regulations (ZDv) 15/2, and a 
handbook, Handbuch des humanitären Völkerrechts in bewaffneten Konflikten, was published in 1994 
(C.H. Beck Verlag, Munich).  Under the editorship of Dieter Fleck, this book was translated into 
English and published in 1995 with commentaries by noted in experts in international humanitarian law 
as The Handbook of Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflicts.  For ease of reference, this publication 
shall be referred to throughout the present work as “German Manual.” 
 
52
  Manual of International Law, Royal Australian Navy, 1998, ABR 5179), referred to hereinafter as 
“Australian Manual.” 
 
53
  Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Joint Doctrine Manual, Chief of Defence 
Staff, Canadian National Defence, B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, 13 August 2001, available at: 
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/training/publications/law_of_armed_conflict/loac_2004_e.pdf>.  Referred 
to hereinafter as “Canadian Manual.” 
 
54
  Interim Law of Armed Conflict, New Zealand Defence Force, Directorate of Legal Services, DM 112, 
26 November 1992), referred to hereinafter as “Interim New Zealand Manual.” 
 
55
  Manual of International Maritime Law, Barabolya, Piotr D., et al., U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC, 1968 (Translation of Военно-Морсой Международно-Правовой Справоцник.  
Military Publishing House [Военное Издательство], Moscow, 1966.)  Referred to hereinafter as 
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Similarly, restatements, such as the 1913 Oxford Manual57 or the more recent San 
Remo Manual58 and Helsinki Principles,59 although not formal sources of the law, are prepared 
by experts and generally reflect the state of the law at the time they are produced.  As such, 
they synthesise and analyse custom and treaties, providing a clear and concise explanation of 
the law.60  In the sections govering naval warfare, both the U.K. and Canadian Manuals draw 
heavily on the San Remo Manual, with many provisions quoted verbatim.61  While this might 
not be surprising given the fact that the San Remo Manual drafting process included military 
practitioners and experts from a number of States, including the United Kingdom and Canada, 
it also clearly demonstrates the weight given to the San Remo Manual by leading naval 
powers.  
VI. Note on Military Principles of Warfare 
 
 All modern militaries operate under doctrines that include a number of well-developed 
principles that may be applied at the strategic, operational or tactical level and which are 
known as the principles of warfare.  There are slight variations in the phrasing and desciptions 
                                                                                                                                                   
“Soviet Manual.” 
 
56
  Fight It Right: Model Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict for Armed Forces, ICRC (1999).  Referred 
to hereinafter as “ICRC Model Manual.” 
 
57
  The 1913 Oxford Manual was adopted by the Institute of International Law and was intended to a 
“complete, objective, rule book for naval warfare.”  Pietro Verr, Commentary to 1913 Oxford Manual, 
Ronzitti, pp. 329-341 at p. 330.  The failure of the States that had adopted the 1909 London Naval 
Declaration to ratify that document played an important role in the Institute of International Law’s 
decision to set up the special commission that ultimately drafted the 1913 Oxford Manual.  Ibid., at 329. 
 
58
  The San Remo Manual was prepared under the auspices of the International Institute of Humanitarian 
Law and took seven years to complete.  The San Remo Manual contains 183 paragraphs and 
accompanying commentary, and was viewed as its drafters as the “modern equivalent” of the 1913 
Oxford Manual.  (San Remo Manual, p. 62.)  For additional information on how this manual was 
produced, see San Remo Manual, Explanation, Introduction, pp. 61-69; Louise Doswald-Beck, “The 
San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea,” 89 AJIL pp. 192-208 
(1995).  See also Heintschel von Heinegg San Remo, pp. 119-148; Jane Gilliland Dalton, “A 
Comparison Between the San Remo Manual and the U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook” 36 Israel YB 
on Human Rights (2006), pp. 71-87; Steven Haines, “The United Kongdom’s Manual of the Law of 
Armed Conflict and the San Remo Manual: Maritime Rules Compared,” 36 Israel YB on Human Rights 
(2006), pp. 89-118, at pp. 103-104.   
 
59
  The International Law Association, “Helsinki Principles on Maritime Neutrality,” Report of the 68th 
Conference (1998), at p. 497 et seq.    
 
60
  But see Busuttil, who notes that the drafters of the San Remo Manual indicated that certain provisions 
were the subject of controversy and disagreement, and thus the manual “must be handled with care.”  
Busuttil, p. 10, footnote 82, citing to San Remo Manual, p. 65.   
 
61
  While the U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook rarely includes verbatim quotes from the San Remo 
Manual in its governing provisions, there are extensive citations to that manual in the footnotes and text. 
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of these principles among the world’s major military forces, although the following concepts 
are common to all published doctrines:62 
 
• Objective: Direct every military objective toward a clearly defined, 
decisive and attainable objective. 
 
• Offensive: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. 
 
• Mass: Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the 
decisive place and time. 
 
• Economy of Force: Employ all combat power available in the 
most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat 
power to secondary effects. 
 
• Maneuver: Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through 
the application of flexible power. 
 
• Unity of Command: For every objective, seek unity of command 
and unity of effort. 
 
• Security: Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected 
advantage. 
 
• Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for 
which he is unprepared. 
 
• Simplicity: Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders 
to ensure thorough understanding. 
 
• Maintenance of Morale: High morale fosters the offensive spirit 
and the will to win. 
 
• Administration: Logistic considerations are often the deciding 
factor in assessing the feasibility of an operation. 
 
While a judge advocate or military lawyer in an operational environment will 
generally rely on the legal principles described above in advising the military commander, the 
commander will have a more thorough background in these principles of warfare.  These 
principles will have been the framework through which the commander has trained his unit.  
In many important ways, however, these principles complement the values underlying the law 
of armed conflict, and when these legal and operational principles operare together, the 
likelihood of military success will increase while the risks of civilian death or injury and 
collateral damage will decrease.   
                                                
62
  See, for example, Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine (“BMD”), prepared 
under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff, Army Code No. 71451, D/CGS/50/8, 1996, Annex 
A; U.S. Army Field Manual FM 100-5, Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993, pp. 2-4 – 2-
5.  Terms employed in the BMD are in italics; those from FM 100-5 are in bold; items in bold italic are 
commonly phrased in both BMD and FM 100-5.  These principles have been distilled through the works 
of Jomini, Clausewitz and J.F.C. Fuller. 
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For example, the principles of proportionality, military necessity and economy of 
force are closely related and when applied consistently, can increase the odds of successfully 
completing a military mission.  Although the U.S. Navy has not formally adopted the 
Principles of Warfare as doctrine,63 the 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook highlights 
the inter-relationship between these concepts: 
 
Together, the law of armed conflict and the principles of warfare 
underscore the importance of concentrating forces against critical 
military targets while avoiding the expenditure of personnel and 
resources against persons, places, and things that are militarily 
unimportant.  However, these principles do not prohibit the 
application of overwhelming force against enemy combatants, 
units and material.64 
 
Similarly, the development of high morale contributes to good order and discipline, which in 
turn increases the likelihood that individual unit commanders and sailors or marines do not 
violate the laws of armed conflict.   Thus, there are clearly synergies between the legal 
principles and the principles of war.  
 
                                                
63
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 5.2, footnote 9. 
 
64
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 5.2.  See also ibid., para. 8.1 indicating that the 
principle of distinction parallels the principles of the objective, mass and economy of force. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Naval Exclusion Zones: An Historical Survey 
 
“Typically, in an armed conflict, one State will claim a right to 
interfere with the navigational rights of States not party to the 
conflict in a manner that the latter find objectionable.”1 
 
“Twentieth-century State practice has stood in direct conflict with 
the traditional international law of naval warfare, belligerent 
parties seeking to restrict severely the rights of commercial ships in 
order to permit more aggressive military operations on the high 
seas.”2 
 
I. Introduction and Definitions 
 
While Professor Lowe’s assertion is certainly borne out by State practice during armed 
conflicts at sea, it is equally true that such interference is not limited to the navigational rights 
of non-belligerents, since the primary objective of naval warfare is to deny the opponent use 
and control of the sea.  This necessarily requires a belligerent State to interfere with the 
navigational rights of other belligerent States.  The use of naval exclusion zones has become a 
common method of achieving this goal during naval warfare.  What sets the use of NEZs 
apart from other forms of naval warfare, however, is the assertion by a belligerent State of 
rights to certain delineated areas of the sea, coupled with prior announcement of military 
intentions with respect to the zone.  It should also be noted that NEZs are a feature of 
international—and not internal—armed conflict.3 
 The present work uses the definition for NEZs set forth by William J. Fenrick, a noted 
authority on international humanitarian law and naval warfare: 
 
An exclusion zone, also referred to as a military area, barred area, 
war zone, or operational zone, is an area of water and superjacent 
air space in which a party to an armed conflict purports to exercise 
control and to which it denies access to ships and aircraft without 
permission.  It thus interferes with the normal rights of passage and 
                                                
1
  Lowe July 1986, p. 183. 
 
2
  Ross Leckow, “The Iran-Iraq Confict in the Gulf: The Law of War Zones,” 37 ICLQ (Part 3, July 
1988), pp. 629-644, p. 629. 
 
3
  Heintschel von Heinegg Legal Issues, p. 160.  (“Being a method of naval warfare such a zone—
whatever its purpose of legality may be—cannot be made use of in times other than international armed 
conflict.”) 
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overflight of ships and aircraft of non-parties.  Unauthorized ships 
or aircraft entering the zone do so at the risk of facing sanctions, 
often including being attacked by missiles, aircraft, submarines or 
surface ships, or of running into minefields.4 
 
Although a survey of the literature reveals that there are several different definitions and 
characterisations of NEZs, such definitions often reflect the authors’ negative views regarding 
the legality of such zones.  For example, one commentator has written that:  
 
[A] war zone, beyond pretexts, wishful assurances, or euchologies, 
is essentially a free-fire zone which has been historically designed 
and operated so as to legitimise, or at least to waive responsibility 
for indiscriminate attack on enemy or neutral merchant ships.5 
 
Similarly, in the view of another author, “the common denominator of all war zones is the 
declaring belligerent’s claim to suspend in the zone some or all of the rules of naval warfare.”6  
Notwithstanding these opposing definitions, other writers have cited the formulation 
advanced by Fenrick approvingly, with one characterising it is the “classical definition.”7   
Although the terms “total exclusion zone” or “maritime exclusion zones” have also 
been used to refer to NEZs, the latter term includes both TEZs and MEZs and notwithstanding 
the specific terminology adopted by the proclaiming State, if the zone falls within the scope of 
Fenrick’s definition, it is treated as a NEZ for purposes of the present work. 
Armed conflict at sea has always had an economic element, with the most common 
manifestations of this generality being blockades and the capture for prize of merchant 
vessels.8  At the outset of this historical survey of the use of NEZs, therefore, it is necessary to 
differentiate such zones from more traditional methods of denying freedom of the seas to 
other States, such as blockades.  Based on the above definition, NEZs may be distinguished 
from blockades and the cordon sanitaire9 based on the following formulation: 
 
                                                
 
4
  Fenrick, p. 92. 
 
5
  Politakis, p. 38. 
 
6
  Karl Zemanek, “War Zones” in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.) Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(1982), volume 4, p. 337. 
 
7
  Pocar, p. 219. 
 
8
  See, for example, Harry H.G. Post (ed.), International Economic Law and Armed Conflict (1994); 
Politakis, Chapters 5 and 6.  See also Chapter 7 of the present work. 
 
9
  Regarding the notion of the cordon sanitaire, see S.F. Gilchrist, “The Cordon Sanitaire: Is It Useful? Is 
It Practical?” 35 NWCR (1982), p. 60. 
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Exclusion zones are different from the more traditional blockade 
zones because in blockade zones the primary risk is that of capture, 
while in exclusion zones it is, frequently, the risk of attack on 
sight; they are also different from more recent devices such as the 
cordon sanitaire, which is intended to be used primarily in a period 
of tension prior to the commencement of hostilities.10  
 
Thus, unlike the use of blockades or the cordon sanitaire, the establishment of a NEZ 
relates more to the strategy employed to conduct the hostilities, than to any specific 
anticipated economic goal to be achieved.  That is, the NEZ is set up as a key component of 
the naval strategy of the State establishing such a zone.  D.P. O’Connell concisely stated the 
issue of NEZs as follows: “The question is whether areas of the high seas can be closed to 
international shipping on the pretext of naval operational uses.”11 
The establishment of NEZs must also be distinguished from warning zones and the 
customary right of belligerents to control the immediate area or vicinity of naval operations.12  
Heintschel von Heinegg, a leading commentator on the law of naval warfare, puts it this way: 
 
It is generally acknowledged that belligerents are entitled to take 
all measures necessary against neutral vessels and aircraft whose 
presence may otherwise jeopardize naval operations in that area.  
While in many cases such measures will consist of a belligerent 
control over the communications of these vessels and aircraft, they 
may, depending on the circumstances, include the closure of the 
sea area in which naval operations are conducted.13 
 
This chapter will describe the use of NEZs during periods of armed conflict at sea in 
the 20th Century and will provide the foundation for the discussion of the role of custom 
concerning NEZs, discussed in the following chapter.  The focus of this chapter will be upon 
the factual situations concerning the NEZs; an analysis of the legality of the establishment of 
such zones will be considered in subsequent chapters.  Moreover, because the concept of the 
NEZ evolved from the naval strategies of unrestricted submarine warfare and mining, some of 
the examples that follow do not fit precisely with the definition of NEZ as set forth above.  
Similarly, some of the examples in this chapter are more analogous to the traditional concept 
of blockade.  These examples are set forth, however, in order to explain both how naval forces 
                                                
 
10
  Fenrick, p. 92.   
 
11
  O’Connell Influence, p. 164. 
 
12
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.8; U.K. Manual, para. 13.80; San Remo Manual, 
para. 108; Helsinki Principles, para. 3.3.  
 
13
  Heintschel von Heinegg Legal Issues, pp. 163-164 (footnotes omitted). 
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have dealt with both belligerent and non-belligerent vessels in the seas constituting the 
conflict zone and how NEZs evolved during the 20th century.  After briefly describing the 
naval components of 20th century armed conflicts, the primary thrust of this chapter will be 
detailed descriptions of the use of NEZs during the Falklands and Iran-Iraq Wars.   
 
II. World War I14 
 
A. Allied Zones 
 
 World War I marked the first conflict in which the belligerents extensively used what 
would come to be recognised as NEZs.15  The precursor to the establishment of the first NEZ 
was the laying of mines almost immediately after the commencement of the war.16  Britain 
was the first belligerent to acknowledge that it had undertaken a policy of mine laying in 
response to alleged similar conduct by the Germans.  On 2 October 1914, Britain duly 
notified the existence of a minefield in the Strait of Dover off the Belgian Coast.17  France 
quickly followed suit, sowing a minefield in the Adriatic Sea in response to the mining of that 
sea by the Austro-Hungarian Navy.18  Similarly, based on the presence of German submarines 
and mines near the Gulf of Finland and Russian coast, the Russians warned of a zone 
encompassing the Russian coast, the Gulf of Riga and the coastal waters of the Aland 
Archipelago.19  Upon its entry into the war in 1917, the United States also declared several 
“defensive sea areas.”20 
                                                
 
14
  In general, see Garner; Politakis, pp. 40-54. 
 
15
  It has been suggested that Japan established a NEZ during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, although 
the precise nature of that zone is debatable.  Compare O’Connell Influence, p. 166, Garner, Vol. I, pp. 
351-352, and Politakis, pp. 39-40. 
 
16
  See the documents reprinted in 11 AJIL (Supplement, No. 4, October 1917), pp. 4-41; for succinct 
discussions concerning mine warfare at sea in World War I, see Busuttil, pp. 30-33; Politakis, pp. 174-
187. 
 
17
  See Telegram from Sir Edward Grey to Sir Cecil Spring Rice, 2 October 1914, reprinted in 11 AJIL 
(Supplement, No. 4, October 1917), pp. 11-12.  The scope of this minefield was subsequently extended.  
See Telegram from Ambassador W.H. Page to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, dated 2 May 1916 
and Telegram from Ambassador W.H. Page to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, dated 29 May 1916, 
reprinted in 11 AJIL (Supplement, No. 4, October 1917), pp. 33-34. 
 
18
  See Note from Ambassador Herrick to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, reprinted in 11 AJIL 
(Supplement, No. 4, October 1917), pp. 12-13. 
 
19
  Editorial Comment, “Mines, Submarines and War Zones—The Absence of Blockade,” 9 AJIL (No. 2, 
April 1915), pp. 461-471, p. 463. 
 
20
  See Executive Order Establishing Defensive Sea Areas, No. 2584, 5 April 1917, reprinted in 12 AJIL 
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The British were the first party to the conflict to establish a NEZ, termed a “danger 
zone,” on 4 November 1914, depicted in Map 1, below.  This zone was established in response 
to indiscriminate mine laying on the high seas by Germany, and in declaring the entire North 
Sea to be a war zone, Britain declared: 
 
 
 
Sources: T.A. Bailey and P.B. Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster (1975), p. 30;  
Politakis, p. 40. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
(Supplement, No. 1, January 1918), pp. 13-16; Executive Order Establishing Additional Defensive Sea 
Area, No. 2597, 14 April 1917, reprinted in 12 AJIL (Supplement, No. 1, January 1918), p. 21; and 
Regulations for Carrying into Effect the Executive Order of the President Establishing Defensive Sea 
Areas, 5 April 1917, reprinted in 12 AJIL (Supplement, No. 1, January 1918), pp. 16-20. 
Map 1  
The British North Sea 
Zone of 4 November 
1914 
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Owing to the discovery of mines in the North Sea, the whole of that 
sea must be considered to be a military area.  Within this area 
merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing 
craft, and all other vessels will be exposed to the gravest dangers 
from mines which it has been necessary to lay and from war-ships 
searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft.21 
 
Although the British order went on to state that every effort would be made to warn merchant 
and fishing vessels of the dangers posed by transiting this area, the order also indicated that 
from 5 November 1914 onwards, “all ships passing a line drawn from the northern point of 
the Hebrides through the Faroe Islands to Iceland do so at their own peril.”22  The British war 
zone was extended on several occasions in 191623 and 1917.24 
 In 1915, the British employed a number of other tactics to wage naval warfare against 
the Germans, including the arming of merchant vessels and the use of such ships to ram 
German U-Boats.25  On 31 January 1915, the British Admiralty ordered British merchant 
vessels to fly the flags of neutral States to avoid being attacked by German submarines.26   
In response to the German exclusion zone established around Great Britain on 4 
February 1915 (described below), the British and French Governments established what came 
to be known as a “long-distance” blockade of Germany, depicted in Map 2 below.27  The first 
of three orders, which were expressly justified as retaliatory measures, was issued by Great 
Britain on 11 March 1915,28 with France following suit two days later.29  The intent behind the  
                                                
 
21
  The full text of this order is reprinted in Garner Questions, p. 595.  See also enclosure to the letter from 
the British Ambassador Cecil Spring Rice to the U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, dated 3 
November 1914, reprinted in 11 AJIL (Supplement, No. 4, October 1917), pp. 14-16. 
 
22
  The full text of this order is reprinted in Garner Questions, p. 595. 
 
23
  Admiralty Notice to Mariners No. 618, 1916, reprinted in 11 AJIL (Supplement, No. 4, October 1917), 
p. 35; Busuttil, p. 32. 
 
24
  Telegram from U.S. Ambassador W.H. Page to U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 25 January 
1917, reprinted in 11 AJIL (Supplement, No. 4, October 1917), p. 36; Telegram from U.S. Ambassador 
W.H. Page to U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 15 February 1917, reprinted in 11 AJIL 
(Supplement, No. 4, October 1917), pp. 36-37; Telegram from U.S. Ambassador W.H. Page to U.S. 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 23 March 1917, reprinted in 11 AJIL (Supplement, No. 4, October 
1917), pp. 38-39; Busuttil, p. 32. 
 
25
  See James Brown Scott, “The Execution of Captain Fryatt,” 10 AJIL (No. 4, October 1916), pp. 865-
877; Garner, Vol. I, pp. 407-413; Fenrick, pp. 96-97, fn. 19. 
 
26
  O’Connell Contemporary Naval Operations, p. 46. 
 
27
  Tucker, pp. 305-315. 
 
28
  Order in Council, Retaliatory Measures Against Trade of Germany, 11 March 1915, reprinted in 1917 
ILD, pp. 138-140.  The second order was issued on 10 January 1917.  See Order in Council, Retaliatory 
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Source: Martin Gilbert, Atlas of World War I (1994), p. 76 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Measures Against German Trade, 10 January 1917, reprinted in 1917 ILD, pp. 141-142..  The third 
order was issued on 11 February 1917.  See Order in Council, Retaliatory Measures Against German 
Trade, 16 February 1917, reprinted in 1917 ILD, pp. 142-143.    
 
29
  Decree Authorising Retaliatory Measures Against Trade of Germany, 13 March 1915, reprinted in 1917 
ILD, pp. 94-96.    
 
Map 2  
Allied Long-Distance Blockades 1914-1918 
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long distance blockade, which was the subject of U.S. notes of protest,30 was to ensure that no 
goods of any kind were to reach or leave German ports.   
In late 1917 and early 1918, the Royal Navy, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, 
sought to seal off the North Sea by expanding the minefields in the English Channel (depicted 
below in Map 3 and known as the Dover Strait or Folkestone-Gris Mine Barrage) and in the 
North Sea between the Orkney Islands and Norway (known as the the North Sea Mine 
Barrage and depicted in Map 4 on the following page).31 
 
 
 
Source: Martin Gilbert, Atlas of World War I (1994), p. 80 
 
                                                
30
  See Hackworth VII Digest of International Law, 134-138; 9 AJIL (1915 Special Supplement), pp. 117, 
157 and 10 AJIL (1916 Special Supplement), pp. 72, 134.  These protests were directed at the 1915 
announcements, since by the time the 1917 blockade orders were issued, the U.S. was on the verge of 
becoming a party to World War War.  See Tucker, p. 308, footnote 63.  Goldie argues that the fact that 
after entering World War I, the U.S. embraced the policy of adopting similar zones tends to undermine 
the significance of the protest.  Goldie, p. 180. 
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Source: Martin Gilbert, Atlas of World War I (1994), p. 74 
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B. German Zones 
 
On 4 February 1915, in response to the initial British exclusion zone declaration and 
the British re-flagging policy, the German government noticed the establishment of a war 
zone around the British Islands, shown on Map 5 on the following page, which was effective 
as of 18 February 1915: 
 
The waters around Great Britain, including the whole of the 
English Channel, are declared hereby to be included within the 
zone of war, and after the 18th inst. all enemy merchant vessels 
encountered within these waters will be destroyed, even if it may 
not be possible always to save their crews and passengers.32 
 
The German order addressed neutral vessels, stating that “within this war zone neutral vessels 
are exposed to danger” and proclaimed that such ships “cannot always be prevented from 
suffering the attacks intended for enemy ships,” as the result of the misuse of neutral flags and 
the general hazards of naval warfare.33  Germany subsequently extended and modified its 
declared exclusion zone, waging war on British commerce with mines and submarines in 
response to the relative success of the British economic warfare campaign, coupled with the 
naval superiority of the Royal Navy surface fleet vis-à-vis Germany.34   
On 31 January 1917, Germany adopted a policy (effective the following day) of 
unrestricted submarine warfare in a zone covering the entire North Sea, including the waters 
around Great Britain, extending north to the Faroe Islands, westward from France and Britain 
for five hundred miles, and southward to within a few miles of the Spanish Coast. With a few 
exceptions, all navigation, including that of neutrals, was prohibited and the announcement 
stated, “all ships met within that zone will be sunk.”35  No warnings would be provided prior 
to attack and no provisions were made for the safety of crews and passengers of such 
vessels.36   
                                                
 
32
  The full text of this order is reprinted in Garner Questions, p. 594. 
 
33
  Ibid. 
 
34
  Fenrick, pp. 96-97.   
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  Hackworth, VI Digest of International Law, p. 481. 
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Sources: T.A. Bailey and P.B. Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster (1975), p. 34;  
Politakis, p. 47 
 
This Geman zone, which was described as a “barred” area, covered more than one 
million square miles of sea, including a large portion of the Mediterranean Sea.37  Narrow 
navigation lanes were established westward from Falmouth through the barred zone into the 
Atlantic and through the Mediterranean Sea to Greece.38  The barred zone was subsequently 
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38
  Garner, Vol. I, p. 337. 
Map 5 
 The German Zone of 4 February 1915 
Chapter Two: Naval Exclusion Zones: An Historical Survey 
Mundis 60 
extended on three occasions, in March 1917, November 1917 and January 1918.  As a result 
of these extensions, the Mediterranean safety lane was closed, in addition to the waters around 
the Azores and Cape Verde Islands, the waters between the Madiera and Azores and a portion 
of the Arctic Ocean (barring access to the northern Russian ports).39  Within these zones, “all 
sea traffic was to be forthwith opposed by means of mines and submarines.”40  One American 
passenger vessel per week was permitted to use the Falmouth safety lane and such vessels 
were required to carry special markings and be highly illuminated at night.41   
The German submarine campaign was credited with sinking 11,135,000 tons of allied 
and neutral merchant vessels (more than 25% of the world’s total tonnage), out of a total of 
12,742,000 tons sunk during the war.42  Thus, submarines were responsible for more than 87% 
of the damage caused to allied and neutral merchant vessels, which is all the more remarkable 
in light of the fact that at no time during the entire war did Germany have more than 140 
submarines in active service, and that no more than one-third of those boats would have been 
operating at any given time.43  Allied public opinion came to label the German campaign of 
unrestricted submarine warfare in World War I as “piracy” and “piratical acts.”44  Although 
not technically acts of piracy (as defined by international law),45 these terms “grew into 
general usage as the pejorative characterization of the policy of unrestricted submarine 
warfare.”46  As a result, there were intensive efforts in the two decades after the First World 
War to abolish—or at least significantly curtail—the use of submarines.47  Map 6 depicts the 
areas where German U-Boats were particularly active against Allied shipping in 1917. 
                                                
 
39
  Ibid. 
 
40
  Ibid. 
 
41
  Ibid. 
 
42
  G.R. Lindsey, “Tactical Anti-Submarine Warfare: The Past and the Future,” in Adelphi Paper 122, 
Power at Sea: The New Environment (1976), p. 30.   
 
43
  O’Connell Influence, p. 47. 
 
44
  L.F.E. Goldie, Commentary on the 1937 Nyon Agreements, in Ronzitti, pp. 489-502, at p. 492. 
 
45
  On the law of piracy, see Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy, 2006.  
 
46
  L.F.E. Goldie, Commentary on the 1937 Nyon Agreements, in Ronzitti, pp. 489-502, at p. 492. 
 
47
  The United Kingdom, as the world’s leading naval power, fought particularly hard to outlaw the use of 
the submarine in warfare.  See Busuttil, pp. 123-130. 
Chapter Two: Naval Exclusion Zones: An Historical Survey 
Mundis 61 
 
 
 
Source: Arthur Banks, A Military Atlas of the First World War, p. 266 
 
 By the conclusion of World War I, it was clear significant changes had occurred with 
respect to the traditional methods of conducting naval warfare, specifically with respect to the 
law of blockade.  In fact, this change was evident from the outset of the war on the basis of 
the widespread use of “war zones.”  As an editorial in the American Journal of International 
Law noted in 1915: 
 
[A] striking feature of the present war is the absence of blockade 
formally declared and applied in the way that doctrine has been 
previously recognized, namely, by the actual patrol of the enemy’s 
coasts and waters with a sufficient number of cruisers to prevent 
ingress and egress.  In its place “military areas” or “war zones,” 
depending for their effectiveness upon submarine mines and 
torpedo boats, have been established not only within the enemy’s 
waters, but upon the high seas.48   
 
Moreover, the risks posed to neutral shipping by these changes had a significant impact on the 
“penalty” imposed on neutrals by the belligerents.  This point is illustrated by the fact that 
under the traditional law of blockade, a vessel that breached the blockade was subject to 
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confiscation after condemnation by a prize court.49  With the establishment of war zones, 
however, a vessel entering such a zone faced the risk imposed by mines or being sunk on 
sight by a belligerent warship.50    
 
III. The Spanish Civil War51 
 
The Spanish Civil War commenced as an “insurrection” led by General Francisco 
Franco against the established Republican government on 14 July 1936.  Almost immediately, 
Spain was physically divided between the Republican government52 and Franco’s National 
forces.53  The issue of whether or not the parties to the conflict could exercise belligerent 
rights on the high seas was the major legal controversy of the war,54 and this problem was 
compounded by the fact that several European States provided arms to one side or the other.  
In interfering with neutral shipping, both parties to the conflict justified their actions on the 
flow of arms intended for the opposing side.   
 
A. Interference with Merchant Shipping 
 
The major naval powers denied belligerent rights to the parties and subsequently the 
parties commenced a multi-pronged campaign of interfering with merchant shipping both on 
the high seas and in Spanish territorial seas.55  The first type of interference involved visitation 
and search of foreign vessels, including forced deviation of ships into Spanish ports for 
inspection and confiscation of cargo.56  This campaign of interference on the high seas was 
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  On the law of prize, see Politakis, pp. 526-642. 
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1936,” 47 NWCR, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 72-101, map at p. 75. 
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government hands.  Ibid. 
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branded as a form of “piracy” and several States placed their merchant vessels under armed 
protection on the high seas adjacent to the Spanish territorial sea.57  Eventually, the Nationalist 
forces, with assistance from the Italian Navy, began attacking without warning ships on the 
high seas that were en route to Republican ports.58   
Second, a campaign of submarine warfare ensued, with Italian and German 
submarines assisting Franco’s Nationalist forces.59  Both foreign merchant vessels and 
warships were targeted60 and at least one vessel, the American S.S. Excambion, was actually 
visited and released on the high seas by a Republican submarine.61  It is worth noting that all 
of these attacks came within months of the signing of the 1936 London Protocol (also known 
as the London Procès-Verbal) governing the conduct of submarine warfare, and which 
included both Germany and Italy (but not Spain) among its signatories.62 
The third form of interference with foreign shipping took the form of declaring “war 
zones” or “blockades.”  On 9 August 1936, Republican Spain declared the following areas to 
be “zones of war” and “subject to blockade”: Spanish Morocco, the Canary Islands, Ifni and 
Rio de Oro, followed two days later by a similar declaration with respect to the coasts of 
Huelva, Cádiz, Lugo, Corunna, Pontevedra and the Balearic Islands.63  Before the war was 
concluded, the Spanish Republican government ultimately proclaimed a war zone around all 
Spanish ports.64  General Franco’s National government announced its intention of halting the 
flow of arms and matériel through the port of Barcelona on 17 November 1936, noticing that: 
 
The National Government, being resolved to prevent this traffic 
with every means of war at its disposal will even go so far, if this 
were necessary, to destroy that port.  Therefore, it warns all foreign 
ships anchored in that harbor of the desirability of abandoning it in 
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a very short time to avoid the consequences of damage which, 
unintentionally, might be caused to them on the occasion of the 
military action referred to of which no further warning will be 
given.65 
 
In addition to these declared war zones, the parties also sowed mines in Spanish 
territorial seas and the adjacent high seas, the fourth form of interference with foreign 
shipping.66  In September 1936, the Spanish Republican government sowed mines in the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Bay of Biscay.67  The Nationalist forces relied on assistance from 
German submarines to sow mines in Spanish waters.68  These mining efforts proved relatively 
fruitless, with the Republican mines destroying or damaging only three vessels inside the 
three-mile territorial sea and damaging one vessel on the high seas,69 while Nationalist mines 
damaged five merchant vessels in Spanish territorial waters, having no impact on the supply 
of Soviet matériel to the Republican forces, which the mines were intended to reduce.70    
A final form of interference with neutral shipping concerned aerial bombardment of 
foreign merchant and naval vessels.71  These aerial attacks were made without warning and 
without any effort being made to visit and search the vessel in question either at sea or 
following a diversion to port.72  Britain, France, Germany and Italy all ordered their warships 
in the vicinity to fire upon any aircraft bombing their respective merchant vessels outside the 
three-mile limit.73  
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B. Non-Intervention System and 1937 Nyon Agreement 
 
Britain, France, Germany and Italy established an international non-intervention 
system in September 1936 in response to this interference.74  As part of this scheme, which 
functioned until it was abandoned in July 1938, these four major European powers concluded 
two agreements on 12 June 1937 for protecting their ships and providing for consultation in 
the event of future attacks.75  These agreements, which were undertaken between the four 
western powers, on the one hand, and each of the Spanish parties acting separately, on the 
other hand, collapsed in the wake of the failure of the western powers to agree on what course 
of action should be taken after the German cruiser Leipzig was torpedoed and because the 
Spanish Republican government eventually rejected the guarantee proposals.76 
In light of the increased aerial attacks in the summer of 1937, coupled with the 
continuing threat from submarines, an international conference was convened in Nyon in 
September 1937.  The 1937 Nyon Agreement77 and the Agreement Supplementary to the 
Nyon Agreement,78 established a scheme which has been characterised by Fenrick as a 
“reverse exclusion zone.”79  The 1937 Nyon Agreement and 1937 Nyon Supplementary 
Agreement were designed to protect “all merchant ships not belonging to either of the 
conflicting Spanish parties,”80 and specifically referred to the submarine attacks as acts of 
piracy.81  The 1937 Nyon Agreement contains several provisions.  First, any submarine that 
attacks a merchant vessel contrary to the 1930 London Naval Treaty or the 1936 London 
London Protocol was to be attacked.82  Second, any submarine encountered in the vicinity 
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where a neutral merchant ship had recently been attacked contrary to the London rules would 
“give valid reasons for the belief that the submarine was guilty of the attack” thereby 
justifying the targeting of the submarine.83  Third, in order to facilitate this arrangement, the 
parties divided the Mediterranean Sea into patrol zones.84  Fourth, to avoid “friendly fire,” the 
parties agreed not to send their own submarines into the Mediterranean Sea without prior 
notification intra partes or in specially reserved exercise areas in that sea pursuant to an 
annex.85  Fifth, the parties agreed to advise their merchant shipping to follow certain shipping 
routes in the Mediterranean Sea.86 Moreover, in the Supplementary Agreement, the parties 
agreed to open fire on any aircraft committing an attack on merchant shipping and to 
intervene in any attack committed against such merchant vessels by surface ships.87 
Thus, the western naval powers established an International Naval Patrol designed to 
protect all non-Spanish merchant vessels in the Mediterranean from unlawful attacks, 
primarily by submarines.  On 2 February 1938, the British, French and Italian governments 
jointly decided that the warships of the International Naval Patrol should be authorised to 
attack (and destroy if possible) any submerged submarine encountered in their respective 
zones.88  Thus, by 3 February 1938, the entire western Mediterranean Sea was a vast anti-
submarine exclusion zone, although the International Naval Patrol engaged no submarines 
after that date.89  Of course, given the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean Sea at that 
time, no nation could challenge the combined naval power of the British, French and Italian 
navies. 
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IV. World War II 
 
A. The War in the Atlantic 
 
 It has been argued that the Second World War was merely the final chapter of the First 
World War, and the naval tactics employed by the belligerents in the Atlantic certainly proves 
this point.90  Almost immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities, Great Britain resumed 
economic warfare on the seas against Germany, using many of the same tactics employed 
during the First World War.  For example, shortly after the war started, the Admiralty armed 
its merchant vessels, placed many of them under convoy, required them to announce sightings 
of submarines and on 1 October 1939, announced that all British merchant vessels had been 
ordered to ram German U-Boats if possible.91  Moreover, as was done in World War I, Britain 
and France announced on 27 November and 28 November 1939, respectively, a long distance 
blockade of German ports and the ports of any territory occupied by Germany, based on 
belligerent reprisals.92   
On 24 December 1939, the British Admiralty also noticed its intent to begin laying 
mines in the North Sea off the east coast of England and Scotland, on the grounds that the 
Germans laid automatic moored mines in that area outside British territorial waters without 
providing adequate notice.93  This minefield, known as the East Coast Mine Barrage, is 
depicted in Map 7. 
Moreover, on 8 May 1940, the Royal Navy established a small exclusion zone in the 
Skaggerak for part of the war and within this zone all ships were to be sunk on sight during 
the night.94  In July 1940, the British Admiralty proposed the establishment of a war zone off 
the coasts of northern Europe and northwest Africa up to a width of 300 nautical miles.95  
Although a proposal to sink neutral ships entering this zone was rejected by the British 
                                                
 
90
  In general, see ibid., pp. 57-64. 
 
91
  Dönitz Judgement p. 558. 
 
92
  Hackworth, VII Digest of International Law, 138-140.  For the U.S. position on these long distance 
blockades, see Hackworth, VII Digest of International Law, pp. 140-141; 1939 ILS, pp. 20-24.  See also 
Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals (1971), pp. 115-160; Tucker, pp. 312-315; Goldie, pp. 180-181.  
See also Note on Belligerent Reprisals, Chapter 6.  
 
93
  Hackworth, VI Digest of International Law, p. 510.  On mine warfare in World War II generally, see 
Busuttil, pp. 34-37; Politakis, pp. 188-189. 
 
94
  Dönitz Judgement, p. 559.  See also Mallison, pp. 86-87. 
 
95
  Politakis, pp. 59-60.   
Chapter Two: Naval Exclusion Zones: An Historical Survey 
Mundis 68 
Government, the war cabinet did agree that any ship in this area that was not certified 
(“navicerted”) would be liable to seizure.96   
 
  
 
 The United States took two important steps during 1939 as a result of the increased 
danger to shipping in the Atlantic, in order to minimise the possibility of U.S. involvement 
and mindful of the events that occurred during World War I.  First, on 4 November 1939, 
President Roosevelt declared a large area of the Eastern Atlantic Ocean to be a combat area.97  
All U.S. citizens, ships and aircraft were prohibited from entering this area, as the President 
made clear in a press release issued at the same time that he signed the proclamation: 
 
From now on, no American ships may go to belligerent ports, 
British, French and German, in Europe or Africa as far south as the 
Canary Islands.  This is laid down in the law and there is no 
discretion in the matter.98 
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This declaration was “readily propagated by the Germans as a tacit consent to the practice of 
free-fire zones,” and has been cited as a contributing factor in their decision to engage in 
unrestricted submarine warfare.99   
Second, a number of States in the Western Hemisphere adopted the Declaration of 
Panama on 3 October 1939, establishing a neutrality zone around the western hemisphere, 
excluding Canada.100  This zone was defined by straight baselines extending roughly 300 
miles out to sea.101  Pursuant to detailed regulations issued by the Inter-American Neutrality 
Committee in April 1940, the belligerents were prohibited from “any hostile, detention, 
capture or pursuit, the discharge of projectiles, the placing of mines of any kind, or any 
operation of war” in the zone.102  Although this neutrality zone eventually became effective, it 
did not have a “sound basis in traditional law” and has been “universally rejected by the 
analysis of the law of war.”103  Moreover, although the creation of the neutrality zone certainly 
interfered with belligerent rights on the high seas, none of the belligerents vigorously 
protested its establishment, largely on political grounds.104  The most striking example of a 
challenge to this zone came with the Graf Spee incident off the coast of Uruguay in December 
1939.105  
In late 1939 and into early 1940 the German Navy took several steps in response to 
these Allied acts.  First, by October 1939, the German U-Boat command was ordered to attack 
all armed enemy merchant vessels without warning and on sight.106  Second, on 24 November 
1939, the Germans issued a warning to neutral shipping that the safety of neutral vessels in 
the waters around the British Isles and the French coast could no longer be guaranteed as a 
result of the engagements occurring between German U-Boats and armed Allied merchant 
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vessels.107  Third, on 1 January 1940, based on German intelligence that the Greek 
government was aware that Greek shipping companies were chartered by England, Hitler 
ordered the German U-Boat command to attack all Greek merchant vessels in a zone around 
the United Kingdom (that was contiguous with the 1939 U.S. Combat Area) and all merchant 
vessels in the Bristol Channel.108  Five days later, further orders extended unrestricted 
submarine warfare in a defined area of the North Sea, including the waters Northeast of 
Scotland, the Orkneys and the Shetlands.109  On 18 January 1940, U-Boats were authorised to 
sink without warning all ships (excluding U.S., Italian, Japanese and Soviet vessels) “in those 
waters near the enemy coast in which the use of mines can be pretended.”110  Early on in the 
submarine campaign, the German Navy was under orders to comply with international law 
concerning rescue of shipwrecked individuals, as far as militarily possible.  In 1942, however, 
following the sinking of the Laconia and American air attacks on submarines attempting to 
assist the shipwrecked, Admiral Dönitz issued an order to the effect that: 
 
The rescue of members of the crew of a ship sunk is not to be 
attempted.  Rescue is contradictory to the most primitive demands 
of warfare, which are the annihilation of enemy ships and crews.111 
 
By May 1940, neutral shipping was excluded from an area extending 60 to 100 miles 
off the French and British coasts and only passenger vessels and merchant ships of those 
neutral states considered friendly to Germany were permitted to enter these waters.112  The 
Germans declared an extensive operational area (which coincided with the 1939 U.S. Combat 
Area) on 17 August 1940, which was notified to all neutral maritime states except the United 
States in light of that country’s neutrality legislation.113   
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In the sea area surrounding the British Isles constant war action is 
consequently from now on to be expected which makes it 
impossible for merchant ships to pass through this area without 
running serious risks.  The entire area around the British Isles has 
therefore become a combat zone.  Every ship which sails in this 
area exposes itself to destruction not only by mines but also by 
other combat means.  Therefore, the German Government once 
more urgently warns against entering this endangered area.114 
 
The total area subject to the German operational area amounted to some 795,000 square 
miles.115   
 For the remainder of the war in the Atlantic, these zones remained intact with two 
important expansions.  First, following the U.S. entry into the war in December 1941, the 
Germans expanded the zone announced in August 1940 to include most of the Atlantic Ocean 
and up to the East Coast of the U.S.  In broadcasting this expansion, the Germans stated that:  
 
Every ship entering this zone after June 26, 1942, will expose itself 
to destruction. … The German Government, therefore, warns all 
ships against navigating in this danger zone…116   
 
Second, on 15 February 1944, the British Admiralty declared an additional area “dangerous” 
to shipping.  This area included virtually the entire Bay of Biscay and blocked the southern 
end of St. George’s Channel between Ireland and Wales.  Any vessel entering this area 
without the express authority of the British Admiralty did so at her own peril.117  Map 8 shows 
the full extent of naval minefields in British waters during the final year of World War II. 
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B. The War in the Pacific 
 
With respect to the war in the Pacific, the United States Navy waged “an extremely 
successful unrestricted anti-shipping campaign against Japanese sea communications.”118  
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States declared an exclusion zone covering 
the entire Pacific Ocean and all non-allied shipping was attacked.119  Although the Pacific 
Ocean encompasses 69,000,000 square miles and stretches from the Arctic Circle to 
Antarctica,120 Goldie has pointed out the obvious, namely that:   
 
An announcement of indiscriminate sinking by submarines in such 
a vast area may not, it is suggested, reasonably be regarded as the 
enforcement of a maritime exclusion zone, except by a naval 
service many times larger than the enormous force that the United 
States Navy deployed there.121 
 
As a result, despite the announcement by the U.S. Government that the entire Pacific Ocean 
was an exclusion zone, the “areas of actual attack tended to be where concentrations of 
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Japanese shipping were to be found and where the submarines were ordered.”122  It was 
argued before the Nürnberg Tribunal that the area actively patrolled by the U.S. Navy in the 
Pacific Ocean was approximately 30 million square miles.123  Morever, very little non-neutral 
shipping occurred in these waters while the war in the Pacific was being fought.   
At the trial of German Admiral Dönitz before the IMT, the defence introduced written 
interrogatories of U.S. Fleet Admiral Chester M. Nimitz regarding the scope of U.S. naval 
operations in this zone.124  According to Fleet Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Harold R. Stark, the 
U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, ordered unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan on 7 
December 1941.125  With the exception of allied merchantmen, hospital ships and other 
vessels under “safe conduct” voyages for humanitarian purposes, submarines attacked all 
merchant vessels without warning.126  Like many allied merchant vessels in the Atlantic, 
Japanese merchantmen were usually armed and, given the opportunity to do so, attacked U.S. 
submarines by ramming, gunfire or depth charges, and it quickly became apparent to U.S. 
officials that Japanese merchant vessels were reporting U.S. submarine sightings to Japanese 
warships.127   Fleet Admiral Nimitz also stated that in general, U.S. submariners did not rescue 
enemy survivors if “undue additional hazard to the submarine resulted or the submarine 
would thereby be prevented from accomplishing its further mission,” although on many 
occasions rubber boats and/or provisions were provided.128 
 The United Sates also waged an extensive mine warfare campaign against the 
Japanese throughout the Pacific Ocean and a number of Asian coastlines and ports were 
mined.129  Among these mining operations was “Operation Starvation,” which, as its name 
suggests, was designed to push the Japanese “to the brink of starvation and capitulation” 
through the mining of Japanese ports and harbours.130 
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 It should also be noted, for the sake of completeness concerning the establishment of 
zones, that a few days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt established 
several “naval defensive sea areas” along the U.S. coasts, similar to those imposed by 
President Wilson in 1917.131 
 
V. The Korean War132 
 
 Since neither North Korea nor China had any significant naval capabilities, NEZs as 
such were not employed during the Korean War.  Rather, the defining aspect of the naval 
component of that conflict was the use of a close blockade, “a method of economic warfare 
considered obsolete because it was essentially unpractised during the two World Wars.”133  
The 1909 London Declaration, which laid down rules to be applied by the International Prize 
Court envisioned by the 1907 Hague Convention XII, contains 21 articles governing the law 
of blockade.134   
 On 4 July 1950, the United States imposed a blockade off the Korean coast, 
broadcasting to all shipping in the Pacific Ocean that: 
 
The President of the United States, in keeping with the United 
Nations Security Council’s request for support to the Republic of 
Korea in repelling the Northern Korean invaders and restoring 
peace in Korea, has ordered a naval blockade of the Korean 
coast.135 
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Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, then U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, stated that all warships, 
except those of North Korea, not under the command of the United Nations, would be 
permitted to enter North Korean ports, while all other types of ships were barred.136  Although 
both the Soviet Union and China denounced the blockade, and refused to acknowledge its 
legality, both States observed it.137   
 In September 1950, the U.N. naval forces began enforcing a restriction on fishing by 
North Korean vessels,138 notwithstanding the fact that fish was the main staple of the Korean 
diet139 and that the 1907 Hague Convention XI prohibited the capture as prizes of war of 
coastal fishing vessels.140  In less than one year, 213 North Korean fishing vessels were 
destroyed, 147 were damaged and nine were captured.141  Although many of the “fishing 
vessels” were actually engaged in mine laying in the blockaded waters,142 and hence were 
legitimate military objects, Fenrick’s conclusion regarding this aspect of the naval war is 
worthy of note: 
 
To the extent that the anti-fishing campaign was conducted to 
destroy the fishing industry and impose additional logistical 
burdens on the enemy, it would appear to have been a military 
failure which merely increased the total suffering of the civilian 
population.143 
 
 Naval mine warfare played a limited role in the Korean War, unlike the situation that 
had existed in the Second World War in the Pacific.144 
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VI. The Vietnam War 
 
 During the Vietnam War, there were two naval operations, Operation Market Time 
and the Yankee and Dixie Stations Carrier Operations, which do not meet the definition of 
NEZs as used in the present work, but which nevertheless merit discussion.  The United 
States and South Vietnam also mined the entrances to North Vietnamese ports from 11 May 
1972 until U.S. forces left Vietnam nine months later.   
 
A. Operation Market Time145 
 
On 27 April 1965, the Republic of Vietnam promulgated a Decree on Sea 
Surveillance,146 which closely mirrored the terms of the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law 
of the Sea.147  Pursuant to this decree, the three-mile breadth of the South Vietnamese 
territorial sea was declared a “defensive sea area,” and any vessel transiting this water, which 
was prejudicial to the peace, order or security of the Republic of Vietnam was not considered 
innocent.  Ships that were not engaged in innocent passage were subject to visit and search 
and possibly arrest and disposition.148  Five categories of cargo were specifically listed as 
being suspect, including weapons, ammunition, explosives, certain chemical products, and 
medical supplies and foodstuffs of communist-bloc nations.149 
In the contiguous zone extending up to twelve miles from the baseline from which the 
South Vietnamese territorial seas were measured, additional conditions were placed on 
transiting vessels.  Vessels transiting this contiguous zone were subjected to the control of 
South Vietnam with respect to customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary regulations.  Vessels 
suspected of infringing such regulations were subject to visit and search “and may be subject 
to arrest and disposition, as provided by the law of the Republic of Vietnam in conformity 
with accepted principles of international law.”150  
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 Vessels suspected of infringing the terms of the decree were subject to hot pursuit on 
the high seas as provided for by international law.151  The Republic of Vietnam acknowledged 
in the decree that it had “requested and obtained the assistance” of the U.S. Navy in carrying 
out the enforcement of the security and defence measures set forth in the decree.152 
 
B. Yankee and Dixie Stations Carrier Operations 
  
Beginning in 1965, the U.S. Navy began launching carrier-based air attacks on North 
Vietnam from operational areas, known as the Yankee and Dixie Stations, on the high seas in 
the Gulf of Tonkin.  Although these operations were initially conceptualised to fill the gap 
created by the lack of secure air bases in the Republic of Vietnam, and notwithstanding the 
fact that North Vietnam was unable to conduct effective operations against the carriers, the 
U.S. claimed sanctuary status for these areas.153  Under this theory, the high seas could be 
used to mount offensive attacks against the mainland, but that retaliation against the sea-based 
platforms was unacceptable.  O’Connell rejects this approach: 
 
It seems to be implied that the high seas is a sanctuary in limited 
operations, from which offensive action can be mounted without 
any right in the coastal State to retaliate against the launching 
vessels.  International law in this case would seem to be used to 
rationalize and justify a course of action which was not likely to 
meet serious challenge in the counsels of nations.  It is by no 
means certain that the argument could be advanced with the same 
cogency in the case of the Mediterranean.154 
 
Fenrick, however, takes a slightly different view, arguing that an assessment of whether or not 
the sanctuary approach is accepted depends on further examples of State acquiescence in 
cases where the coastal State clearly has the means to strike back at the launching vessels.155 
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C. The Mining of North Vietnamese Ports 
 
 The vast majority of North Vietnam’s arms and military supplies were imported by sea 
and the major port of entry was Haiphong.156  When the Easter offensive commenced on 30 
March 1972, it was estimated that North Vietnam had adequate ammunition and supplies to 
last approximately four months, although about 40 merchant vessels called on North 
Vietnamese ports monthly.157  On 8 May 1972, after the fifth week of this campaign, the 
Nixon administration announced that effective 11 May 1972, South Vietnamese and 
American naval forces would begin mining the entrances to North Vietnamese ports as a form 
of collective self-defence.158  In a nationally-televised address, President Nixon announced 
that: 
 
All entrances to North Vietnamese ports will be mined to prevent 
access to these ports and North Vietnamese naval operations from 
these ports.  United States forces have been directed to take 
appropriate measures within the internal and claimed territorial 
waters of North Vietnam to interdict the delivery of any supplies.159 
 
U.S. naval forces began immediately mining the internal waters and claimed territorial waters 
leading to North Vietnamese ports.160  This blockade remained in effect for nine months until 
U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam.  No foreign merchant vessels were sunk by the 
minefields and although five merchantmen got underway within the three-day waiting period, 
27 other vessels were blocked in Haiphong Harbour by the minefields until the blockade was 
lifted.161  Neither South Vietnam nor the United States formally declared these actions to be a 
blockade, relying instead on collective self-defence.  Nevertheless, according to Fenrick, these 
operations meet the classic criteria for a close blockade.162    
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VII. The Arab-Israeli Conflicts163 
 
 The Arab-Israeli conflicts between 1948 and 1979 included a relatively limited naval 
component.  The most important aspect of this naval activity concerned economic warfare 
waged from the sea, including the closure of the Suez Canal and the blockade measures in the 
Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran and Bab-al-Mandeb.164  These economic measures 
continued to apply more or less consistently throughout the period from 1948 through 1979, 
notwithstanding various periods of armistice or suspension of hostilities on the grounds that 
the Egyptians considered a state of war to exist vis-à-vis Israel during that entire period.165 
 With respect to the Suez Canal, the Egyptian authorities issued a military order for the 
inspection of all vessels in the ports of Alexandria, Port Said and Suez immediately after 
Israel declared its independence.166  Shortly thereafter, a prize court was established and all 
ships transiting the canal were inspected with goods destined for or exported from Israel 
seized.167  From its establishment through 1977, this prize court rendered 581 prize 
decisions.168  The Security Council condemned Egypt’s actions in 1951, finding that in light of 
the fact that an armistice had been in effect for more than two and a half years, Egypt could 
not rely on a state of belligerency to justify the right of visit, search and seizure.169 
 The Egyptians also hindered freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the 
Straits of Tiran from 1948-1956, when the Israelis gained control over the chokepoint to the 
Gulf of Aqaba following the 1956 Suez Crisis.  Shortly thereafter, United Nations 
peacekeeping forces (UNEF), stationed at Sharm-el-Sheikh, controlled these waters until 
being expelled in 1967.  Egypt again controlled the chokepoint and a blockade was in effect 
from 23 May 1967 until Israeli forces recaptured Sharm-el-Sheikh on the third day of the Six 
Days War.  From 7 June 1967 onwards, the Straits of Tiran were open to international 
shipping, a situation later reflected in the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.170   
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 During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Strait of Bab-al-Mandeb, connecting the 
Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, Egyptian naval forces imposed a long distance blockade with 
the goal of impeding traffic to Eilat.171  This blockade was in effect until mid-December 1973, 
and resulted in some 12 vessels being blocked at Eilat and a further 11 vessels destined for 
Eilat being forced to return to Bab-al-Mandeb.172  The legality of this blockade, being some 
1200 miles below the Strait of Tiran, is debatable, in part because the Egyptians apparently 
lacked the confidence in their ability to maintain a totally effective blockade.173   
 
VIII. The Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1965 and 1971174 
 
 India and Pakistan fought two short wars over the disputed province of Kashmir in 
1965 and 1971, and although these conflicts were fought primarily on land and in the air, both 
had naval components.  The 1965 war consisted of two main periods of engagement: a 
Pakistanti armoured thrust into Indian territory in the Rann of Kutch in spring 1965 that was 
designed to lure the Indian Army away from northern India and Kashmir and to gauge the 
U.S. response;175 and a lengthier conflict that ran from August through December 1965, and 
which included naval action, when Pakistani warships shelled the Indian coastal city of 
Dwarka.176  According to a retired Indian Navy Vice Admiral, the Indian Navy was ordered 
not to take aggressive action against the Pakistani naval forces because New Delhi wanted to 
confine the conflict to land and in the air.177   
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 The naval component of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War was short but intense, with the 
Indian Navy establishing complete domination of the sea due to its quantitative (ten to one) 
and qualitative (one aircraft carrier and several missile boats) superiority over its Pakistani 
counterpart.178  The Indian Navy was divided into two forces, the Eastern Naval Command, 
which operated in the Bay of Bengal and blockaded East Pakistan, and the Western Naval 
Command, which operated in the Arabian Sea and was principally responsible for destroying 
naval targets and military facilities in the Port of Karachi and its environs.179  The Indian Navy 
launched attacks in the Karachi area, during which Pakistan suffered several losses and at 
least three neutral vessels were hit.180   
 The Indian Government announced a blockade of East Pakistan on 4 December 1971, 
covering a 180-nautical mile range from a point situated between the Malta and Passur Rivers 
eastward to the Burma East Pakistan border.181  Several Indian warships, including the aircraft 
carrier Vikrant enforced the blockade, which was relatively effective.  Six merchantmen and 
several smaller ships were captured, others were sunk for failing to surrender and only one or 
two ships were believed to have run the blockade.182  Due to the short duration of the conflict, 
no prize courts were ever established.  In addition, although ten Pakistani-flagged merchant 
ships were captured on the high seas by Indian ships operating in the western front, Pakistan 
did not interfere with Indian merchant shipping during the war.183 
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IX. The 1982 Falkland Islands War 
 
A. Background and Introduction 
 
 Title to the Falkland Islands has been in dispute for centuries, with Britain’s claim 
dating to 1833 on the basis of prescription and Argentina’s claim dating to 1816, as successor 
to the Spanish claim of sovereignty.184  With the exception of the two-month period when 
Argentina controlled the Falklands during the 1982 war, the islands have been administered 
continuously by Great Britain.  The two main islands, East and West Falkland, lie 400 miles 
east of Argentina and cover approximately 4300 square miles and there are about 1800 
inhabitants, 1000 of whom live in the capitol, Stanley.  South Georgia Island and the South 
Sandwich Islands, which lie 780 miles and 1180 miles respectively east of the Falkland 
Islands, and both of which are virtually unpopulated, are also administered by Great Britain. 
 The Falklands War,185 which began when Argentine forces invaded the Falkland 
Islands on 1-2 April 1982, has been described by Fenrick as a “freak of history.”186  
Notwithstanding this assessment, there were four features of the Falklands War that make that 
conflict particularly important from the point of view of military history.  Namely, the 
Falklands War involved: 
• The first use of modern cruise missiles against the warships of a 
major navy; 
 
• The first use of nuclear-powered submarines in combat; 
 
• The first known use of Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing 
(V/STOL) aircraft in combat; and 
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• The first time since World War II that sustained air attacks were 
conducted against naval forces.187 
 
To this list must be added four additional important issues for the law of naval warfare:  
• The extensive use of exclusion zones,  
 
• The rules of engagement in effect throughout the war;  
 
• The sinking of the Argentine cruiser Belgrano outside of such a 
zone; and 
 
• The legality of the use of naval cruise missiles.188   
 
After briefly discussing the Falklands War in general, the focus of the present discussion will 
be on the first three legal issues, with a detailed discussion of the various zones and rules of 
engagement in effect.  Because there is significant overlap between the use of NEZs and the 
rules of engagement, these topics will be considered together whenever possible.189 
 Notwithstanding slight overlaps, the Falklands War may be conveniently divided into 
three phases: the Argentine invasion and initial British reaction (1-29 April 1982); the naval 
war (29 April-21 May 1982); and the British invasion and recapture of the Falklands (21 
May-14 June 1982).  The first phase of the war consisted of the Argentine invasion of the 
Falklands and the surrender of the islands within a few hours of the invasion.  Within three 
days of the invasion, the British secured a Security Council Resolution calling for the 
immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces,190 the United Kingdom issued an order 
requisitioning merchant ships, and a naval task force, “Operation Corporate,” departed 
Portsmouth for the South Atlantic.  During this period the Argentines consolidated their 
positions and brought in reinforcements, while the British fleet steamed southward and efforts 
were underway to re-fit merchant vessels for military cargo purposes.191  The first exclusion 
zone was announced by the British on 7 April, with effect from 11 April (local time)192, a date 
                                                
 
187
  U.S. Navy, “Lessons of the Falklands: Summary Report,” (1983), p. 23, cited in Fenrick Falklands, at p. 
30, footnote 3.  
 
188
  Fenrick Falklands, p. 36.  The use of naval cruise missiles is beyond the scope of the present work.  See 
ibid., p. 49, footnotes 68-70; O’Connell Contemporary Naval Operations, pp. 61-67; Busuttil, pp. 187-
207; Pocar. 
 
189
  See Introduction, Note on Rules of Engagement. 
 
190
  UN Doc. S/RES/502 (1982). 
 
191
  It should be noted that the South Georgia Islands were re-taken by the British on 25 April 1982.  See 
UN Doc. S/14944 and S/15002 (1982), reprinted in “United Kingdom Materials on International Law 
1982,” 53 British YBIL (1983), p. 541 and Middlebrook, pp. 103-113.   
 
192
  The zone was to take effect on 12 April 1982 at 0400 GMT (Zulu).  To avoid confusion, all dates and 
Chapter Two: Naval Exclusion Zones: An Historical Survey 
Mundis 84 
undoubtedly selected in anticipation of the arrival of the first Royal Navy submarine, which 
arrived near the Falklands the following day, 12 April.193  On 15 April 1982, the Argentine 
Navy announced that it had mined the waters off Port Stanley.194 
 The second phase of the war was characterised by naval warfare, including extensive 
air attacks on the Royal Navy by the Argentine Air Force.  The Royal Navy task force arrived 
off the coast of the Falkland Islands on 29 April 1982 and on the same day Argentina declared 
a 200-nautical mile zone around the islands, effective the same day.195  Britain followed suit 
the next day, declaring a total exclusion zone around the islands.  On 1 May, British air strikes 
began, including a long-range attack from an Ascension Island-based Vulcan bomber, which 
bombed the airfields at Port Stanley and Goose Green.  At about the same time the San Luis, 
an Argentine submarine, fired an unknown number of torpedoes at several British ships, and 
then escaped.  The next day the naval war escalated as the General Belgrano became the first 
warship to be sunk by submarine in the post-World War II era.  During the first three weeks in 
May, the Royal Navy suffered loss or damage to six frigates or destroyers, all hit with either 
air-launched Exocet missiles or bombs, while the Argentines lost several vessels, including a 
cutter, intelligence-gathering trawler, tugboat and a transport ship.  In addition, both sides 
suffered the loss of several aircraft. 
 The British landing and recapture of the Falkland and South Georgia Islands marked 
the third phase of the campaign, which commenced with the landing of 2500 British marines 
and soldiers at various locations near Port San Carlos, East Falkland Island at 0340 hours on 
21 May 1982.196  Over the course of the next four days following the commencement of the 
British landings, the Argentine Air Force launched an all-out attempt to destroy the Royal 
Navy fleet, with five more British ships being struck by bombs and one hit by an Exocet.  By 
the end of May the British forces had recaptured Goose Green, Darwin and several other 
locations.  In the final week of the campaign, 7-14 June 1982, three more Royal Navy vessels 
were struck, two LSTs off-loading troops at Bluff Cove and one guided missile destroyer, 
which was hit by a land-based Exocet.  On 11-12 June and again on 13-14 June Royal 
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Marines and British Army forces attacked Argentine positions in Port Stanley and Argentine 
forces on the Falkland Islands formally surrendered at 0859 hours on 14 June 1982.  
Diplomatic and other relations were not normalised until February 1990, however.197  Map 9 
presents an overview of the Falklands War with the main exclusion zones delineated. 
 
 
 
 
Map 9 The Falklands War: An Overview 
Source: Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands 
 
 
 
B. Naval Exclusion Zones in the Falklands War198 
 
 Given the short duration of the Falklands War, the tit-for-tat announcements of ever 
expanding exclusion zones, with Argentina responding to the British announcement of zones 
with zones of their own, was remarkable.  As Fenrick notes, “The rationale for these zones is 
difficult to determine; presumably they were intended to provide a visible manifestation of 
both sides’ conscious efforts to limit the scope of the conflict.”199  Nevertheless, throughout 
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the ten-week war, seven zones would be established, in addition to a hospital ship zone and a 
zone established by Britain around the islands after the conflict was over.   
 
1. British Maritime Exclusion Zone announced 7 April 1982 
 On 7 April 1982, as the ships of Operation Corporate were steaming towards the South 
Atlantic, the British Government announced that a 200 nautical-mile maritime exclusion zone 
(“MEZ”) was to be established around the Falkland Islands as of 12 April.200  The British 
Government informed the Security Council of the establishment of the MEZ on 9 April 
1982,201 describing the MEZ as follows:  
 
From 0400 Greenwich Mean Time on Monday 12 April 1982, a 
maritime exclusion zone will be established around the Falkland 
Islands.  The outer limit of this zone is a circle of 200 nautical mile 
radius from 51° 40΄S, 59° 30΄W, which is approximately the centre 
of the Falkland Islands.  From the time indicated, any Argentine 
warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries found within this zone 
will be treated as hostile and are liable to be attacked by British 
forces.  This measure is without prejudice to the right of the United 
Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in 
exercise of its right of self-defence, under Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter.  
 
The MEZ was directed solely at Argentine naval vessels and did not apply to Argentine 
merchant vessels or aircraft, including military aircraft. 
 Argentina responded to this announced zone by declaring it a blockade, with the 
consequence that it was illegal as an act of aggression pursuant to Article 3(c) of General 
Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.202  Britain denied that this act 
constituted a blockade, on the grounds that the measures fell short of the concept as 
understand under international law, that such a claim was irrelevant since the territory 
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enclosed by the zone was British, and on the grounds that Argentina had been the first State to 
use force in the conflict.203 
 At this point, the British rules of engagement did not allow British forces to attack an 
Argentine vessel prior to entering the MEZ, unless British forces were themselves attacked, in 
which case they were permitted to respond in self-defence using “minimum force.”204  These 
rules would change slightly with the announcement of the “Defensive Bubble Zone” again 
shortly before the British fleet entered the Total Exclusion Zone, when Admiral Woodward’s 
forces would be permitted “open fire on any combat ship or aircraft in that Zone identified as 
Argentenian,” once the Royal Navy fleet was inside the zone.205 
 
2. Argentine Maritime Zone announced 8 April 1982 
 On the day after Great Britain announced the MEZ, Argentina responded by declaring 
a 200 nautical mile maritime zone (“MZ”) around the Falkland Islands, Georgia Islands and 
Argentine coast.  Due to the inclusion of the Argentine coast, and the points from which this 
zone were drawn, it was slightly larger than the British MEZ, extending roughly 60 miles 
further off the coast of the Falkland Islands.206  Argentina warned England that within this 
entire theatre of operations, military action in self-defence could be taken as necessary.207  
 
3. British “Defensive Bubble” Zone announced 23 April 1982 
 Approximately one week before the Royal Navy task force arrived off the Falkland 
Islands, the British Government established (on 23 April 1982) what have been termed 
“Defensive Bubble Zones” or a cordon sanitaire, around the ships, naval auxiliaries and 
military aircraft making up the task force.208  In informing the Security Council of this action 
the following day, the Permanent Representative of the U.K. to the U.N. wrote: 
 
Her Majesty’s Government now wishes to make clear that any 
approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, 
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naval auxiliaries, or military aircraft which could amount to a 
threat to interfere with the mission of the British forces in the 
South Atlantic, will encounter the appropriate response.  All 
Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaging in surveillance 
of these British forces will be regarded as hostile and are liable to 
be dealt with accordingly.209 
 
This “Defensive Bubble Zone” differed from the MEZ in that it set no geographic limits and 
because it specifically included civilian aircraft engaged in tracking the British fleet.210  
 
4. British Total Exclusion Zone announced 28 April 1982  
 Upon the arrival of the British fleet in the waters off the Falklands Island, Great 
Britain again revised its zone policy, announcing a Total Exclusion Zone (“TEZ”) effective 
30 April 1982.  The precise boundaries of the TEZ were the same as those for the MEZ 
announced on 8 April.  However, as from 1100 GMT on 30 April 1982:  
 
[T]he exclusion zone will apply not only to Argentine warships and 
Argentine naval auxiliaries but also to any other ship, whether 
naval or merchant vessel, which is operating in support of the 
illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine forces.  The 
exclusion zone will also apply to any aircraft, whether military or 
civil, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation.  Any 
ship and any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is found 
within this zone without due authority from the Ministry of 
Defence in London will be regarded as operating in support of the 
illegal occupation and will therefore be regarded as hostile and will 
be liable to be attacked by the British forces.211 
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Admiral Woodward, the Falklands Battle Group Commander.  In his memoirs, Admiral Woodward 
describes how a Boeing 707 in Argentine Air Force regalia, began tracking the fleet on 21 April 1982.  
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It seemed to me that this sort of thing could not be allowed to continue, so I 
‘tweaked’ Fleet Headquarters in Northwood to leak information that we now 
had instructions to shoot the Burglar down in the hope that this might put him 
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that—a) he came within a certain specific range limit, and b) we had positive 
identification that he was, indeed, the Burglar. 
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 Simultaneously, Britain announced that Port Stanley airfield was closed 
(notwithstanding the fact that the airfield was controlled by Argentine forces) and that any 
aircraft on the ground in the Falkland Islands were to be regarded as “present in support of the 
illegal occupation” and also liable to attack.212  Moreover, as with the announcements of the 
other zones, the British authorities specifically stated that this action was without prejudice to 
their right to take any further self-defence measures necessary pursuant to Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter.213  
 In defending the use of the TEZ, the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Francis Pym, 
stated that “the Falkland Islands is a British possession and we intend to enforce a total 
exclusion zone.”214 
 
5. Argentine Strengthened Maritime Zone announced 29 April 1982 
 On 29 April 1982, apparently in response to the announcement of the British TEZ the 
preceding day, Argentina strengthened its position with respect to the Maritime Zone it had 
announced on 8 April 1982.  Argentina asserted that all waters within its Maritime Zone were 
Argentine and that all British vessels, whether naval or merchant, and all British aircraft 
entering the zone would be subject to attack.215 
 
6. British Policy Statement announced 7 May 1982 
 In line with their previous statements that they reserved the right to take additional 
steps in self-defence, the British Ministry of Defence released a press statement on 7 May 
1982 warning Argentina that: 
 
[A]ny Argentine warship or military aircraft which are found more 
than 12 nautical miles from the Argentine coast will be regarded as 
hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.216 
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It is important to note that although this policy greatly expanded the geographic area of the 
TEZ, it was also limited to warships or military aircraft.  Thus, in effect there were two 
overlapping British exclusion zones operating simultaneously.  Any Argentine naval vessel or 
military aircraft travelling more than 12 miles from the Argentine coast would be subject to 
attack, as would any vessel or aircraft—military or civilian, Argentine or neutral—which was 
in the TEZ and “operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands by the 
Argentine forces.”  
 
7. Argentine South Atlantic War Zone announced 11 May 1982 
 Quite predictably, in light of their previous responses to the announcement of British 
zones, the Argentine authorities declared the entire South Atlantic to be a war zone on 11 May 
1982.  Pursuant to this declaration, any British vessel found therein would be subject to 
immediate attack.217 
 
8. “Red Cross Box” 
 A final point worthy of note was the use of the so-called “Red Cross Box” during the 
Falklands War.218  At the suggestion of Great Britain, the two belligerents established a 
neutral zone approximately 20 nautical miles north of the Falkland Islands, which came to be 
known as the “Red Cross Box.”  Within this zone, the British hospital ship Uganda was able 
to receive and treat the wounded and the parties were able to exchange wounded personnel.219   
 
9. British Maritime Protection Zone announced 22 July 1982 
 Great Britain lifted the TEZ on 22 July 1982, although Port Stanley Harbour and 
airfield, together with the three-mile territorial sea around the Falklands remained in effect 
after that date.220  Simultaneously, in order to minimise the risk of misunderstandings or 
inadvertent clashes, the British Government asked the Argentine Government to ensure that 
no Argentine warships or military aircraft enter a zone 150 miles around the islands where 
they would pose a threat to British forces.221  Argentine civil aircraft and shipping were also 
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requested to avoid this zone and other British dependencies in the South Atlantic unless the 
British authorities granted prior approval.222  The British lifted this Maritime Protection Zone 
in February 1990.223 
 
C. The Sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano224 
 
 In his memoirs, Admiral Woodward describes an exercise that he participated in with 
the USS Coral Sea in the Arabian Sea shortly before the Falklands War.  He likened the 
Coral Sea battle group to a circular exclusion zone, with the carrier at the centre.  One of the 
lessons that he learned from this exercise was 
 
[T]hat if an enemy is skirting his way around you along the edge of 
an exclusion zone, there is no way that you should allow him to go 
on doing that.  He must not be able to choose where and when he is 
going to come at you, just because he is a few miles outside of the 
zone.225 
 
If Woodward was aware fully of the events of 2 May 1982, as HMS Conqueror began 
tracking the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano 225 miles southwest of the Falkland 
Islands,226 this lesson must have been on his mind.  Map 10 depicts the movement of 
Argentinian Naval Forces from 29 April through 2 May 1982, when the Belgrano was sunk. 
 Conqueror had been supporting the South Georgia operation until 28 April, when she 
was diverted westward to a patrol area between Isla de los Estados and the Burdwood Bank, a 
large shallow area of water south of the Falklands,227 most of which lay within the TEZ.  The  
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Further south, the Atlantic is more than 2 miles deep, but around the Falkland 
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shelf, giving a general depth of about three hundred feet.  On the Bank, 
however, the bottom rises to shallows just one hundred fifty feet below the 
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Source: Middlebrook, p. 144. 
 
British were aware that the Belgrano and her two Exocet-equipped destroyer escorts were 
operating in this area and Conqueror’s skipper, Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown’s 
orders, in accordance with the rules of engagement, were that he was authorised to attack if 
the Argentine ships were in the TEZ.228  Wreford-Brown first encountered Belgrano and her 
escorts shortly after dawn on 1 May.229   
                                                                                                                                                   
surface.  These shoals are quite well charted, but they can be a lethal place for a 
submarine trying to stay with a cruiser making more than twenty-five knots 
through the water.   
 
Map 10 
Argentinian Naval Moves 29 April to 2 May 1982 
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 The bulk of Woodward’s task force was in an operating area immediately east of East 
Falkland Island and just inside the TEZ.230  The Argentine carrier, Veinticinco de Mayo and 
her escorts, was located northwest of the Falkland Islands and approximately 150 miles 
outside the TEZ.  The Veinticinco de Mayo attempted to launch aircraft against the British 
task force at dawn on 2 May, but had been prevented from doing so due to the lack of wind.  
Admiral Woodward feared that the Argentines were preparing a pincer attack on his task 
force, a plan that might have worked given the distances involved and the 15 hours of 
darkness in the South Atlantic winter.  Referring to the two Argentine surface groups, 
Woodward writes: 
 
The aircraft of the one, and the Exocet-carrying destroyers of the 
other, could both get in close to us very quickly in the present calm 
weather.  The long southern nights gave them fifteen hours of 
darkness, and between now and first light there was till over six 
hours, during which either Belgrano or Veinticinco de Mayo, or 
both, could have moved comfortably within range for a decisive 
battle which would give them, tactically, all the advantages.231 
 
 Admiral Woodward determined that one—if not both—of the major Argentine ships 
had to be taken out.232  The only problem was that the two submarines tracking the Veinticinco 
de Mayo, HMS Spartan and HMS Superb, were not in contact with the Argentine carrier.  
The British commander had only three weapon systems that were capable of sinking the 
heavily-armoured Belgrano: thousand-pound bombs dropped by aircraft or the Conqueror’s 
Mark 8 or Tigerfish torpedoes.  Due to the anti-aircraft capabilities of Belgrano’s escorts, and 
the fact that Wreford-Brown was trailing Belgrano, Woodward’s choice was clear.233  Only 
one problem remained: the Belgrano was skirting along the edge of the TEZ, zigging and 
zagging but apparently careful not to enter the zone, and until she did so, Conqueror was 
impotent to act against her under the rules of engagement in force at the time.  The British 
task force commander made a decision:   
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My conclusion: I cannot let that cruiser even stay where she is, 
regardless of her present course or speed.  Whether she is inside or 
outside the TEZ is irrelevant.  She will have to go.234 
 
Woodward then set about getting the rules of engagement altered so as to order Commander 
Wreford-Brown to attack the Belgrano.235  With Prime Minister Thatcher presiding, the War 
Cabinet changed the rules of engagement to permit Conqueror to attack the Belgrano whether 
she was inside the TEZ or not.236 
 Early on 2 May, the Belgrano turned westward making 13 knots aimlessly zigging and 
zagging, with Conqueror trailing her.  In the afternoon, Wreford-Brown received his new 
orders and prepared his attack.  Having determined that the Mark 8 torpedo would be the 
weapon of choice, Wreford-Brown was required to close within a mile of the target.  Wreford-
Brown described the attack as follows: 
 
It was tedious rather than operationally difficult. … I think the 
escorts were mainly thinking of a threat from the north, while we 
were to the south.  We fired three Mark 8s at 1857 Zulu, at a range 
of 1400 yards.  The object was never to hit with all three but to fire 
a spread to cover any inaccuracies in the fire-control solution.  We 
heard the weapons run and then heard two torpedo hits; we’d got 
two out of three.  We were still at periscope depth.  I think I saw an 
orange fireball in line with the mainmast—just aft of the centre of 
the target—and shortly after the second explosion I thought I saw a 
spout of water, smoke and debris from the back end.237 
 
The Belgrano was abandoned thirty minutes after the attack and sank fifteen minutes later, 
taking 368 of her 1042-man crew with her.238  At the time she sank, the Belgrano was situated 
at 55° 27΄S, 61° 25΄W, and was approximately 36 nautical miles outside and to the southwest 
of the TEZ.239  Thus was sealed the fate of the General Belgrano, a ship built in the U.S. in the 
mid-1930s as the Brooklyn Class light cruiser USS Phoenix, a ship that had survived the 
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attack on Pearl Harbor and had gone on to serve throughout World War II in the Pacific.240  
From an operational point of view, the sinking of the Belgrano greatly improved the tactical 
situation for the British, not only because it eliminated that ship from the Argentine fleet, but 
also because it caused the Argentine Navy to remain in port for the duration of the war.241 
 In the wake of the sinking of the Belgrano, John Nott, the British Secretary of State for 
Defence, stated that the TEZ was “not relevant”242 to the sinking and that the establishment of 
the Defensive Bubble Zone provided ample warning to the Argentines to keep their naval 
forces away from the British fleet.243  Moreover, Mr. Nott noted that: 
 
The General Belgrano was in a heavily armed group of warships.  
The cruiser and two destroyers had been closing on elements of our 
task force.  At the time that she was engaged, the General 
Belgrano and a group of British warships could have been within 
striking distance of each other in a matter of some five to six hours, 
converging from a distance of some 200 nautical miles.244 
 
Finally, the Secretary of State for Defence asserted that in light of the attacks against the 
Royal Navy on the previous day,245 and given the possible presence of an Argentine 
submarine in the area, there was “every reason to believe that the General Belgrano group 
was manoeuvering to a position from which to attack our ships.”246  Consequently, HMS 
Conqueror sunk the Belgrano for self-defence of the British fleet. 
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 The sinking of the Belgrano continued to be a periodic subject of debate in Parliament 
for the remainder of 1982.  On 29 November 1982, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces 
expanded on the reasons previously given for the sinking of the Belgrano, adding that: 
 
There were indications on 2 May that the carrier 25 de Mayo and 
her escorts would approach the task force from the north, while the 
General Belgrano and her escorts were attempting to complete a 
pincer movement from the south.  Concerned that HMS Conqueror 
might lose the General Belgrano as she ran over the shallow water 
of the Burdwood Bank, the task force commander sought and 
obtained a change in the rules of engagement to allow an attack 
outside the 200-mile exclusion zone but within the general 
principle set out in our warning of 23 April.  Throughout 2 May, 
the cruiser and her escorts had made many changes of course.247 
 
D. Concluding Remarks on the Falklands War 
 
 The total cost of this war, in terms of lives lost and equipment destroyed is staggering, 
given the relatively limited scale of the war.248  The British lost 255 men killed, including 
three Falkland Island civilians, with 777 wounded; the figures for Argentina are less precise, 
with reports ranging from 652 men dead or missing to 746 dead, with 1105 soldiers and an 
unknown number of personnel from the other branches wounded.  British registries count 
12,978 men taken as prisoner of war during the conflict.  With respect to material, Britain 
suffered the sinking of seven vessels and 34 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, while 
Argentina lost virtually all the military weapons and equipment taken to the Falklands, as well 
as the General Belgrano and several other ships and at least 100 helicopters and fixed-wing 
aircraft.  In terms of finances, the war cost Great Britain alone more than $3.2 billion, 
including replacement costs of equipment, ships and aircraft lost.249    
 Notwithstanding the extensive use of NEZs, however, the only neutral vessel attacked 
during the course of the war was a tanker, the Hercules, a Liberian-flagged vessel owned by 
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an Israeli company controlled by Americans.250  This was due, at least partially to the fact that 
the South Atlantic contains few sea-lanes for international trade, thus relatively few merchant 
vessels ply the waters that were the subject of the various exclusion zones employed during 
the war.  The Hercules was steaming on a northerly course some 450 nautical miles north of 
the Falklands and approximately 550 nautical miles from Argentina, in a passage unrelated to 
the conflict, when it was bombed on 8 June 1982 by Argentine aircraft, including C-130s and 
a jet aircraft.  At least two bombing runs were conducted and the bombs were pushed out of 
the cargo door of the aircraft.251  At the time of this attack, the Hercules was “in international 
waters, well outside the ‘exclusion zones’ declared by the warring parties.”252   
 
X. The Iran-Iraq War253 
 
 Unlike the Falklands War, the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s occurred in one of the 
world’s most important—and densest—shipping lanes in the world.254  The Iran-Iraq War, 
also known as “The Tanker War,” commenced in September 1980 and during the course of 
the eight-year war, it is estimated that 500 merchant vessels were attacked, with the loss of 
more than 200 merchant seamen.255  Although there is evidence that mines may have been laid 
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251
  Amerada Hess; Morison, p. 124; Fenrick, p. 112.  According to Goldie, there were “three successive air 
strikes by Argentine aircraft using bombs and air-to-surface missiles.”  Goldie Targeting, p. 15; Goldie, 
p. 174.    
 
252
  Amerada Hess, p. 820.  Goldie notes that this conclusion of the court is incorrect in that at the time of 
her sinking, Hercules was within Argentina’s South Atlantic War Zone.  Nevertheless, Goldie points 
out that this zone itself was unlawful since it failed to meet the tests of reasonableness, proportionality, 
clarity of definition and self-defence.  Goldie Targeting, pp. 15-16. 
 
253
  See Walker Tanker War; De Guttry and Ronzitti (and in particular, pp. 133-138); Politakis, pp. 89-119; 
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early in the war, by 1987, mines became an inceasing threat to shipping during this war.256  
Map 11 depicts the exclusion zones established during this war. 
 
 
 
Sources: New York Times, Russo, p. 390 
 
 
 
A. Iranian Maritime Coastal Defence Area 
 
 Iraq’s only port was closed during the war and Iran’s primary concerns were with 
stopping trade to Iraq via neutral ports, and Kuwaiti ports specifically, and publicity.  Shortly 
after the commencement of the war, Iran announced a Maritime Coastal Defence Area, in 
which the Iranian Navy directed that all ships destined for Iraqi waters were required to 
follow a specified route.257  Although Iran did not specifically state that ships that strayed 
from this route would be subject to attack, Iran specifically stated that it would accept no 
responsibility for vessels that strayed from this route.258  However, on the same day that this 
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zone was announced, Tehran Radio Domestic Service broadcast the text of a communique of 
the Iranian Joint Staff, which said, in part: 
 
Bearing in mind the violations of the Iraqi armed forces, all 
waterways near the Iranian shores are hereby declared war zones.  
Iran will not allow any merchant ship to carry cargo into Iraqi 
ports.259 
 
At any rate, Iran did not attack any merchant ships in the Persian Gulf until May 1984,260 and 
this declared zone did not vary significantly during the course of the conflict.261  Politakis has 
characterised this zone as “more a defensive sea area roughly coterminous with Iran’s 
territorial sea limits (although at points reaching out as far as 40 miles from the coast).262  Iraq, 
however, characterised Iranian waters north of 29-30° (which includes part of the Iranian 
Maritime Coastal Defence Area) as a “prohibited war zone” and threatened to attack all 
tankers docking at Iran’s Kharg Island as from 7 October 1980.263  
 
B. Iraqi Kharg Island Exclusion Zone 
 
 Nearly two years would elapse before Iraq formally declared, in August 1982, an 
exclusion zone around Kharg Island.264  In February 1984, Iraqi officials began speaking of a 
“blockade” around Kharg Island and warned that they would attack any ship found in the 
zone.265  In late February and early March 1984, Iraq intensified its attacks on ships in this 
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zone in and around Kharg Island.266  However, in light of these Iraqi attacks in this zone, one 
scholar has argued that was more of “free-fire zone” than a blockade: 
 
Inasmuch as Iraqi attacks occurred inside its ‘war zones,’ they 
could not have been justified by the traditional law of maritime 
blockade, since blockade cannot be enforced by unrestricted 
aircraft attacks on merchant vessels; nor could they have been 
justified by the new concept of the ‘exclusion zone,’ since such a 
concept does not validate attacks on sight on neutral merchant 
vessels.267 
 
 Over time, however, the limits of this zone, as imprecise as they were, became 
increasingly irrelevant, as Iraqi attacks began occurring with greater frequency at distances 
outside of the zone.  As Politakis notes:  
 
[I]n the climax of the Gulf War (August 1986-July 1988), war 
zones seemed to venture on the verge of legal irrelevancy.  
Belligerent practices substituted the entire Gulf for the relatively 
modest prohibited zones of the early stages of the conflict.  
Tankers were now being aimed at, surprisingly, by air-launched 
missiles or by fast boats, and sea lanes were being freely mined, 
virtually throughout the 500-mile-long Persian Gulf.268  
 
 These indiscriminate attacks led the U.S. to begin re-flagging Kuwaiti tankers in May 
1987, followed by escorting such tankers in convoys in July 1987, which seems to have led to 
an escalation of mining in the Gulf.269  Shortly thereafter, a coalition including several 
European States was established.  By the end of 1987, there were some 48 naval vessels and 
mines countermeasures vessels from seven States in the Persian Gulf and 18 other naval 
vessels in the Arabian Sea, making this the largest naval build-up in the Gulf region since 
World War II.270 
 
C. U.S. “Defensive Sea Bubble Zones” 
 
 The re-flagging and escorting operations did not signal the commencement of U.S. 
naval operations in the Persian Gulf, as U.S. naval forces have long operated in these waters.  
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However, due to the increased threats to U.S. naval vessels patrolling in the area as a result of 
the escalation of naval combat during 1984, the U.S. adopted the approach taken by the 
British in the Falklands War: the use of “Defensive Sea Bubble Zones” around U.S. naval 
vessels.  On 20 and 21 January 1984, the U.S. issued notices to aviators and mariners, 
respectively, concerning the U.S. defence posture with respect to its naval forces operating in 
international waters within the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman and North 
Arabian Sea.271   
 The Notice to Mariners (“NOTAM”) requested all surface and subsurface ships to 
avoid closing within five nautical miles of U.S. naval forces in these waters without 
previously identifying themselves.272  Any vessel violating this request “and/or whose 
intentions are unclear to such forces may be held at risk by U.S. defence measures.”273  The 
notice specifically provided that these measures were also in effect when U.S. naval forces 
were exercising the right of transit passage through the Strait of Hormuz or when in innocent 
passage through foreign territorial waters when operating in such waters with the consent of 
the coastal State.274   
 The Notice to Airmen (“NOTAR”) requested aircraft at less than 2000 feet altitude 
and not cleared for approach to or departure from a regional airport to avoid approaching 
closer than five nautical miles from U.S. naval forces operating in the area.275  Aircraft 
approaching closer than five nautical miles to U.S. naval forces were requested to establish 
and maintain radio contact with U.S. naval forces on a specified radio frequency, and failure 
to do so could result in the U.S. forces taking self-defence measures.276 
 In May 1987, two Iraqi air-launched Exocet missiles struck the USS Stark, causing 
deaths and injuries and resulting in serious damage to the ship.277  As a result, the U.S. 
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strengthened its rules of engagement and revised the notices concerning the “sea bubbles.”  
The first revision to the notices came in July 1987, when references to distance and altitude in 
the NOTAR were deleted and the following warning was inserted: “Illumination of a U.S. 
naval vessel with a weapons fire control radar could result in immediate U.S. defensive 
reaction.”278  These notices were subsequently revised in September 1987, when the 
references to distance and altitude were once again in the text.279  Notwithstanding the 
NOTAR, however, the USS Vincennes fired two surface-to-air missiles at an Iranian civilian 
airliner on 3 July 1987, killing 290 civilians.280 
 
XI. Desert Storm/Desert Shield: The Gulf War281 
 
 Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and naval forces of the coalition established to 
oust Saddam Hussein’s army played an important role in maritime interdiction in the waters 
surrounding the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea.  
Four days after the invasion, the Security Council adopted Resolution 661, prohibiting, inter 
alia, the importation of any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and 
prohibited all financial transactions with those two States, excluding the funds for medical 
supplies and food products for humanitarian purposes.282  On 25 August 1990, the Security 
Council, in Resolution 665, called upon all Member States to: 
 
Use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as 
may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to 
halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect 
and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict 
implementation of the provisions related to such shipping aid down 
in Resolution 661 (1990).283 
 
Maritime interdiction operations were established in order to give effect to these and 
subsequent Security Council resolutions. 
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 This was the first time that the U.N. authorised military action without establishing a 
U.N. command and control structure and consequently, the naval forces in the region were 
acting under the U.N. “umbrella,” but not under the U.N. flag.284  As a result of this 
arrangement, each State contributing to the maritime interdiction operations retained 
operational control of its naval forces and was permitted to develop its own rules of 
engagement.285 
 Rather than assigning permanent zones of responsibility to the national naval forces 
operating in the Persian Gulf, patrol boxes were established by geographical co-ordinates.  
The coalition naval forces met monthly and vessels were rotated among the patrol boxes in 
order to demonstrate unity and to maximise co-ordination and effectiveness.286  Some of the 
patrol boxes were located in international waters, but overlapped with the Iranian Maritime 
Coastal Defence Area, which was still in force during the Gulf War.287   
 With respect to actual interdiction, most vessels were intercepted on the high seas, 
aided by the fact that modern surveillance methods meant that vessels could be intercepted 
before they entered the Iraqi or Kuwaiti territorial seas.288  The territorial seas of other littoral 
States in the Persian Gulf were used for interdiction only with the permission of the coastal 
States, whose degree of co-operation with the coalition navies varied.289 
 Limited mining operations were conducted both by Iraq (off the coast of Kuwait to 
deter an amphibious invasion of occupied Kuwait) and by the U.S. Navy (to keep Iraqi naval 
forces from leaving Iraqi ports).290 
 
XII. “Anti-Terror” Zones 
 
 Shortly after 11 September 2001, the United States issued a “special warning” to 
international shipping and aviation that U.S. Forces are operating “at a heightened state of 
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readiness and taking additional defensive precautions against terrorist and other potential 
threats” and as a result all “aircraft, surface vessels and subsurface vessels approaching U.S. 
Forces” are required to maintain radio contact with such U.S. Forces.291  This warning also 
indicated that the intention of U.S. Forces is not to impede or interfere with freedom of 
navigation, but also made clear that U.S. Forces will “exercise appropriate measures in self-
defence if warranted by the circumstances.”292  Although this warning reflects a cautious 
approach to force protection, it is an open question whether zones may be employed for other 
purposes in the “Global War on Terror.”293  To date, no such exclusion zones have been 
established,294 although maritime interdiction operations have been undertaken in the sea areas 
surrounding the Arabian Peninsula, apparently without protest or condemnation.295 
 
XIII. The On-Going War in Iraq 
 
 As a result of terrorist attacks against the Al Basra Oil Terminal (“ABOT”) and a 
coalition warship in the vicinity of the Khawr Al’Amaya Oil Terminal (“KAAOT”), both in 
Iraqi waters, the U.S. Navy Maritime Liaison Office in Bahrain issued an advisory that an 
exclusion zone had been established in Iraqi waters within 2,000 metres of the ABOT and 
KAAOT, while also temporarily suspending the right of innocent passage in those waters.296  
These exclusion zones were still in effect as of early 2007.297 
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XIV. Conclusion 
 
 The following chapter includes a discussion on the role of customary international law 
on the development of NEZs.  The historical examples of zones described in this chapter 
provide a wealth of material demonstrating state practice with respect to NEZs.  It is clear 
from the historical accounts that NEZs as employed in the Falklands and Iran-Iraq Wars did 
not develop in a vacuum.  Rather, this method of naval warfare evolved over time, and 
although it may appear that each historical example is unique, in fact each zone was 
influenced by the state practice in prior conflicts.   
 At this stage, a few comments may be made concerning the common themes that have 
emerged from these historical examples.  These commonalities are significant in the 
development of the modern law relating to NEZs.  During both World War I and World War 
II, unrestricted submarine warfare was waged across wide areas of the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans.  There was little or no effort made to comply with the principle of distinction, 
primarily because of the global nature of these conflicts, the tactics used by merchantmen in 
convoying and because there was so little “neutral” shipping.  In effect, these areas were 
“free-fire zones” and although these campaigns violated the customary and conventional law 
of the age, they contributed to the notion that exclusion zones were a valid form of naval 
warfare.   
 What distinguishes the fighting in the World Wars from more modern armed conflicts 
at sea, however, is the incorporation of the entire range of international humanitarian law 
principles governing armed conflict into the ROE for NEZs.  In short, modern NEZs are not 
“free-fire zones” and there is widespread recognition among major naval powers that the law 
governing such zones is identical to the law outside the zone.  This trend away from “free-fire 
zones” reflects a fundamental change in the concept of exclusion zones and has served to 
legitimize zones as a unique method of naval warfare.  The following chapters will develop 
further this theme, demonstrating both that NEZs are a sui generis method of naval warfare 
and that there is a body of law applicable to such zones notwithstanding the fact that they may 
lack a distinct juridical status. 
 If history is a guide, naval exclusion zones will play a role in any future conflict 
involving hostilities at sea.  Based on the history of warfare during the 20th century, this will 
almost certainly be the situation in any conflict that is primarily conducted at sea and will 
probably be true with respect to conflicts that are primarily ground or air conflicts, but which 
have a small naval component as well.  For example, during the 1999 NATO campaign 
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against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, General Wesley K. Clark was concerned about 
Russian assistance to the Serbs by way of naval vessels transiting the Dardenelles and 
entering the Mediterranean.  Consequently, he directed Admiral James Ellis, dual-hatted as 
the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Commander-in-Chief of Allied 
Forces Southern Europe, to be prepared to implement a naval exclusion zone to prevent the 
Russian Navy from supplying the Serbs.298  Although the most likely outcome of such a plan, 
had one been implemented, would be more akin to a blockade than a NEZ, it is nevertheless 
significant that General Clark used the term “naval exclusion zone” with respect to this 
option.  This clearly signifies that senior military commanders have adopted the use of this 
term and that it may come to be more widely used in future campaigns, even in those such as 
Operation Allied Force, which was primarily an air campaign.   
 Having explored how States have established and utilised NEZs, the following chapter 
sets forth the legal requirements for the establishment of NEZs and lays the groundwork for 
the chapters that follow.   
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Chapter 3 
 
The Legal Requirements of Naval Exclusion Zones 
 
“Whether it is termed ‘limited naval blockade,’ ‘quarantine-
interdiction,’ some kind of ‘operational area,’ or given another 
label, one should be slow to condemn as illegal such limited 
measures especially when they are used to maintain world public 
order.  This is particularly true where the principal alternatives 
may be the use of much more coercion including weapons of mass 
destruction.”1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 This chapter explores the legality of establishing NEZs, using the framework set forth 
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which sets forth the following 
sources of international law:2  
1. International conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting States; 
 
2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law; 
 
3. The general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; 
 
4. Subject to the provisions of Article 59,3 judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of 
law. 
 
Each of these sources will be examined in turn and the focus of the analysis will be on 
whether or not these sources support the establishment of NEZs.   
 
II. Treaties 
 
 While no treaty specifically permits the establishment of naval exclusion zones, it is 
equally true that no treaty prohibits them either.  This is not surprising in light of the fact that 
“the laws of naval warfare have repeatedly escaped the nib of drafters” and thus it “merits no 
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amazement that the concept of war zones is omni-absent from conventional texts.”4  The 
following brief survey of conventions governing naval warfare thus touches upon issues 
bearing some relevance to the subject matter, although none are directly on point. 
The “Preliminary Provision” of the 1909 London Declaration5 indicates that the rules 
set forth in that convention “correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles 
of international law.”6  As will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 7, several provisions of the 
1909 London Declaration, such as those concerning blockade7 and the law of prize8 are useful 
to the discussion of the establishment of NEZs, although their relevance is limited for a 
number of reasons.  There was no discussion of exclusion zones or related concepts during the 
diplomatic conference that produced the 1930 London Naval Treaty.9  The 1936 London 
Protocol (which supplanted the 1930 London Naval Treaty) concerned submarine warfare and 
places a premium on humanitarian concerns.10  Although there is some dispute as to the 
continuing validity of the 1936 London Protocol notwithstanding the fact that it remains in 
force, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg placed considerable emphasis on its 
provisions in dealing with Admirals Karl Dönitz and Erich Räder, as discussed below. 
Turning briefly to treaties governing peaceful uses of the high seas, Article 2 of the 
1958 High Seas Convention and Article 87 of the 1982 LOS Convention provide that freedom 
of the seas include the freedoms of navigation and overflight.  These provisions also 
specifically indicate, however, that these treaties are subject to other applicable rules of 
international law, which “leaves the backdoor open” with respect to the legality of NEZs.11  
This reference to other applicable rules includes general principles, such as the lex specialis 
principle, as well as specific substantive rules, including belligerent rights that would 
                                                
4
  Politakis, pp. 122-123.  Politakis writes, “contemplation on the subject … resembles blind man’s bluff.”  
Ibid., p. 122. 
 
5
  1909 London Declaration, Articles 1-21.   
 
6
  Ibid., Preliminary Provision. 
 
7
  Ibid., Chapter I, Articles 1-21. 
 
8
  In particular, ibid., Chapter III (Unneutral Service), Articles 45-47 and Chapter IV (Destruction of 
Neutral Prizes), Articles 48-54. 
  
9
  Fenrick, p. 99. 
 
10
  “Its significance rests in the hierarchy of values that the Protocol announces, in making the safety of 
innocent people a prime consideration, and constraining the operational necessities to bow before such 
an imperative of humanitarian concern.”  Politakis, p. 128. 
 
11
  Pocar, pp. 221-222. 
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otherwise infringe upon the freedom of the seas, like visit and search.  On the basis of the 
Dönitz Judgement (discussed below), Fenrick concludes that the “invocation of exclusion 
zones directed against enemy merchant shipping in a general war in certain circumstances” is 
among the belligerent rights constituting the lex specialis that prevails over the lex generalis 
of freedom of the seas.12 
 Of course, the United Nations Charter, as a treaty, also plays an important role in 
determining the legality of the establishment of NEZs, although it is applicable only to those 
zones established after World War II.  Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, although Article 
51 of the Charter specifically preserves the rights of States to use armed force in self-
defence.13  As discussed in Chapter 6, any exercise of the right of self-defence must still be 
consistent with the principles of military necessity and proportionality.  The General 
Assembly’s Definition of Aggression14 is silent as to the issue of NEZs,15 and is of limited 
value because it is not binding as a matter of law (other than perhaps being evidence of 
custom).   
 Based on this analysis, the law of naval warfare as reflected by the relevant treaties 
provides neither a legal basis for, nor a prohibition of, the establishment and use of NEZs, 
provided that the NEZ otherwise complies with the requirements of the Charter of the United 
Nations.   
 
III. Custom 
 
 International custom, as a source of law under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, requires 
State practice16 and opinio juris.  Of the traditional sources of international law, custom is the 
most important source of the law governing NEZs.  The scale and scope of the recently 
                                                
12
  Fenrick, pp. 114-115. 
 
13
  The use of force is also permitted if taken pursuant to a Chapter VII authorisation by the U.N. Security 
Council or as part of an enforcement action within a regional arrangement undertaken in accordance 
with Article 53. 
 
14
  UN Doc. A/9631 (14 December 1974) (General Assembly Definition of Aggression Resolution). 
 
15
  This resolution does categorise blockades as being acts of aggression.  Nevertheless, NEZs are typically 
more limited than blockades and are usually established on the high seas, although NEZs certainly have 
the potential to cause great loss of life and to shipping. 
 
16
  Brownlie identifies three elements of State practice: duration, uniformity or consistency of the practice, 
and the generality of the practice.  Brownlie, pp. 7-8. 
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published ICRC Customary IHL Study demonstrates the difficulties of identifying rules of 
customary international law and it is perhaps telling that the editors of that monumental work 
chose to avoid dealing with the customary rules applicable exclusively to naval warfare.17  
With respect to NEZs, custom is by far the most important source of international law.  As the 
preceding makes clear, there are many important examples of State practice relating to NEZs.  
Moreover, the military manuals of the world’s leading maritime powers—while not sources 
of international law in and of themselves—contain discussions of NEZs and provide strong 
indicia of the opinio juris of these States.  For this reason, the discussion below draws heavily 
on a number of provisions from these military manuals.   
Of course, the law applicable in NEZs necessarily overlaps with other areas of 
customary international law, given the environment in which naval warfare is condutced.  
There is no doubt that customary international law recognises freedom of navigation, but what 
about a customary right to establish NEZs?  While States supporting such a customary rule 
rely on the principles of self-defence, lex specialis and freedom of the seas in establishing 
operational zones, neutrals rely on the latter principle in arguing that such zones interfere with 
their freedom of navigation.18  Consequently, because the notion of freedom of navigation 
supports both sides of the argument, due regard must be given to the rights of neutrals to 
pursue legitimate use of the sea in determining whether zones are lawful or not.19  
 As is clear from the Chapter 2, zones of various types were used extensively during 
both World War I and World War II.  As will be discussed in section VI., infra, commentators 
generally took the view that the zones established in the First World War had no basis in 
customary international law, but were divided as to whether custom could support the 
establishment of similar zones in the Second World War.  With the exception of the Falklands 
and Iran-Iraq Wars, the post-World War II practice of establishing exclusion zones during 
naval conflict is not extensive, primarily because there have been relatively few conflicts at 
sea during this period and the few conflicts that have occurred have been relatively limited in 
scope.20  Certainly those States that have established NEZs have, during the course of the 
                                                
17
  In declining to do so, however, they explicitly referred to the fact that the San Remo Manual presents a 
“major restatement” of the “customary law applicable to naval warfare.”  See ICRC Customary IHL 
Study, Vol. 1, Introduction, p. XXX. 
 
18
  Regarding this conundrum in the context of weapons testing that involves closing off areas of the high 
seas, see Brownlie, p. 225, footnote 13 and the sources cited therein.  
 
19
  San Remo Manual, para. 106(c).   
 
20
  There are, of course, significant differences between the impacts on commercial shipping as a result of 
the zones employed in the Falklands War and the Iran-Iraq War.  This is primarily the result of the fact 
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establishment of those zones, expressed the opinion that their course of action was legally 
justified, typically relying on the right of self-defence.21   
As noted in the Introduction, military manuals, although not binding on courts or 
tribunals, may be evidence of customary international law, and may be particularly important 
in determining opinio juris.22  Consequently, although military manuals are not, technically 
speaking, sources of the law, they are nevertheless important for the present analysis.  This is 
particularly the case with respect to military manuals of the major sea-going powers, since the 
establishment and use of NEZs specially affect the interests of those States.23  As the ICJ 
recognised in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, special attention should be paid to the 
practice of those States which are most affected by an emerging rule.  In determining whether 
this practice evidences a new rule of custom, the fact that this State practice is “both extensive 
and virtually uniform”24 would be probative of the issue, notwithstanding the fact that a 
majority of the world’s States have not pronounced on the issue on the issue of NEZs.25 
A survey of publicly available military manuals (and particularly those of maritime 
powers) supports the proposition that customary international law permits the establishment 
of naval exclusion zones, although all of the manuals indicate that the right to establish NEZs 
is qualified.   
                                                                                                                                                   
that the waters around the Falklands are far from major sea lanes of communication, while the Iran-Iraq 
War was fought in one of the world’s busiest shipping areas. 
 
21
  See, for example, UN Doc. S/14963 (1982) (reprinted in “United Kingdom Materials on International 
Law 1982,” 53 British YBIL (1983), p. 539) the statement of the British Government to the Security 
Council on 9 April 1982 concerning the establishment of the maritime exclusion zone in the Falklands 
War.  In that document, the British Government asserted that the MEZ was established in conformity 
with Article 51 of the UN Charter.  The British Government noted that the MEZ “falls short of the 
concept of blockade as understood in international law.” See UN Doc. S/14964 (1982), (reprinted in 
“United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1982,” 53 British YBIL (1983), pp. 539-540).  The 
British Government also justified the establishment of the MEZ on the grounds of its “inherent right of 
self-defence” without reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter.  See, for example, UN Doc. S/14988 
(1982) (reprinted in “United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1982,” 53 British YBIL (1983), 
p. 540).  It does not appear that the British Government asserted a customary right to establish NEZs 
during the Falklands War. 
 
22
  See Introduction, Note on Military Manuals and Restatements. 
 
23
  In the context of determining whether innovative treaty provisions had become binding as customary 
international law, the ICJ has placed particular importance on the State practice of States whose 
interests are “specially affected.”  See, for example, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, para. 74. 
 
24
  Ibid. 
 
25
  Of course, silence may denote either tacit agreement with the rule in question or may be indicative of a 
lack of interest in the issue presented. 
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The 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook distinguishes between “belligerent 
control of the immediate area of naval operations” and exclusion or war zones.26  This 
publication cites Tucker for support of the notion that the NEZs of World Wars I and II were 
based on the right of reprisal against alleged unlawful acts of the enemy and were used “to 
justify the exercise of control over, or capture and destruction of, neutral vessels not otherwise 
permitted by rules of naval warfare.”27  Notwithstanding that this statement acknowledges that 
such zones were used to justify acts “not otherwise permitted,” the 1995 U.S. Navy 
Commander’s Handbook supports in principle the establishment of NEZs: 
 
Exclusion or war zones established by belligerents in the context of 
limited warfare that has characterized post-World War II 
belligerency at sea, have been justified, at least in part, as 
reasonable, albeit coercive, measures to contain the geographic 
area of the conflict or to keep neutral shipping at a safe distance 
from actual or potential hostilities.  To the extent that such zones 
serve to warn neutral vessels and aircraft away from belligerent 
activities and thereby reduce their exposure to collateral damage 
and incidental injury, and to the extent that they do not 
unreasonably interfere with legitimate neutral commerce, they are 
undoubtedly lawful.28 
 
Given its extensive use of exclusion zones in the Falklands War, the U.K. Manual is 
particularly instructive.  It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that the U.K. Manual makes 
scant reference to its own practice with respect to NEZs—and then in the chapter on air, 
rather than naval, operations.29  With respect to naval warfare, the U.K. Manual adopts the 
approach taken by the San Remo Manual and describes NEZs under the general heading, 
                                                
26
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.9, p. 395.  Regarding the notion of “belligerent 
control of the immediate area of naval operations,” see ibid., paras. 7.8 and 7.8.1, pp. 394-395.  The 
right of belligerents to control neutral vessels and aircraft in the immediate vicinity of naval operations 
is a customary right.  See San Remo Manual, para. 108, Explanation, para. 108.1; and Tucker, pp. 299-
300.   
 
27
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.9, p. 395, citing to Tucker, pp. 301-17.  See also 
Tucker, pp. 301-302 (and footnote 44 therein), in which Tucker takes the view that although the 
belligerents relied on reprisals to establish zones during the early part of World War II, by the close of 
that war, justifying such zones on the basis of reprisals was not necessary and took on a rather 
“perfunctory character.”  Regarding British reprisals during the naval conflict in the early years of 
World War II, see Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals (1971), pp. 115-160.  See also the Note on 
Belligerent Reprisals, in Chapter 6. 
 
28
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.9, p. 395.  Regarding the qualifier concerning 
unreasonable interference with legitimate neutral commerce, see Chapter 5. 
 
29
  In the chapter on air operations, the U.K. Manual has a sub-section on “war zones restrictions” 
(paragraphs 12.58-12.12.58.2), and in footnote 76 of that discussion, reference is made to British 
practice in the Falklands War and the TEZ.  The U.K. Manual states, “The zone was imposed in 
exercise of the right to self-defence recognised by Art. 51 of the UN Charter.”  
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“Security Zones.”30  According to the U.K. Manual, zones may be established either as a 
defensive measure or as a means of restricting the geographical extent of the area of armed 
conflict, although the manual specifically notes that belligerents establishing zones remain 
duty-bound to respect the “legitimate uses of defined areas of the sea.”31  Under the general 
rubric of security zones, the U.K. Manual specifically refers to “maritime exclusion zones” 
and “total exclusion zones,” providing that both types are “legitimate means of exercising the 
rights of self-defence and other rights enjoyed under international law.”32  Such zones, which 
are an “exceptional measure” are subject to certain limitations, which are drawn directly from 
the San Remo Manual.33   
Other manuals also draw heavily on the San Remo Manual, with the Canadian Manual 
virtually adopting verbatim the language of that manual concerning exclusion zones.34  
Similarly, the Australian Manual basically tracks the San Remo formulation, but sets forth 
three “operational advantages” in declaring NEZs.35  These advantages are: a likely reduction 
in the number of vessels entering the area, facilitating rapid identification of vessels that do 
enter the zone; simplification of the issuance and interpretation of ROE; and limitation of the 
geographical spread of the conflict.36   
 The German Manual utilises the term, “maritime exclusion zone” and defines such 
zones as “a distinct area of the sea and the airspace above in which a party to the conflict 
exercises extensive rights of control and prohibits access to ships and aircraft.”37  Moreover, a 
distinction is made between static and movable zones.38  Adopting the approach taken by the 
                                                
30
  U.K. Manual, paras. 13.77-13.80. 
 
31
  Ibid., para. 13.77.  This provision is adopted from San Remo Manual, para. 105.  At the same time, the 
U.K. Manual specifically acknowledges the “customary belligerent right to control neutral vessels and 
aircraft in the immediate vicinity of naval operations.” U.K. Manual, para. 13.80, citing to San Remo 
Manual, para. 108. 
 
32
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.77.1. 
 
33
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.78.  These limitations are drawn from San Remo Manual, para. 106 and are set 
forth in section VI, infra. 
 
34
  Canadian Manual, paras. 852-855.  The San Remo Manual formulation is set forth in section VI, infra. 
 
35
  Australian Manual, paras. 8.15-8.18.   
 
36
  Ibid., para. 8.18. 
 
37
 German Manual, para. 1048. 
 
38
  Ibid.  Static zones are three-dimensional areas designated by discrete co-ordinates, whereas movable 
zones comprise the three-dimensional area around naval units, with the area of the zone moving as the 
naval unit moves.  Ibid.  Movable zones are also known as “defence bubbles.”  Ibid., para. 1048.3. 
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San Remo Manual, the commentary to the German Manual indicates that the establishment of 
NEZs is “not yet a method of naval warfare generally accepted by international law,” but 
NEZs were included in the manual “as a contribution to the progressive development of 
international law.”39  Like the other manuals, the German Manual sets forth certain conditions 
that must be met if the zone is to be legal.40 
 The Interim New Zealand Manual states that “a dogmatic statement that exclusion 
zones are legally acceptable or unacceptable would be inaccurate.”41  Rather, this Manual 
proposes a case-by-case approach, even setting forth questions to be posed in assessing the 
legality of the proposed zone.42 
1. What is the purpose of the zone? 
 
2. Who or what is excluded from the zone? 
 
3. What is the sanction imposed on vessels or aircraft entering the 
zone without its permission? 
 
4. Where is the zone located? 
 
5. How large an area does the zone occupy? 
 
6. For how long is the zone established? 
 
7. To what extent are neutral States and their shipping affected by 
compliance with the requirements of the State establishing the 
zone?43 
 
The Interim New Zealand Manual goes on to state that zones that are established for a brief 
period of time, in relatively limited areas of the sea and which are located away from 
established shipping routes are more likely to be considered legal than those of longer 
duration over wider areas of the oceans and which encompass shipping routes.44  This manual 
also stresses that the decision to establish an exclusion zone must be made at the “government 
level,” precluding naval commanders from ordering the establishment of such zones.45 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
39
  Ibid., para. 1049.1. 
 
40
  Ibid., paras. 1049-1050. 
 
41
  Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 705.4. 
 
42
  These questions are discussed in greater detail in the Conclusion.  The Interim New Zealand is silent as 
to the weight to be afforded to each of these issues, rendering it impossible to determine which factors 
are the most relevant to determining the legality of a particular zone. 
 
43
  Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 705.4. 
 
44
  Ibid., para. 705.4, footnote 6 therein.   
 
45
  Ibid.   
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 Given that it is nearly 40 years old, the Soviet Manual, does not discuss NEZs in great 
detail, although it is worth noting that a relatively neutral tone is taken with respect to the 
NEZs established in both the First and Second World Wars.46  The Soviet Union took a more 
critical approach to naval zones in the second half of the 20th Century, describing a number of 
naval actions as illegal,” including the U.S. blockade of the Korean Peninsula, British and 
French naval operations in the eastern Mediterranean and Red Seas during the Suez Crisis, 
and U.S. declarations of waters to a distance of 100 miles from the Vietnamese coast to be a 
combat area.47  It should also be noted that during the Falklands War, the Soviet Union 
protested (but apparently observed) the establishment of the British TEZ, but not the 
Argentine MZ.48  
 Based on the above survey, the fact that most of the manuals refer to a customary right 
to establish NEZs, and that none of the manuals specifically oppose the creation of exclusion 
zones, it appears that customary international law supports the establishment of such zones, 
provided that certain criteria are met.49  Exclusion zones present special and obvious 
challenges for neutral merchant vessels exercising freedom of navigation.  For this reason, 
special attention should be given to those provisions that relate specifically to notification of 
the zone for the safety of all mariners and neutral merchant shipping.   
The general rule, of course, is that the establishment of such a zone does not relieve 
the proclaiming belligerent of the obligation to refrain from attacking vessels and aircraft that 
are not otherwise lawful targets50 and the same body of law applies both inside and outside the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
46
  The Soviet Manual does not criticise any of the belligerent zones established in World War I and with 
respect to World War II, it mentions only the U.S. “patrol zone” established in the April 1941 in the 
North Atlantic and the U.S. “special submarine zones” in the Pacific Ocean.  This manual is completely 
silent as to German war zones in World War II in the section of the manual dealing with theatres of 
combat for naval warfare.  See Soviet Manual, pp. 417-419.  
 
47
  Soviet Manual, pp. 418-419. 
 
48
  See Walker Tanker War, p. 465, footnote 556 and the sources cited therein.  See also Goldie, pp. 173-
174, 181 (noting that the Soviet Union was the only State to protest the British TEZ); Howard S. Levie, 
“The Falklands Crisis and the Law of War,” in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arends, eds., The 
Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law, (1985) p. 64 at p. 66.  
 
49
  There have been modern instances, however, where States have protested the establishment of NEZs, 
such as the position taken by the Soviet Union in protesting the TEZ established around the Falkland 
Islands by the United Kingdom on 28 April 1982 (although they did not protest the Argentine MZ 
announced earlier that month).  See Walker Tanker War, p. 465, footnote 556 and the sources cited 
therein.  
  
50
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.9; U.K. Manual, para. 13.77; Canadian Manual, para. 
852(2); ICRC Model Manual, para. 1711.1; San Remo Manual, paras. 105-108. 
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zone.51  The Canadian Manual specifies that the practical effect of NEZs is to “warn shipping 
that hostilities are taking place and that there is a greater risk if entry into the zone occurs.”52   
The customary belligerent right to control neutral vessels and aircraft in the immediate 
vicinity of naval operations is not affected by either the law of blockade or the law of NEZs.53  
The U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbok describes the right of a belligerent to exercise control 
over neutral vessels and aircraft within the immediate area of naval operations as:  
 
[A] limited and transient claim … based on a belligerent’s right to 
attack and destroy its enemy, its right to defend itself without 
suffering from neutral interference, and its right to ensure the 
security of its forces.54 
 
Similarly, the establishment of a zone does not preclude naval operations from being 
conducted outside of the zone.55 
 
A. Public Declarations and Notifications of the Exclusion Zone 
 
 The San Remo Manual and those military manuals specifically addressing NEZs 
require States establishing such zones to publicly declare and notify the international 
community that a zone has been established.56  The declaration must include the 
commencement date and duration of the zone, the location and extent of the zone and any 
specific restrictions imposed.57  The commentary to the German Manual states: 
 
A grace period sufficient for all interested vessels and aircraft to 
leave the area covered by a proclamation is as essential for a zone’s 
                                                
51
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.78(a); Canadian Manual, para. 853(1)(a); San Remo Manual, paras. 105-106(a). 
 
52
  Canadian Manual, para. 853(1)(a).  See also ICRC Model Manual, para. 1711.2 (“a limited exclusion 
zone can be useful to indicate a danger area to neutral shipping”). 
 
53
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.80; ICRC Model Manual, para. 1711; San Remo Manual, para. 108.  See also 
1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 7.8, 7.8.1; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 704; 
Tucker, pp. 300-301. 
 
54
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.8, footnote 144. 
 
55
  Canadian Manual, para. 855; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 705(5).  
 
56
  U.K. Manual, paras. 13.77.1, 13.78(d); Canadian Manual, para. 853.1(e); German Manual, para. 1049; 
ICRC Model Manual, para. 1711.2.  The German Manual also specifies that if the NEZ is divided into 
sub-zones, the notification requirement includes an obligation to “define the extent of restrictions and 
the boundaries of each individual sub-zone.”  Ibid.  See also San Remo Manual, para. 106(e).  The 
notification should be made via diplomatic channels and through the appropriate international 
organisations, including the IMO and the ICAO.  San Remo Manual, Explanation, para. 106.6.  
 
57
  San Remo Manual, para. 106(e).   
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legality as the official notification of its commencement, duration, 
location and extent, and the restrictions imposed.58 
 
No other manual includes this requirement, although as a practical matter, it seems entirely 
reasonable.  There is no requirement that the establishing State declare the enforcement 
measures that it intends to apply within the NEZ, although the drafters of the San Remo 
Manual discussed this issue.59 
 
B. Due Regard for the Rights of Neutrals to Legitimate Uses of the Seas 
 
 In the event that a belligerent opts to establish an NEZ, due regard must be given to 
the “rights of neutral States to legitimate uses of the seas,”60 including the right to fish and to 
use submarine cables and pipelines.61   
 
C. Safe Passage Through Exclusion Zones under Certain Circumstances 
 
 The State establishing the zone must ensure safe passage through the zone in two 
situations: (1) where the “geographical extent of the zone significantly impedes free and safe 
access to the ports and coasts of a neutral State;”62 and (2) when normal navigation routes are 
affected,” except when it is not possible to do so due to military requirements.63  It follows 
from this requirement that the geographic and temporal scope of the NEZ must be considered 
in conjunction with the restrictive and enforcement measures and the self-defence rights of the 
establishing belligerent.  As the commentary to the San Remo Manual states: 
 
Zones located in isolated areas far from normal shipping routes, 
such as those used in the Falklands, are less likely to raise 
objections than zones on major shipping routes such as those in the 
Persian Arabian Gulf.  Zones occupying relatively small areas or 
                                                
58
  German Manual, paras. 1049, 1049.4.   
 
59
  San Remo Manual, Explanation, para. 106.3.  Proponents of the idea that enforcement measures be 
declared argued that such publication would enhance the “legitimacy of the zonal concept.”  Ibid.  
Opponents argued that States would not accept any obligation to declare such enforcement measures, 
since to do so would be akin to publishing its rules of engagement.  Ibid. 
 
60
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.77; San Remo Manual, paras. 105, 106(c).   
 
61
  San Remo Manual, Explanation, para. 106.4. 
 
62
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.78(c)(1); Canadian Manual, para. 853.1(d)(1); San Remo Manual, para. 
106(d)(i). 
 
63
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.78(c)(2); Canadian Manual, para. 853.1(d)(2); San Remo Manual, para. 
106(d)(ii). 
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established for relatively brief periods are more likely than the 
converse to be considered acceptable.64 
 
 This provision is designed to ensure that the inconveniences and risks faced by neutral 
merchant vessels is minimised.  To this end, any measures taken by neutrals to comply with 
the requirements of a belligerent vis-à-vis NEZs must not be construed as a harmful act to the 
opposing belligerent.65  This rule must be construed narrowly and is limited to those measures 
that are essential for safe passage through the zone.  For example, the San Remo Manual 
indicates that to require neutral merchant vessels to travel through the zone under convoy of 
belligerent warships would be impermissible since that could be considered by the opposing 
belligerent as an act of resistance to visit and search, rendering the neutral merchant vessels 
liable to attack on sight.66 
 
IV. General Principles 
 
 Paragraph 1(c) of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute essentially refers to evidentiary, 
procedural and interpretative rules.67  Applying this conception of “general principles,” the 
right to establish NEZs is clearly not a general principle of law.  Brownlie, however, also 
refers to “general principles of international law,”68 which he argues may refer to: 
 
[R]ules of customary law, to general principles of law as in Article 
38(1)(c), or to logical propositions resulting from judicial 
reasoning on the basis of existing pieces of international law and 
analogies.69 
 
                                                
64
  San Remo Manual, Explanation, para. 106.2.  With respect to the Falklands War, the commentary states 
that the 200-mile zone established by Argentina around the islands was “probably adequate,” while its 
declaration that the entire South Atlantic was a war zone was “ disproportionate to its defence 
requirements and would affect shipping unconnected with the conflict.”  Ibid.  See also German 
Manual, para. 1049.2.   
 
65
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.79; Canadian Manual, para. 854; San Remo Manual, para. 107, Explanation, 
para. 107.1. 
 
66
  San Remo Manual, Explanation, para. 107.2. 
 
67
  Brownlie asserts that “the most frequent and successful use of domestic law analogies has been in the 
field of evidence, procedure, and jurisdictional questions.”  Brownlie, p. 18.  See also ibid., p. 16: 
“What has happened is that international tribunals have employed elements of legal reasoning and 
private law analogies in order to make the law of nations a viable system for application in a judicial 
process.”   
 
68
  Ibid., p. 18 (emphasis added). 
 
69
  Ibid. 
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Although Brownlie concedes that the principles underlying examples of general principles 
may be traced to state practice, “they are primarily abstractions from a mass of rules and have 
been so long and so generally accepted as to be no longer directly connected with state 
practice.”70  Brownlie goes on to set forth several examples of general principles of 
international law, including freedom of navigation, which is a general principle applicable 
both in time of peace and during armed conflict at sea.71   
 Some writers take the notion that freedom of the seas is a general principle of 
international law even further, asserting that freedom of the seas is a peremptory norm or jus 
cogens.72  Among the commentators taking this view are Fitzmaurice73 and Frowein.74  Thus, 
freedom of the seas may be considered as a general principle (if not jus cogens), and as noted 
above in the context of the customary nature of freedom of the seas, this principle can cut 
both ways with respect to the legality of establishing NEZs.  Guggenheim, for example, takes 
the position that zones are contrary to the principle of freedom of the seas,75 while others 
argue that it is the principle of freedom of the seas that underlies the right of belligerents to 
establish such zones.76 
 
V. Judicial Decisions 
 
 By the terms of Article 38 of the ICJ statute, judicial decisions are subsidiary means of 
determining international law, a characterisation that should not be exaggerated, since a 
“coherent body of jurisprudence will naturally have important consequences for the law.”77  
                                                
70
  Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
 
71
  See Corfu Channel Case, p. 30; and Military And Paramilitary Activities, para. 214. 
 
72
  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 53 (“[A] peremptory norm of general 
international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole 
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm 
of general international law having the same character.”)  See also Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of 
International Obligations Erga Omnes (Clarendon Press, 1997). 
 
73
  Fitzmaurice reaches this conclusion on the grounds that the sea is res communis.  This position was set 
forth in Fitzmaurice’s capacity as Special Rapporteur for the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.  See Third Report on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/115. 
 
74
  Jochen Abr. Frowein, “Jus Cogens,” Encyclopedia of Public International Law, R. Bernhardt (ed.), 
Instalment 7 (1984), p. 329. 
 
75
  II Guggenheim, Traité de Driot international public (Geneva, 1954), p. 348. 
 
76
  See, for example, the arguments set forth by Pocar, pp. 221-222. 
 
77
  Brownlie, p. 19. 
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There is only one international judicial decision addressing the issue of NEZs directly: that 
portion of the Judgement of the IMT dealing with Admiral Karl Dönitz and his alleged role in 
the German unrestricted submarine warfare campaign in World War II.78  There are a few 
other cases, including those concerning the tactics employed by the German Navy in the First 
and Second World Wars and the ICJ Corfu Channel, Military and Paramilitary Activities and 
Oil Platforms cases, that deal with issues relating to the present topic and these cases will be 
briefly discussed. 
Under the IMT Indictment, Admiral Karl Dönitz was charged with three counts, 
namely, being a member of the common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity; crimes against peace; and war crimes.79  Dönitz was 
charged with waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the 1936 London Protocol.80  
Dönitz was convicted of two counts, crimes against peace and war crimes, the latter 
conviction being the important one for the present purposes, and sentenced to ten years’ 
imprisonment. 
In his defence, Dönitz asserted that at all times the German Navy operated in 
conformity with its obligations under international law, specifically including the 1936 
London Protocol.81  He testified that at the commencement of the war, the German Prize 
Ordinance, based on the 1936 London Protocol, governed German submarine operations.  
Pursuant to these regulations, he had ordered his submarines to attack all merchant vessels in 
convoy, those merchant vessels that refused to stop or those merchant vessels that used their 
radio upon sighting a submarine.82  He also successfully demonstrated that by October 1939, 
British merchant vessels were being armed and convoyed under armed escort, were radioing 
information concerning the locations of German submarines, and were attacking such boats 
                                                
78
  Nürnberg Proceedings, Vol. XXII, pp. 556-561 (“Dönitz Judgement”) (the full text of the entire IMT 
Judgement is also printed in ibid., Volume I).  Admiral Erich Räder faced the same charges as Dönitz 
(at least through the period up to the Räder’s reassignment as Admiral Inspector of the Navy on 30 
January 1943), but with respect to the issue of NEZs, the tribunal adopted the same findings that it made 
with respect to Dönitz.  Thus, that portion of the Judgement relating to Räder (ibid., Volume XXII, pp. 
561-563) does not add anything particularly helpful to the present analysis.  
 
79
  Indictment, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume I, pp. 
27-79. 
 
80
  Dönitz Judgement, p. 557. 
 
81
  Ibid. 
 
82
  Ibid. 
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on sight.83  These factors all made it extremely difficult for the German submarine forces to 
comply with the 1936 London Protocol.84  Moreover, the fact that the Royal Navy had issued 
orders to sink all vessels in the Skagerrak and that the U.S. Navy pursued unrestricted 
submarine warfare in the Pacific were also established by the defence, in the form of written 
interrogatories from U.S. Admiral Chester Nimitz.85  On the basis of these findings, Dönitz 
was acquitted by the IMT of the charges relating to unrestricted submarine warfare.86  The 
judges were of the view that the general practice of the belligerents in incorporating merchant 
vessels into the war effort provided sufficient grounds for acquitting Dönitz and although they 
clearly had an opportunity to do so, the judges avoided the issue of determining whether the 
1936 London Protocol was compatible with the sinking of neutral merchant vessels used in a 
manner that was “functionally indistinguishable from the use of belligerent merchant 
shipping.”87  
 However, the IMT went on to convict Dönitz of sinking neutral merchant vessels in 
the “operational zones.”88  The operative paragraph of the IMT Judgement states: 
[T]he proclamation of operational zones and the sinking of neutral 
merchant vessels which enter those zones presents a different 
question.  This practice was employed in the war of 1914-1918 by 
Germany and adopted in retaliation by Great Britain.  The 
Washington Conference of 1922, the London Naval Agreement of 
1930 and the Protocol of 1936 were entered into with full 
knowledge that such zones had been employed in that war.  Yet the 
Protocol made no exception for operational zones.  The order of 
Dönitz to sink neutral ships without warning when found within 
these zones was, in the opinion of the Tribunal, therefore a 
violation of the Protocol.89 
 
As noted by Fenrick: “This portion of the judgement appears to accept the legitimacy of 
exclusion zones for belligerent merchant vessels under certain circumstances but to prohibit 
such zones when they affect neutral merchant vessels.”90  Because the 1936 London Protocol 
                                                
83
  Ibid., p. 558. 
 
84
  Busuttil, p. 160. 
 
85
  Dönitz Judgement, p. 559 and Dönitz Document 100. 
 
86
  Dönitz Judgement, p. 559. 
 
87
  Fenrick, p. 102. 
 
88
  Dönitz Judgement, pp. 558-559. 
 
89
  Ibid., p. 558. 
 
90
  Fenrick, p. 104.  Fenrick goes on to criticise part of this decision.  See ibid., pp. 104-105.  (In 
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does not explicitly refer to exclusion zones, and thus does not distinguish between ships 
inside or outside of such zones, one commentator has described the reasoning of the Tribunal 
as “faulty,” insofar as it found all attacks on neutral ships within exclusion zones to be a 
violation of the Protocol.91 
 During the course of the proceedings, Flottenrichter Kranzbühler, counsel for Dönitz, 
was asked by the IMT President if the legality of operational zones—like blockades—
depended at least in part on their effectiveness, that is, the power of the declaring State to 
enforce such zones.92  Kranzbühler argued that:  
 
In contrast to the blockade zone in a classical sense where full 
effect is necessary, the operational zone only provides for practical 
endangering through continuous combat actions.93 
 
As the following exchange demonstrates, Dönitz put up a defence that once such zones were 
declared, the ability of the belligerent to control events in that zone—particularly if the 
operational zone consisted of mines—was uncertain: 
 
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean, then, that you are basing the 
power of the state to declare a certain zone as an operational zone 
not upon the power of the state to enforce its orders in that zone, 
but upon the possibility of danger in that zone? 
 
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: You say it depends on the possibility of 
danger in the zone? 
 
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I would not say the 
possibility of danger, Mr. President, but the probability of danger, 
and the impossibility for the belligerent to protect neutral shipping 
against this danger. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
distinguishing between neutral and belligerent merchant vessels, the IMT “ignores the fact that in a 
general war many neutral vessels will be engaged in transporting cargoes in support of one belligerent’s 
war effort and will, therefore, be functionally indistinguishable from belligerent merchant vessels.”  
Ibid., p. 104.) 
 
91
  Busuttil, p. 162.  See also Mallison, pp. 81-84, in which he is also critical of this aspect of the IMT 
Judgement.  See also Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, pp. 592-594 concerning 
the drafting of this portion of the IMT Judgement.  
 
92
  Dönitz Trial, pp. 332-334. 
 
93
  Ibid., pp. 332-333. 
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THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you what other legal basis there is 
for the theory you are putting forward, other than the adoption of 
the blockade? 
 
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am referring as a 
legal basis especially to the practice of the first World War, and the 
statements made by experts after the first World War, and also to 
the generally recognized rules about mined areas.  The mined areas 
actually in this war proved to be operational zones where every 
means of sea warfare was used to sink without warning.94 
 
The IMT judges did not accept this line of argument, leading Mallison to conclude: 
 
The questions, therefore, appear to indicate full judicial agreement 
with the prosecution claim that the legal requirements of 
enforcement or control could not be met by a “paper order” and 
submarine enforcement.95 
 
Similarly, Fenrick has written: 
 
The Tribunal apparently considered that the right to declare an 
exclusion zone should depend upon the power to enforce the zone 
or make it effective.  It appears to have concluded that, as with 
traditional blockades, exclusion zones must be enforced by surface 
warships rather than by submarines alone.  It was not persuaded by 
Kranzbühler’s argument that all that was necessary for a legitimate 
zone was a declaration plus the probability of danger to neutral 
shipping from any form of attack together with the impossibility 
for operational reasons of the belligerent declaring the zone to 
protect neutral shipping in the zone.96 
 
 In conclusion, the Dönitz Judgement may be read to mean “maritime exclusion zones 
are probably not illegal if measures taken there either serve purely defensive purposes or are 
directed solely at enemy military objectives.”97  Such zones, like naval blockades, must meet 
the test of effectiveness98 and as Fenrick notes, the decision “appears to accept exclusion 
                                                
94
  Ibid., pp. 333-334.  Of this colloquy, Mallison writes, “Unfortunately, Kranzbühler did not respond to 
the express statements in the questions and demonstrate their juridical inadequacy.”  Mallison, p. 84. 
 
95
  Mallison, pp. 83-84.  Historically, blockades lacking sufficient naval power to ensure legal effectiveness 
were said to be established under a “paper order” (or known simply as a “paper blockade”) and hence 
the reference to “paper order.”  See Hall, pp. 198-199. 
 
96
  Fenrick, pp. 104-105, citing to Dönitz Trial, pp. 332-334.  Fenrick also cites to the 4th edition of 
Colombos, who wrote that “any declaration of war zones by a belligerent is unlawful unless supported 
by naval forces sufficient to ensure the effective control of his regulations within the declared area of 
belligerent operations.”  C.J. Colombos, The International Law of the Sea, 4th rev. ed., London, 1961, p. 
466, cited in Fenrick, p. 107. 
 
97
  German Manual, para. 1049. 
 
98
  Several military manuals support this proposition.  See, for example, German Manual, para. 1049. 
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zones enforced by a sink-on-sight policy directed against belligerent merchant shipping 
incorporated into the enemy war effort.”99   
 Although Dönitz and Räder were the only two individuals brought to trial for sinking 
merchant vessels without warning in zones, several other cases must be noted, including the 
Llandovery Castle,100 Dover Castle,101 Peleus,102 Moehle103 and Von Ruckteschell104 cases.  The 
Llandovery Castle and Dover Castle were both British hospital ships torpedoed by German 
submarines during the First World War.  In the Dover Castle case, the commander of the 
German submarine U.C. 67, Karl Neumann, admitted sinking the hospital ship, but relied 
upon the defence that he was following the orders of the German Admiralty Staff.  Based on 
the facts as found by the court, the accused was acquitted based on this defence.105  In the 
Llandovery Castle case, Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt the first and second officers of 
German submarine U-Boat 82 were convicted, despite their defence of superior orders, of 
firing on lifeboats carrying survivors of the Llandovery Castle following her torpedoing by 
the German submarine, resulting in an unknown number of fatalities.106  These cases may be 
                                                
99
  Fenrick, pp. 107-108. 
 
100
  Judgement in Cases of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt, German Reichsgericht, 16 July 1921, reprinted 
in 16 AJIL (Supplement, No. 4, October 1922), pp. 708-722 (“Llandovery Castle Judgement”); see also 
Hackworth, VI Digest of International Law, pp. 462-463.  The Llandovery Castle and the Dover Castle 
cases were part of the post-World War I Leipzig War Crimes Trials. 
 
101
  Judgement in Case of Commander Karl Neumann, German Reichsgericht, 4 June 1921, reprinted in 16 
AJIL (Supplement, No. 4, October 1922), pp. 704-708 (“Dover Castle Judgement”); see also 
Hackworth, VI Digest of International Law,p. 463.  
 
102
  In re Eck and Others (The Peleus), British Military Court, Hamburg, 17-20 October 1945, reported in 1 
LRTWC Case No. 1, pp. 1-21 and 13 Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases, 
1946, Case no. 108, pp. 248-250. 
 
103
  Trial of Karl-Heinz Moehle, British Military Court, Hamburg, 15-16 October 1945, reported in 9 
LRTWC, Case No. 54, pp. 75-81 and 13 Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases, 
1946, Case No. 107, pp. 246-247. 
 
104
  Trial of Helmuth von Ruckteschell, British Military Court, Hamburg, 5-21 May 1947, reported in 9 
LRTWC, Case No. 55, pp. 82-90 and 13 Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases, 
1946, Case no. 108, pp. 247-248. 
 
105
  The court found that this defence was valid in light of the fact that the German Government had 
concluded that allied military hospital ships were being operated in violation of the 1907 Hague 
Convention X and that these conclusions had been communicated to the allied powers.  The Germans 
then imposed restrictions on hospital ship transit and warned that any vessels violating these restrictions 
would be subject to a sink on sight policy.  See Dover Castle Judgement, pp. 706-707 and Hackworth, 
VI Digest of International Law,pp. 460-463. 
 
106
  The captain of U-Boat 82, First-Lieutenant Patzig, could not be located after the war.  The superior 
orders defence of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt was rejected on the grounds that “killing defenceless 
people in life-boats could be nothing less else but a breach of the law.” Llandovery Castle Judgement, p. 
722.  
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distinguished on the grounds that the survivors of the attack on the Llandovery Castle had 
been intentionally targeted following the sinking of that vessel, whereas the Dover Castle 
suffered only six casualties, all the result of the initial torpedo attack.   
 In addition to the case of Admiral Dönitz before the Nürnberg Tribnual, the “Laconia 
Order”107 was the subject of three World War II cases (The Peleus, Moehle and Von 
Ruckteschell) that involved attacks upon survivors following the sinking of merchant vessels.  
The Peleus and Moehle cases involved submarine commanders who ordered deck gunners to 
fire on survivors clinging to pieces of wreckage from the sunken ships, while the Von 
Ruckteschell case involved a German surface raider.  In the latter case, the commander of the 
surface raider, Helmuth von Ruckteschell, was charged with committing a variety of offences 
against allied merchant vessels, including firing on the targeted vessel even after that ship had 
signaled her surrender, failing to make provision for the safety of survivors despite having the 
capacity to do so, and firing at survivors in lifeboats.   
 Based on his analysis of these cases, Fenrick concluded that: 
 
Unless a deliberate effort is made to massacre survivors, it appears 
that individual unit commanders are unlikely to expose themselves 
to war crimes charges if they attack merchant ships without 
warning in exclusion zones in compliance with superior orders.108  
 
 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the “Tokyo Tribunal”) dealt with 
Japanese submarine activities in only a cursory way, although some detail was devoted to the 
killing of survivors of the Jean Nicolet, an armed U.S. merchantman.109   
 The ICJ has never ruled on the legality of exclusion zones, although the Corfu 
Channel, Military And Paramilitary Activities and Oil Platforms cases dealt with issues 
concerning the use of naval mines and their effect on shipping.  In the Corfu Channel and 
Military and Paramilitary Activities cases, the ICJ held that states have an obligation to notify 
vessels of the existence and danger of minefields during times of peace while reaffirming the 
duty to do so during armed conflict, in accordance with the 1907 Hague Convention VIII.110  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
107
  See Chapter 2, Section IV.A. 
 
108
  Fenrick, p. 107.  The author also expresses the view that criminal liability in cases involving attacks on 
merchant vessels in NEZs (excluding situations where survivors are subsequently attacked) should only 
attach to senior commanders, such as Dönitz or Räder and that “it might be more appropriate to consider 
actions occurring in exclusion zones, other than breaches of explicit and generally accepted treaty law, 
perhaps giving rise to state responsibility but not forming the basis of war crimes charges.”  Ibid.  
 
109
  See Mallison, pp. 142-143. 
 
110
  See Busuttil, pp. 54-54.  See also ibid., p. 54, where the author writes with respect to the Corfu Channel 
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In the Oil Platforms case, the ICJ dealt with events arising from the Tanker War of the 1980s, 
and specifically Iranian attacks on the Sea Isle City, a Kuwaiti tanker re-flagged to the U.S., 
which was hit by a missile near Kuwait Harbour and the USS Samuel B. Roberts, which hit a 
naval mine in international waters while returning from an escort mission.  In response to 
these attacks, and relying on the doctrine of self-defence, U.S. armed forces attacked offshore 
Iranian oil platforms and other complexes from which the U.S. claimed Iran had launched the 
attacks on the Sea Isle City and the USS Samuel B. Roberts. 
 The United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in the Amerada Hess case 
concerning the sinking of Hercules by Argentina, held that “it is beyond controversy that 
attacking a neutral ship in international waters, without proper cause for suspicion or 
investigation violates international law.”111   
 
VI. Writings of Publicists 
 
 As with judicial decisions, the writing of publicists112 is a subsidiary means of 
determining the law, pursuant to the terms of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.  This category 
includes ILC draft articles and other reports written for the ILC, reports prepared by other 
expert groups, including the Institute of International Law and restatements, whether authored 
by single or multiple rapportuers and such sources are at least as authoritative as those 
written by single authors.113   
Unlike more general areas of international law, or even the sub-category of 
international humanitarian law, the law of naval conflict poses particular problems when it 
comes to reliance upon “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations.”114  A comprehensive survey of the literature on the law of naval warfare by Busuttil 
revealed some startling figures.  His review led to the conclusion that writers from only 27 
States—predominately from North America and Europe—have written on this subject.115  
                                                                                                                                                   
case that, “The Court evidently believed in 1949 that Hague Convention VIII remained in effect and had 
not been eroded away by State practice during the two World Wars.”   
 
111
  Amerada Hess, p. 424. 
 
112
  See Politakis, pp. 135-145, for a detailed analysis of doctrinal writings concerning the legality of war 
zones. 
 
113
  Brownlie, p. 24. 
 
114
  In general, see Busuttil, pp. 8-10. 
 
115
  Ibid., p. 9, footnotes 66-72. 
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While it may not seem prudent to base conclusions on such a small sample, especially from a 
relatively heterogeneous pool, however, Busuttil is quick to point out that: 
 
[I]t is some comfort that these publicists have often been intimately 
involved in the development of their national legal policies with 
regard to naval warfare and so have a kind of “double measure” of 
credibility.116 
 
Moreover, these writers tend to come from the nations that have the largest and most 
significant naval forces.117   
There are two primary 20th century restatements of the law of naval warfare, the 1913 
Oxford Manual and the 1995 San Remo Manual, and this analysis begins with these 
documents.  Delegates at the Second International Peace Conference in The Hague 
determined that the Third Conference should include discussions on regulations for the 
conduct of naval warfare, and as a result, the Institute of International Law prepared the 1913 
Oxford Manual.118  This manual does not deal specifically with NEZs, since the concept of 
such zones was not as developed as it would become shortly thereafter.119  Article 50 of the 
1913 Oxford Manual, however, refers to “rights of the belligerent in the zone of operations,” 
and it is clear from the text of this article that it refers to the immediate vicinity of naval 
operations.120  Within this zone, the belligerent could restrict enemy vessels and preclude them 
from the performance of certain tasks, such as communication with enemy warships.121  
Enemy ships found to be in violation of this provision could be forcibly driven from the zone 
and would be liable to capture if it was confirmed that the merchant vessel had communicated 
information concerning the conduct of hostilities to enemy warships.122 
                                                
116
  Ibid., p. 9. 
 
117
  This also raises the issue of whether they are acting as advocates for their particular military forces, 
rather than simply being subjective commentators on the law.  See ibid. 
 
118
  1913 Oxford Manual.  The Third International Peace Conference was never held due to the outbreak of 
World War I.  See also Verri, pp. 329-341. 
 
119
  Verri, p. 331, who states that the 1913 Oxford Manual “does deal with the barred zones (or war zones) 
which will figure prominently in the First World War.”  Verri makes this comment without specifying 
precisely which article of the manual he is referring to, although it is likely that he is referring to Article 
50. 
 
120
  1913 Oxford Manual, Art. 50 (“the zone corresponding to the actual sphere of his operations”).  See 
Politakis, p. 125 and footnotes 209 and 210 therein, to the effect that this phrase reflects the drafters’ 
intention to limit the applicability of this provision to the area of active hostilities.  In his commentary to 
the 1913 Oxford Manual, Verri is of the view that Article 50 represents a “new norm.”   
 
121
  1913 Oxford Manual, Art. 50. 
 
122
  Ibid.  Politakis is of the view that this provision did not qualitatively alter the traditional law of prize: 
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 The San Remo Manual addresses the issue of zones and in the preliminary remarks to 
the commentary it is noted that the participants in the drafting of the manual were split as to 
the lawfulness of such zones, with some participants taking the view that zones were 
unlawful.123  The majority of the participants, however, took the view that “the existence of 
such zones was a reality and that it was desirable to develop guidelines for them.”124  The San 
Remo Manual starts with the proposition that belligerents are not absolved of their obligations 
under international humanitarian law by establishing zones that might adversely affect the 
legitimate uses of the sea contained in such zones.125  The experts noted that such zones 
should be considered as an “exceptional measure” and concluded that setting forth detailed 
criteria for such zones would be a progressive development of the law.126  These factors 
include: 
 
• the applicability of the same body of law both inside and outside 
the zone;127 
 
• the applicability of strict adherence to military necessity and the 
principle of proportionality concerning the extent, location and 
duration of the zone;128 
 
• ensuring due regard to the rights of neutrals to enjoy legitimate 
uses of the sea;129 
 
• provisions for the safe passage of neutral vessels and aircraft under 
certain circumstances;130 and 
 
• public declarations and notifications concerning the 
commencement, duration, location and extent of the zone, as well 
as the restrictions imposed within the zone.131 
                                                                                                                                                   
“True though it was that merchantmen would be kept clear by warning, or even by force, and eventually 
would be liable to capture owing to their geographic proximity to enemy warships and not because of 
their cargo or destination, this implied, however, a variation in context rather than in means.”  Politakis, 
p. 125. 
 
123
  San Remo Manual, p. 181. 
 
124
  Ibid. 
 
125
  Ibid., para. 105, Explanation, para. 105.1. 
 
126
  Ibid., para. 106, Explanation, para. 106.1. 
 
127
 Ibid., para. 106(a). 
 
128
  Ibid., para. 106(b). 
 
129
  Ibid., para. 106(c). 
 
130
  Ibid., para. 106(d). 
 
131
  Ibid., para. 106(e). 
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The fact that the experts who participated in the drafting of the San Remo Manual articulated 
detailed criteria concerning the operation of such zones clearly indicates that they concluded 
that it was legal to establish exclusion zones. 
 The Helsinki Principles also indicate that “Special Zones” are lawful, subject to a 
number of provisos: 
 
Subject to Principle 5.29 and without prejudice to the rights of 
commanders in the zone of immediate naval operations, the 
establishment by a belligerent of special zones does not confer 
upon that belligerent rights in relation to neutral shipping which it 
would not otherwise possess.  In particular, the establishment of a 
special zone cannot confer upon a belligerent the right to attack 
neutral shipping merely on account of its presence in the zone.  
However, a belligerent may, as an exceptional measure, declare 
zones where neutral shipping would be particularly exposed to 
risks caused by the hostilities.  The extent, location and duration 
must be made public and may not go beyond what is required by 
military necessity, regard being paid to the principle of 
proportionality.  Due regard shall also be given to the rights of all 
States to legitimate uses of the seas.  Where such a zone 
significantly impedes free and safe access to the ports of a neutral 
State and the use of normal navigation routes, measures to 
facilitate safe passage shall be taken.132 
 
 Although the San Remo Manual and the Helsinki Principles support the notion that at 
the end of the 20th Century, the establishment of NEZs was lawful (subject to certain 
important caveats) the views of commentators earlier in the century were often to the 
contrary.  Because modern exclusion zones had their roots in the zones connected with 
unrestricted submarine warfare, and given the criticisms of this type of warfare from the 
international law community, it is not surprising that many writers in the first half of the 20th 
Century disapproved of the notion of exclusion zones.  The remainder of this chapter traces 
the development of legal thought concerning exclusion zones during the 20th Century, 
following a more or less chronological approach.   
With respect to commentators—whether from the academy or the armed services—it 
is difficult to develop an overall framework for analysing the various positions, for several 
reasons.  First, the historical examples of zones, the focus of many international legal writers, 
are of only limited assistance to an area of the law that has developed in more recent conflicts.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
132
  Helsinki Principles, para. 3.3.  Paragraph 5.2.9. relates the right of transit passage through international 
straits, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage and the right of innocent passage through the 
territorial sea or archipelagic waters of belligerents.  
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Second, the views of some writers have changed over time, with some who were sceptical of 
the notion of zones as developed during the World Wars taking a less hostile view in 
subsequent conflicts.  Third, many writers recognise the difficulties and hazards in 
commenting upon the legality of zones in abstracto, without the benefit of addressing zones 
on a case-by-case basis.  As a result, writers who tend to address the legality of zones often 
reach conclusions that might be considered tentative or halting.  Fourth, many writers analyse 
NEZs from particular viewpoints, such as the law of reprisals.  For these reasons, the 
following discussion generally follows a chronological approach, with deviations when 
necessary to retain topical disucussions or where the ideas of commentators are cross-
fertilised, such as when a particular zone draws the attention of numerous authors.  There has 
been no overall attempt to categorise the positions taken between those who generally oppose 
zones and those who tend to support the concept.    
At the outset, however, the views of a prominent writer on naval warfare, Goldie, 
should be noted, since in many respects his views help frame the debates that follow.   
 
Because, for so long maritime States have stressed, as fundamental 
to their survival, the freedom of the high seas, belligerents’ claims 
to enforce maritime excusion zones must be carefully balanced 
against the traditional and basal doctrine and the interests 
interpreting it.  Assertions that the power to create such zones has 
emerged into customary international law demand rigorous criteria 
for justifying their promulgation by warring States.  Indeed, a case-
by-case approach is required.  On the other hand, it should be 
observed that the creation of such zones has arisen, in part, from 
the development and deployment of new weapons, from the 
evolution of new tactics, and from the emergence of economic 
warfare as an important, indeed essential, weapon.  Thus, they 
have been resorted to for the purposes of both combat and 
logistical strategies.133 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that Goldie seems to gloss over the fact that economic warfare has 
always been an important aspect of naval strategy (and thus might not be characterised 
properly as “emerging”), his analytical approach is sound.134  His emphasis on the importance 
of weapons systems and tactics cannot be emphasised enough. 
In the wake of World War I, the commentators addressed specific steps taken vis-à-vis 
the various zones established by the parties to that conflict.  For example, Garner forcefully 
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argued that belligerents had neither a right to close portions of the high seas to navigation nor 
to mine the high seas in such a way as to expose neutral ships to the danger of destruction.135 
Garner succinctly described the state of the customary law of naval warfare at the end of the 
First World War as follows: 
 
Unquestionably the naval forces of a belligerent have a right to 
engage the enemy and prey upon his commerce anywhere on the 
high seas.  In a certain sense, therefore, the outbreak of war 
between two or more maritime powers automatically converts that 
portion of the high seas which becomes a sphere of immediate 
military operations into a war zone, and belligerents may formally 
proclaim such waters to be a theatre of hostilities.  …  Neutral 
vessels venturing into such waters are, therefore, exposed to 
destruction in the same way that a non-combatant individual is who 
in land warfare strays into the lines which embrace the theatre of 
military operations.  …  But the waters embraced within such 
zones remain, as before, a portion of the high seas, and a 
belligerent probably has no greater rights of search, capture, or 
destruction in respect to enemy or neutral vessels therein than he 
has outside the area.  In short, belligerents have no right to 
appropriate any portion of the high seas and close them to 
navigation of neutral vessels, and it is very doubtful whether they 
may lawfully plant mines in them in such a way as to expose 
neutral ships to the danger of destruction while peacefully 
navigating the waters thereof.136 
 
Similarly, in 1921, Hall wrote that claims by the belligerents to “control portions of the high 
seas” may only be justified by “genuine necessity and for long as that necessity continues.”137  
Hall also agreed with Garner that international law did not support the notion that a 
belligerent could “cover wide areas of sea within which submarine mines may be sown 
without notification, or as a substitute for the recognised rules of blockade by threatening to 
sink at sight any vessel which comes within the area.”138 
With respect to the German war zone declaration of 31 January 1917, Garner has 
described it as being “so flagrantly contrary to the laws of maritime warfare that nothing can 
be said in defence of it.”139  Likewise, concerning this German war zone and the one 
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announced on 17 August 1940, Tucker has written, “these belligerent measures cannot be 
regarded as conforming to the customary requirements laid down for lawful blockades.”140  
Tucker acknowledged that this conclusion might not necessarily mean that exclusion zones 
were lawful under different grounds,141 thus acknowledging that State practice might support 
the adoption of such zones.  Even then, however, Tucker argues that belligerents may not 
preclude innocent neutral traffic from using the seas within such zones and that the declaring 
State must indicate routes through the zone that neutral traffic may transit with a “reasonable 
assurance of safety.”142  However, his analysis led him to conclude that 
[I]t does not appear possible to assert that—apart from reprisals—
belligerents have at present the right to restrict the movement of 
neutral vessels within vast tracts of the open seas merely by 
proclaiming that these areas have been rendered dangerous—in one 
form or another—to neutral shipping.  Hence, despite belligerent 
practices in two wars the establishment of war zones forms a 
lawful measure only when taken in response to the persistent 
misconduct of an enemy.143 
 
Tucker wrote that unless one is prepared to admit that a belligerent right to attack all 
enemy merchant shipping without regard to the safety of passengers and crew exists, the 
proclamation of war zones involves certain legal problems relating to enemy shipping.  
Nevertheless, he wrote: 
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It should be pointed out that in considering the legal issues raised 
by the belligerent establishment of war zones, most writers have 
emphasised only the effect of such zones on neutral—though not 
enemy—merchant vessels despite the fact that the zones have 
operated equally against both.144 
 
Stone wrote that “between the belligerents inter se this belligerent assertion of extended 
control raises no problems.”145  Consequently, the lawfulness of zones as they pertain to 
merchant vessels of the belligerents is beyond question, assuming that the zone is otherwise 
enforced by lawful means.146 
 Tucker concludes by arguing that the creation of zones is a “thinly veiled endeavour to 
replace the traditional law [of blockade] through the instrument of reprisals” and that the law 
as it stood in the mid-1950s was in need of reform.147  Nevertheless, he saw reason to maintain 
the belief that the “element of danger associated with an effective blockade would still have to 
be understood in terms of a liability of seizure—not to destruction upon entrance into the 
forbidden area.”148  Consequently, he argued that the establishment of NEZs was lawful only 
when taken in response to the “persistent misconduct of an enemy” and only when the 
belligerent indicated routes through which neutral shipping could pass unmolested.149 
 Goldie disagrees with the approach taken by Stone to the extent that he relies upon the 
notion of comparing the German and Allied policies simply because they were both based on 
belligerent reprisals.150  To Goldie, the fact that both Britain and Germany invoked belligerent 
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reprisals as justification for their respective positions concerning long distance blockade and 
unrestricted submarine warfare does not mean that these tactics should be treated similarly 
from the juridical perspective.151  Goldie describes the Allied long distance blockade policy as 
being an “effective persisting holding logistical strategy,” while the German unrestricted 
submarine polcy was based on a “raiding logistical strategy.”152  In his view, the “raiding 
logistical strategy” is so unlike the “persisting holding logistical strategy” involved in 
maintaining a long distance blockade that it would be “absurd to invoke arguments and 
evidences justifying the latter to validate the former.”153  
 Goldie similarly rejected the approach taken by Lauterpacht in 1952.  Lauterpacht had 
written that measures: 
 
[R]egularly and uniformly repeated in successive wars in the form 
of reprisals and aiming at the economic isolation of the opposing 
belligerent must be regarded as a devlopment of the latent principle 
of the law of blockade, namely, that the belligerent who possesses 
the effective command of the sea is entitled to deprive his 
opponent of the use thereof for the purpose either of navigation by 
his own vessels or conveying on neutral vessels such goods as are 
destined to or originate from him.154 
 
Goldie considers Lauterpacht’s view overly permissive and seems to argue that it could lead 
to a “Panglossian position” that would allow the “commander of the sea [to] dictate, merely 
by virtue of his power, what the law allows.”155  At the same time, Goldie has rejected other 
positions that he describes as being overly restrictive, and in particular, he has criticised 
Leckow, who in the context of the Iran-Iraq War focused his attention on the 
“reasonableness” of zones.156  Goldie claims that “reasonableness” cannot be considered 
“without a necessary spelling out of the meaning of the word in terms of strategies and goals, 
and in terms of means and methods relative to those strategies and goals.”157 
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Nevertheless, writing in 1991, Goldie’s analysis of State practice led him to conclude 
that although the “controversial long-distance blockading, prohibited maritime zones or 
logistical strategies may not yet appear to have received the unqualified, universal 
endorsement of legality,” they were moving in that direction: 
 
[S]ubject to the test of proportionality and reasonableness, and 
especially when created for purposes of maintaining a persisting 
logistical strategy supported by an adequate ratio of force to time 
and space, they may appear to be moving conditionally into the 
light of recognition as customary international law.158 
 
 Schwarzenberger, on the other hand, took a sceptical view of the legality of NEZs,159 
but acknowledged that customary international law had undergone a change primarily as the 
result of the breakdown of the notions of neutrality and private trade and the emergence of the 
concept of total warfare at sea.160  Consequently, he accepted begrudgingly the legality of 
zones as a consequence of these developments.161  
 Writing in the mid-1960s, Mallison distinguished between general and limited war at 
sea and concluded that exclusion zones (or in his parlance, “operational areas”) were both 
legal and good policy in both types of armed conflict.162  Mallison viewed NEZs as modern 
versions of naval blockades,163 which clearly enjoy customary status, provided certain 
requirements were met.  In the context of general war, he supports exclusion zones with sink-
on-sight policies directed against both belligerent and neutral shipping when such shipping is 
incorporated into the belligerent war effort and stated that “it appears that the continued 
legality of this method of warfare is assured in general war.”164  He rests this conclusion on his 
analysis of submarine warfare during the First and Second World Wars that demonstrated that 
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the use of submarine operational areas was not disproportionate to their military efficiency.165  
Moreover, he contends that to assert that this method of conducting war at sea is unlawful 
would not be a “realistic way of promoting human values.”166  Mallison comes to the same 
conclusions in the context of limited war at sea.167 
 At least with respect to the Falklands War, Levie shares Mallison’s perspective that 
the establishment of zones in that conflict had the effect of limiting the scope of the naval 
conflict.  For example, he concludes that the British Maritime Exclusion Zone had the effect 
of being “nothing more than a gratuitous warning to Argentine naval vessels,” since enemy 
and merchant vessels were not barred from the exclusion zone, which only applied to enemy 
naval vessels.168  
O’Connell took a more restrained view than Mallison, at least with respect to limited 
armed conflict at sea.  In his view, the establishment of operational zones on the high seas—if 
lawful at all—are permitted “only for the purpose of belligerent operations among the 
protagonists and not for the purpose of molesting neutrals.”169  O’Connell then takes a critical 
position of the justification for declaring such zones: 
 
The problem, of course, is one of positive identification, and the 
only purpose in declaring a war zone is to circumvent the 
difficulties of identification by supposing all contacts to be hostile, 
and to bridge the gap between hostile intent and hostile act, which 
is otherwise probably insurmountable, by supposing them to be 
assailants against whom the right of self-defence is exercisable.  If 
operational zones are not an easy method of escape from that 
problem, speculation about their future availability may as well be 
abandoned.170 
 
Writing after the Falklands War, however, O’Connell further articulated his position: 
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Provided that publicity is given to the creation of an exclusion 
zone, and neutral shipping is not put unduly at risk, self-defence 
can conceivably justify a proclamation that contacts within a zone 
will be treated as hostile.  Such an argument is more plausible in 
the case of submerged contacts than in the case of surface contacts 
because the problem of positive identification is acute in the former 
instance but hardly ever arises in the latter because of the available 
technologies of surveillance.171 
 
 With respect to so-called “bubble zones,” O’Connell seems open to the idea that such 
zones could be justified as a means of self-defence and based on the precedent of the Spanish 
Civil War.172  In O’Connell’s view, these “moving war zones” would be noticed to mariners 
and diplomats and would be structured as a “moving circle centred on the task force and 
extending to the effective weapon range of likely submarine opposition.”173  He acknowledges 
that maritime States would be hesitant to notice the movements of their naval assets, but that 
without such information, submerged submarines on innocent passage may find themselves 
inadvertently within such zones and subject to attack.174  On balance, however, O’Connell 
seems to support such self-defence measures and states that in permitting the creation of such 
zones, “the law appears to be sufficiently malleable to give naval staffs a certain freedom of 
manoeuvre in their planning.”175   
 Heintschel von Heinegg considers “defence bubbles” to be “generally recognized as 
[being] in accordance with international law.”176  It is difficult to determine the permissible 
extent of such zones in abstracto and the circumstances of each case, including the threat 
level and the location of the ships concerned, play important roles in making that 
determination.177  Based on the attack on the USS Cole, such zones may be increasingly 
common for warships making port calls.  As Heintschel von Heinegg notes, the threat posed 
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by terrorist activities is “obvious but will vary according to the region of operation and to the 
general security environment.”178   
 Writing in the mid-1980s, Fenrick distinguished NEZs from other methods of naval 
warfare: 
 
Exclusion zones are different from the more traditional blockade 
zones because in blockade zones the primary risk is that of capture, 
while in exclusion zones it is, frequently, the risk of attack on 
sight; they are also different from more recent devices such as the 
cordon sanitaire, which is intended to be used primarily in a period 
of tension prior to the commencement of hostilities.179 
 
Fenrick also expresses the opinion that the NEZ as a method of naval warfare is likely to 
endure: “On the basis of the history of the use of exclusion zones, it is reasonable to conclude 
that such zones will be used in some future conflicts.”180   
In his opinion, an assessment of the legal aspects of the use of exclusion zones 
depends upon an assessment of the current validity and meaning of the London Protocol on 
submarine warfare.181  Because this treaty appears to have either fallen into desuetude or has 
been broadly interpreted, it is likely to be ignored in future conflicts since many belligerents 
will view compliance with the treaty to be to their disadvantage. 182  In order to retain the 
humanitarian value of the treaty, it will be important to interpret the term “merchant vessel” 
as excluding “all belligerent and neutral vessels that are incorporated in the belligerent war 
effort.”183   
 Fenrick argues that the key question is not whether the proclamation of the zone is 
unlawful, but rather what is legally permissible in the zone, once it is established.  Thus, he 
argues that it would be desirable to develop legal standards to be applied in NEZs, based on 
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two assumptions.  First, it is likely that such zones will be used in future conflicts.  Second, he 
assumes:  
 
[T]hat exclusion zones in which a sink-at-sight policy is enforced 
are not illegal per se because warships, naval auxiliaries, and ships 
incorporated into the belligerent war effort may be so targeted.184 
 
Fenrick envisages generally agreed standards that would not vary from conflict to conflict or 
differ depending on whether the conflict was limited or of a more general nature.  He 
acknowledges, however, that the facts of a given conflict may mean that different types of 
zones may be permitted: “If merchant ships trading with belligerents are incorporated into the 
belligerent war effort, more stringent exclusion zones would be acceptable than if they were 
not so incorporated.”185  Fenrick then goes on to set forth the following standards that he 
would advocate including in a regime covering NEZs:186 
 
• Belligerents should publicly declare (with sufficient time for 
vessels and aircraft to leave the zone) the existence, location and 
duration of the zone, indicating precisely what is to be excluded, 
the sanctions to be imposed on vessels and aircraft entering the 
zone without permission; 
 
• The zone must be effective, in the sense that ships or aircraft 
entering the zone face a “significant probability” of encountering 
submarines, ships or aircraft of the declaring belligerent’s armed 
forces; 
 
• All militarily practicable steps should be taken to minimise 
sanctions, such as seizure rather than destruction; 
 
• All militarily practicable efforts should be made to ensure both 
proper target identification and that only military objectives are 
attacked; and  
 
• There must be a “proportional and demonstrable nexus” between 
the NEZ and the self-defence requirements of the declaring State. 
 
Several other factors are also relevant in determining whether the NEZ is acceptable, 
including the size, location, duration and purpose of the zone.187   
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 Another leading commentator on armed conflict at sea, Heintschel von Heinegg, has 
written: 
 
There is general agreement that the “war zones” established by the 
belligerents of the two World Wars were and remain illegal.  No 
zone, whatever its denomination or alleged purpose, does relieve 
the proclaiming belligerent of the obligation under the law of naval 
warfare to refrain from attacking vessels and aircraft which do not 
constitute legitimate military objectives.  In other words, a zone 
amounting to a “free-fire-zone” has no basis in the existing law.  
Considerations of military necessity—e.g., from a submariner’s 
point of view—do not justify a conclusion to the contrary.188 
 
He also goes on to write, “most of the doubts surrounding the employment of submarines 
during armed conflict have now been settled” and that merchant vessels (whether enemy or 
neutral) are exempt from attack only if they are innocently employed in their normal role.189   
 Heintschel von Heinegg argues that those States that have characterised exclusions 
zones as lawful have taken a “rather cautious approach” and he has identified the following 
indicia as being common to the military manuals of these States: 
 
• The establishment of such a zone does not relieve the proclaiming 
belligerent of the obligation under the law of armed conflict to 
refrain from attacking vessels and aircraft which do not constitute 
lawful targets;  
 
• The zone may not unreasonably interfere with neutral commerce; 
and  
 
• The geographical area covered, the duration, and the measures 
taken within the zone should not exceed what is strictly required 
by military necessity and the principle of proportionality.190 
 
He concludes that all States that have recognised the legality of NEZs have also indicated that 
such zones constitute an exceptional measure.191  If all of these conditions are met, the zone in 
question conforms to the law of naval armed conflict as set forth in both the San Remo 
Manual and the Helsinki Principles.192 
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 Notwithstanding these criteria, Heintschel von Heinegg questions the ends to which 
NEZs are established; that is, what object and purpose is an exclusion zone to serve.193  He 
points out that the 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook sets forth two objects of 
purposes: to contain the geographic area of the conflict or to keep neutral shipping at a safe 
distance from the actual or potential armed conflict.194  Heintschel von Heinegg persuasively 
argues that: 
 
[I]f not designed to contain or restrict the area of naval operations 
and if not a—legitimate—ruse of (naval) warfare, an exclusion 
zone may either serve the protection of neutral navigation and 
aviation or it may imply that a belligerent, in a given area, will 
extensively exercise the control rights already conferred on it by 
the law of naval warfare and of maritime neutrality.  Then, 
however, the zone will rather resemble a geographical restriction 
of belligerent rights of control—the establishment of the zone 
would merely indicate that in sea areas not covered by the zone the 
belligerent may refrain from exercising these rights.195 
 
If the zone meets the criteria identified in the preceding paragraph and serves the purposes 
above, then in Heintschel von Heinegg’s view, “there can be no doubt about the legality of 
exclusion zones.”196  
With respect to the British TEZ established in the Falklands, Heintschel von Heinegg 
concludes “the British TEZ may not serve as a legal precedent for the –alleged—legality of 
exclusion zones as a method of naval warfare.”197  His view of the language used by the 
United Kingdom in establishing the TEZ “clearly indicates that the British were prepared to 
attack any vessel or aircraft encountered within the TEZ,”198 and that as a result the British 
were “establishing and enforcing a ‘free-fire-zone,’”199 which is clearly prohibited.200  Based 
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on the fact that the Belgrano was sunk outside the TEZ, Heintschel von Heinegg takes the 
position that the TEZ was misunderstood as being a geographical restriction, as described in 
the preceding paragraph, although that may have been the original intention when the TEZ 
was established.201  He uses this example to make the valid point that a “belligerent making 
use of the exclusion zone device ought to be as clear as possible as regards his intentions.”202 
Noting that it was possible that the British forces were “not allowed to target any 
contact in the TEZ—at least not with prior authorisation from the highest political level,” 
Heintschel von Heinegg has another explanation for the TEZ—one that would comply with 
international law: 
 
[T]he U.K. was either lucky that its naval units were not forced to 
really enforce the TEZ vis-à-vis neutral vessels and aircraft or, what 
is more likely, the proclamation of the TEZ was nothing but a most 
effective ruse of war because it obviously induced the Argentine 
forces to avoid the area.203 
 
This view finds some support in the fact that when the British announced the Maritime 
Exclusion Zone, the British fleet was still at considerable distance from the Falklands.  
Moreover, at the same time, the British played upon the unfounded Argentine fear that the 
Royal Navy submarine HMS Superb was on station near the Falklands, when in fact it was at 
Holy Loch, Scotland.204 
 By contrast, Goldie advances the position that the Argentine declaration of the South 
Atlantic War Zone was clearly unlawful, since it was unreasonable, disproportionate, lacked 
clarity and otherwise failed to meet the narrow scope of self-defence.205  According to Goldie, 
the Argentine South Atlantic War Zone 
 
[C]learly failed to provide for an adequate ratio of power to space 
and time, and amounted to little more than an excuse for 
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conducting indiscriminate attacks on neutral shipping, rather than 
formulating an effective logistical persisting, holding strategy, 
which could be integrated in a sea-keeping assertion of naval 
power utilized for rational ends.206 
 
This view seems entirely reasonable, and is shared by the few writers who devote attention to 
it in their analysis.207 
 Turning to the Iran-Iraq War, Heintschel von Heinegg notes that in contrast to the 
Falklands War, both belligerents in the Iran-Iraq War enforced their exclusion zones by 
attacking neutral tankers.208  He concludes that this practice demonstrates that both Iran and 
Iraq viewed their zones as “free-fire-zones” and as such, they were unlawful since the attacks 
were not directed exclusively against legitimate military objectives.209  He does acknowledge, 
however, that the attacks on tankers may not be so clear-cut if their “contribution to the war-
sustaining effort” is included in the calculus and that both Iran and Iraq were able to wage war 
against each other for eight years because oil revenue allowed the belligerents to purchase 
weapons abroad.210  
 Relying on neutral protests to the announcement of the British TEZ in the Falklands 
and the international community’s reaction to Iraq’s designation of a fifty-mile war zone 
around Kharg Island (and subsequent attack on neutral shipping), Michael Bothe concludes 
that there is no customary right to establish NEZs.211  He thus urges restrictions on their use in 
any treaty dealing with armed conflict at sea: 
 
It has thus to be concluded that so-called exclusion zones have not 
become a new element of the positive law of neutrality in naval 
warfare.  Practice shows, however, a certain inclination of States to 
establish zones from which they want to bar all traffic.  These 
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tendencies must be viewed very critically and must be carefully 
restricted in any future codification.212 
 
 Many commentators have argued that the zones established by Iraq were unreasonable 
and thus illegal.  For example, Fenrick generally found the establishment of the Iraqi “war 
zone” lawful on the basis that the tankers were incorporated into Iran’s war efforts, but he 
concedes that “Iraqi practices in using exclusion zones touches the outer limits of legal 
acceptability and may well overstep the boundary.”213  Similarly, Leckow,214 Jenkins215 and 
Gioa216 criticised the Iraqi Kharg Island zone as being unreasonable and lacking legal 
justification in that they demonstrated no respect for neutral shipping and could not be 
legitimately characterised as reprisals.  Naval mines played an important role in the exclusion 
zones established in the Iran-Iraq War, and Robert D. Powers, Jr., writing in the early 1960s, 
had expressed the view that naval mines would play an important role in establishing and 
enforcing NEZs in the future.217  Powers argued that war zones “directed against neutral 
shipping were illegal … and that any restrictions of neutrals be reasonable so as to preserve 
the freedom of the high seas.”218  
 Politakis expresses caution about any attempt to offer a “single, perhaps 
oversimplified, aphorism regarding the legality or illegality of war zones.”219  Although he 
acknowledges that “in the post-1945 era the world has experienced numerous international 
naval conflicts in most of which states declared and enforced blockade measures and war 
zones of varying extent, nature and scope,” he argues that only a few writers have cited these 
historical precedents to claim that a rule of customary international law has emerged.220  Why 
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is this the case?  According to Politakis, it is because of an “insurmountable difficulty, that is 
to say, all one has is a set of very varied practices, and at best scanty hints of opnio juris.”221  
He concludes, “no custom could emanate from a practice which has been consistently 
justified purely on grounds of belligerent reprisals.”222   
 As one might expect given the wide diversity of viewpoints among international legal 
scholars, the views of “publicists” range from writers who generally conclude that NEZs may 
be legally established and/or that they can serve important roles in limiting armed conflict at 
sea, such as Mallison, O’Connell and Fenrick, to those who are of the view that there is no 
customary rule permitting the establishment of NEZs, such as Bothe, Castrén and Politakis.  
Other writers, such as Tucker and Schwarzenberger, seem to accept that NEZs may be a 
necessary evil of modern armed conflict at sea, but that their legality has resulted from 
questionable practices.  
 
VII. Other Maritime Zones 
 
 Certain States have also declared other types of peacetime zones which merit brief 
discussion.  Zones which are declared during times of armed conflict, such as so-called 
“Neutralised Zones” or “Special Hospital Zones” will be discussed below, in the context of 
the armed conflicts in which such zones were declared. 
 
A. Security (or Defence) Zones 
 
 Several coastal States have declared security (or defence) zones beyond their territorial 
seas, in which they purport to prohibit or regulate peacetime navigation by warships and 
military aircraft.  At least 19 States which have asserted such claims, which typically range in 
breadth from 18-24 nautical miles.223  Such zones have no basis in international law, in the 
absence of armed conflict, on the grounds that the law of the sea regime does not recognise 
the right of coastal States to establish zones restricting freedom of the high seas beyond the 
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territorial seas, with the exception of resource-related activities or other regulatory activities 
explicitly set forth in the 1982 LOS Convention.224   
 
B. Nuclear Free Zones225 
 
 There are three international nuclear free zones, each of which potentially impacts 
naval operations.226  Such treaties do not violate the law of the sea regime, provided that 
freedom of navigation and overflight of the high seas are respected.227   
 
C. Safety Zones 
 
 Littoral States may establish safety zones for the protection of artificial islands, 
installations and structures located in their internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial seas, 
EEZs and on their continental shelves.  When such zones are in the EEZ or on the continental 
shelf beyond the territorial sea, such zones must not extend beyond 500 meters from the outer 
edges of the artificial island, installation or structure, unless a generally accepted international 
standard permits otherwise.228  Safety zones must not interfere with internationally recognised 
navigational sea lanes and all ships must respect these zones and comply with internationally-
accepted navigation standards in the vicinity of artificial islands, installations, structures and 
safety zones.229  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
 A survey of the primary sources of international law as set forth in Article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute reveals the following.  There is no treaty specifically prohibiting the establishment 
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of NEZs, provided that the State imposing the NEZ can legally justify the zone as a measure 
undertaken in self-defence.  With respect to customary international law, the practice of 
States—and particularly the major maritime nations—generally supports the notion that NEZs 
may be lawfully established again with the proviso that certain conditions are fulfilled, a 
conclusion that also bears scrutiny when taking the scarce jurisprudence on the subject into 
consideration.  Although the views of commentators are split on the issue of the legality of 
NEZs, it must be kept in mind that their opinions are a subsidiary—and not a primary—
source of determining the law.   
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Chapter 4 
 
The Modern Law of the Sea Regime and Naval Warfare 
 
“It is the law of the sea which dictates the practicalities of this 
deployment of seapower, related to areas of its exercise and the 
modes of its exercise.”1 
 
“The legal classifications (‘regimes’) of ocean and airspace areas 
directly affect naval operations by determining the degree of 
control that a coastal nation may exercise over the conduct of 
foreign merchant ships, warships, and aircraft operating within 
these areas.”2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 For several centuries, international law regarded the oceans as both belonging to all 
States and to none.  Since Grotius elaborated upon the principle of mare liberum in 1609, it 
has been the fundamental tenet applicable throughout the seas.  Over time, however, littoral 
States began asserting sovereign claims to ever-increasing bands of sea adjacent to their 
coastlines.  The history of the law of the sea, therefore, is a struggle between the conflicting 
interests of coastal States seeking to control areas of the sea contiguous to their shorelines on 
the one hand, and States seeking to maximise freedom of the seas for navigational and 
commercial purposes on the other.3 
 Traditionally, naval conflicts have ranged globally, as the strategies employed by Lord 
Nelson and both the Royal Navy and the United States Navy in the First and Second World 
Wars clearly demonstrate.4  These global naval strategies often clashed with the claims of 
neutrals to unimpeded access to sea lines of communication.  For example, the zones 
established during the Second World War imposed considerable operational difficulties on the 
rights of neutrals.  Neutral claims have also been affected in other ways, as the “Altmark 
incident” demonstrates.5  
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This chapter focuses on how the evolution of the law of the sea has impacted on 
belligerent claims to control the seas during war and other periods of armed conflict at sea.  
Attempts to codify the law of the sea in the latter half of the 20th century culminated in the 
1982 LOS Convention,6 which has been characterised as a “new constitution for the oceans.”7  
This study begins with an overview of the modern law of the sea regime, since the 1982 LOS 
Convention delineates areas of the oceans and permits littoral States to claim waters that 
impact on the ability of navies to operate.  Moreover, the number of coastal States has 
increased from 60 in 1945 to 151 in 1997, enlarging the potential claims that effectively carve 
up of the world’s seas.8  As a result of these maritime claims, about 50,000,000 square miles 
of the world’s oceans and seas are governed by some form of coastal sovereignty.9  This 
equals an area covering more than 27% of the world’s oceans and seas and is larger than the 
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Atlantic Ocean.10  With the advent of the Exclusive Economic Zones regime under the 1982 
LOS Convention, an even larger area of the world’s seas fall under some form of limited State 
sovereignty.  Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov calculated (at the time 
the 1982 LOS Convention was being negotiated) that if all coastal States claimed a 200 
nautical mile territorial sea, approximately 54-58 million square miles of ocean—of a total of 
about 139 million square miles—would be subject to coastal State sovereignty.11  Although a 
12-mile limit was put on the breadth of the territorial sea, a State may claim a 200-mile EEZ 
under the terms of the 1982 LOS Convention and most States have done so.  According to the 
Fisheries Centre of the University of British Columbia, after taking into account all claims 
asserted by States over the world’s oceans, the high seas constitute some 85 milion square 
miles.12  Thus, Admiral Gorshkov’s prediction has become reality: States have claimed more 
than 40% of the world’s oceans.   
Moreover, one should not under-estimate the scope of international shipping in the 
modern world and the tremendous rise in the commercial uses of the sea lanes of 
communication when compared with a century ago: 
 
The value of U.S. imports and exports in 2002 was a thousand 
times what it was in 1900.  Roughly 80 percent by volume of that 
portion of all international trade travels the sea lanes of the world, 
and some 90 percent of that portion is transported in cargo 
containers.  Nearly nine million containers arrive annually in the 
301 American ports of entry.13 
 
Of course, coupled with the rise in commercial shipping, the significant changes in the size 
and types of modern merchant vessels that ply the world’s oceans play a central role in how 
such vessels are dealt with by military warships and aircraft.  The Note on Modern Merchant 
Vessels in Chapter 7 expands upon this issue. 
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Because it defines the legal regime in the environment in which naval forces operate, 
the 1982 LOS Convention sets the parameters for the exercise of naval power.  Moreover, 
several aspects of the law of the sea regime under the 1982 LOS Convention have made 
significant encroachments into the traditional high seas.  The following analysis focuses on 
the law of the sea regime as it relates to freedom of navigation and operational issues for 
warships and naval aircraft and how the new divisions of the ocean impact on the ability of 
belligerents to establish anduse NEZs.  In order to place the 1982 LOS Convention regime in 
proper perspective, and because many of its provisions reflect custom, it is necessary to 
survey briefly the customary law of the sea, which applied at the time many of the zones 
described in the first chapter were established.  The contributions of the 1958 and 1960 
United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea to the development of the law will then be 
briefly analysed, before fully discussing the 1982 LOS Convention rules affecting freedom of 
navigation. 
 
II. Customary Law of the Sea and Naval Operations 
 
Although Roman law had accepted the notion of freedom of the seas,14 this doctrine 
fell into gradual decline in direct proportion to the rise of city-states, principalities and 
eventually nation States in Europe as a result of the disintegration of the Holy Roman 
Empire.15  These new States quickly began asserting exclusive rights of navigation, with the 
boldest such claim being those asserted by Spain and Portugal under the 1494 Treaty of 
Tordesillas.  With this treaty, the Iberian States codified the Papal Bull of Pope Alexander VI 
splitting the then-known oceans of the world between these two maritime powers.16  Other 
seafaring powers, such as England, vacillated between policies that maximised freedom of 
navigation and policies that maximised national claims over the oceans.  Thus, during the 
reign of the Plantagenet and Stuart monarchies, England laid extensive maritime claims, 
whereas Elizabeth actively opposed the maritime claims of Venice, Portugal and Spain.17   
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 In the early 17th century, a debate concerning mare liberum and mare clausum ensued.  
Grotius played a significant role in this debate, arguing in favour of freedom of navigation.18  
Nevertheless, Grotius recognised that certain limited areas of the sea might be subject to 
control from the adjacent coastal State.19   
The doctrine of a territorial sea was further refined during the 17th and 18th centuries as 
the result of two parallel developments.  First, the law of neutrality played an important role 
in the development of the custom of a territorial sea, since prize courts routinely held that 
prizes captured within the range of neutral coastal artillery must be returned to their lawful 
owner.20  Second, the ability of the littoral State effectively to exercise control over the 
adjacent sea was a direct function of the effective range of coastal artillery, approximately 
three miles.  As Fulton succinctly put it: 
 
[T]he maritime dominion of a State ended where its power of 
asserting continuous possession ended.  The belt of sea along the 
coast which could be commanded and controlled by artillery on 
shore thus came to be regarded as the territorial sea belonging to 
the contiguous State.  Beyond the range of guns on shore the sea 
was common.21 
 
The principle of a three-mile territorial sea thus came to be known as the “cannon-shot rule,” 
a term attributed to the Dutch legal scholar Cornelius van Bynkershoek.22  As one scholar has 
noted: 
 
The cannon-shot rule, as understood in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, was meant to guard neutral states against 
being drawn into the quarrels of warring Powers by discouraging 
warlike actions, such as the taking of prizes, within neutral harbors, 
and within a zone circumscribed by the actual range of cannons 
stationed on neutral shores.23 
 
 Notwithstanding subsequent refinements in the range of coastal artillery, by the end of 
the 18th century, there was general acceptance for a three-mile band of territorial sea24 adjacent 
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to the coastal State and this principle remained largely intact until the end of the Second 
World War.25  The Scandinavian States constituted the one notable regional exception to this 
general rule.  By 1672, Denmark, a major maritime power that once made extensive claims 
throughout the North Sea for historical reasons,26 had declared a defensive maritime belt 
adjacent to her shoreline.  The breadth of this belt was set at one Scandinavian league, which 
was four nautical miles as compared to the standard league of three nautical miles.27  The 
other Nordic States followed suit after attaining their independence and the Scandinavian 
States maintained the four-mile rule until the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
Contemporaneously with the acceptance of the three-mile breadth of the territorial sea, 
littoral States began asserting a greater degree of sovereignty over their territorial sea, leading 
one prominent commentator to conclude that by the early 20th century it was beyond dispute 
that “the territorial sea is subject to sovereignty.”28  Thus, under customary international law, 
the sovereignty that coastal States may exercise over their territorial sea is identical to that 
which they possess with respect to their land territory and internal waters with one important 
exception: the right of innocent passage.29   
 It was perhaps inevitable that, having developed a custom with respect to the territorial 
sea, certain coastal States would begin asserting sovereignty over ever increasing bands of the 
sea, generally out to twelve nautical miles from shore.30  Such claims, known as “hovering 
acts,” typically took the form of extending jurisdiction with respect to the enforcement of 
excise and customs laws and regulations, although certain South American States also 
included fiscal, revenue, and security provisions.31  The lack of uniformity in state practice 
regarding both the permissible scope and breadth of jurisdiction over such contiguous zones, 
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combined with the objections of many maritime powers, has led one commentator to conclude 
that such zones were not customary international law, prior to the 1958 Territorial Sea 
Convention.32  Similarly, although many States advanced claims either to the exclusive rights 
to exploit fishery resources beyond their territorial sea or to regulate such exploration, no 
customary right to exclusive economic rights to the resources of the high seas existed.33 
 Thus, by 1945, customary international law divided the oceans into three distinct 
categories: 1) internal waters; 2) the territorial sea; and 3) the high seas, broadly defined as the 
remainder of the oceans.  All States were permitted freedom of the high seas, including, inter 
alia, freedom of navigation, resource exploitation, scientific research, and (during times of 
armed conflict at sea) the right of belligerents to conduct hostilities.34  Thus, compared with 
the current state of the law of the sea, with coastal States able to exert some form of 
sovereignty over vast stretches of the world’s seas, the customary law of the sea at the end of 
the Second World War permitted such States to make relatively limited claims.  Nevertheless, 
even these “limited” claims still caused considerable problems for naval planners and 
operators.35   
 
III. Post-World War II Developments 
 
 The precipitating factor that caused this customary law of the sea to unravel was the 
U.S. claim to exercise jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the seabed and 
subsoil of the U.S. continental shelf.36  In asserting this claim, President Truman stressed that 
the right to “free and unimpeded navigation” on the high seas of the waters above the 
continental shelf was in no way affected by this claim.37  The most important effect that this 
assertion of jurisdiction had was not on freedom of navigation, but rather the effect that this 
“unilateral claim by the then-pre-eminent maritime power and one of the leading exponents of 
                                                
32
  Robertson, p. 6. 
 
33
  Ibid.; Jessup, p. 20.  
 
34
  Robertson, p. 7. 
 
35
  See Chapter 5, the discussion on the Altmark above at note 5, and other incidents impacting neutral-
belligerent relations occurring in World War II, for example. 
 
36
  Presidential Proclamation 2667, 28 September 1945. 10 Fed.Reg. 12303 (1945); 40 AJIL (Supplement, 
1946) p. 47.  The ICJ Judgment in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), 
1951 I.C.J. Reports 116 (Merits), also played a role in the developments that followed in this respect. 
 
37
  Presidential Proclamation 2667, 28 September 1945. 10 Fed.Reg. 12303 (1945); 40 AJIL (Supplement, 
1946) p. 47.  
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the freedom of the high seas”38 would have on other coastal States.  In the wake of this 
presidential proclamation, many States extended their territorial sea claims to six or twelve 
miles,39 or in the case of a few States, to 200 nautical miles.40  
 By 1951, the variance in the breadth of such claims prompted the General Assembly to 
recommend that the International Law Commission (“ILC”) begin work on a treaty governing 
the territorial sea.  Seven years later, the First United Nations (or Geneva) Conference on the 
Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS I”) convened with the goal of establishing the breadth of the 
territorial sea, on the basis of a draft treaty prepared by the ILC at its eighth session in 1956.41   
 
A. UNCLOS I42 
  
The 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea produced four treaties, only three 
of which are relevant for purposes of the present work:43 the 1958 High Seas Convention, the 
1958 Territorial Sea Convention, and the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention.  With respect to 
the 1958 High Seas Convention, that treaty defined the high seas as being “all parts of the sea 
that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State.”44  Article 2 of 
the treaty forbids States to purport to subject any part of the high seas to sovereignty and 
guarantees, inter alia, freedom of navigation45 and freedom to fly over the high seas.46   
Pursuant to the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, coastal States may establish zones 
contiguous to their territorial sea for the purposes of preventing infringement of customs, 
                                                
 
38
  Robertson, p. 7. 
 
39
  28 Department of State Bulletin, pp. 486-487. 
 
40
  Including Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uruguay.  Rose, p. 73, note 23; Robertson, p. 7. 
 
41
  2 YB of the I.L.C. 12 [1956] (A/CN.4/97). 
 
42
  For a discussion of the UNCLOS I negotiations, with passing reference to the impact of the 1958 
treaties on naval warfare, see Carl M. Franklin, The Law of the Sea: Some Recent Developments (With 
Particular Reference to the United Nations Conference of 1958), 53 US NWC International Law Studies 
1959-1960.   
 
43
  The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, which entered 
into force 20 March 1966 (559 UNTS 285, TIAS 5969, 17 UST 138) is the other treaty concluded at the 
1958 Geneva Conference. 
 
44
  Article 1. 
 
45
  Article 2(1). 
 
46
  Article 2(4). 
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fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within the territory or territorial sea of the littoral 
State.47  Notwithstanding this agreement, there was widespread disagreement concerning the 
exclusive right to control fishing in the contiguous zone.48   
Under Article 24(2) of the treaty, the coastal State may claim a contiguous zone not to 
extend greater than 12 miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured.  However, the States Parties were unable to define the breadth of the territorial sea, 
one of the primary reasons why the Geneva Conference was convened.  Thus, although a 
contiguous zone could be claimed up to twelve miles from the baseline, the extent of the 
territorial sea within that twelve-mile band was intentionally left unclear. 
Although the delegates failed to specify the breadth of the territorial sea, the 1958 
Territorial Sea Convention was successful with respect to codifying the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea.49  Although this right existed for commercial ships under 
customary law,50 the right of innocent passage for warships was not clear.  In the North 
Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration, Elihu Root declared that “Warships may not pass 
without consent into [the territorial sea] zone, because they threaten.”51  The International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) held in the Corfu Channel Case that warships had the right to 
innocent passage through the territorial seas of international straits, although the court 
specifically reserved the question whether the right existed in other territorial waters.52  The 
commentators in the first half of the 20th century were divided on the issue of innocent 
passage for warships, with Jessup writing, “the sound rule seems to be that [warships] should 
not enjoy an absolute right to pass through a State’s territorial waters any more than an army 
                                                
 
47
  Article 24. 
 
48
  Robertson, p. 8. 
 
49
  1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Section III (Articles 14-23). 
 
50
  Jessup, p. 120. 
 
51
  11 Proceedings, North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration 2007 (1912).  This is ironic since Root was 
a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and the U.S. has recently been the most steadfast defender of 
rights of passage for warships.  The U.S. position regarding innocent passage for warships changed 180 
degrees between 1930 Hague Codification Conference on the Law of the Sea, where the U.S. was one 
of only four States that denied the right of innocent passage, and the drafting of the 1958 Territorial Sea 
Convention, at which time the U.S. supported the right of innocent passage during times of peace.  The 
end of isolationist sentiments in the U.S. in the 1930s contributed to this shift, as did the the U.S. 
Navy’s experience in the Second World War.  During the isolationist era, the U.S. was concerned about 
the presence of foreign warships in U.S. waters, but after 1945, the U.S. Navy was particularly 
interested in maintaining a robust and flexible approach to innocent passage through the territorial seas 
of other States.  See Slonim, pp. 116-118 and the sources cited therein.   
 
52
  Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. Reports 4, p. 30. (Merits).  
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may cross the land territory.”53  Other scholars took a contrary view, arguing that warships 
enjoy a customary right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.54   
Despite the advances made by the 1958 treaty in codifying the law of the sea, the 
failure of the Geneva Conference to reach agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea and 
on the extent of fishing rights in the contiguous zone—the two most important items on the 
conference agenda—prompted the General Assembly to vote overwhelmingly to convene a 
second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS II. 
 
B.  UNCLOS II 
 
 The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was assembled in 1960 
with the goal of resolving the breadth of the territorial sea.  This conference also failed 
following the rejection of a compromise proposal put forward by the U.S. and Canada for a 
six-mile territorial sea with an adjacent six-mile exclusive fishery zone and following this 
failure, States began abandoning the concept of a three-mile territorial sea,55 as Table 1 
indicates. 
As shown in Table 1, the three-mile territorial sea was accepted by a wide majority of 
the world’s coastal States in 1945.  Over the course of the next three decades, however, the 
number of coastal States nearly doubled as a result of decolonisation.  This process had two 
important components.  First, a growing number of littoral States began asserting claims to 
wider territorial seas.  Thus, by 1965, a majority of States was claiming territorial seas of 
between four and eleven nautical miles, and in 1974, shortly after the commencement of the 
Third United Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 States were claiming territorial seas of at 
least twelve miles.  Second, many of these newly independent States sought to extend 
exclusive jurisdiction over the resources of the sea to ever increasing distances. 
 The erosion of support for the customary three-mile territorial sea and the desire of 
many new coastal States to secure exclusive control over the resources of the sea adjacent to 
their territorial seas were among the principal reasons for convening yet another international 
conference on the law of the sea. 
                                                
 
53
  Jessup, p. 120.  See also Hall, International Law, 7th ed., 1917 (Higgins, ed.), p. 163; and Oppenheim’s 
International Law, 8th ed., 1955 (Lauterpacht, ed.), Vol. 1, pp. 494, 853. 
 
54
  See, for example, 1 Hyde, International Law, 2nd ed., 1945, p. 516; 1 Moore Digest of International 
Law, 1906, pp. 700-701; and 1 Westlake, International Law, 2nd ed., 1910, p. 196.  
 
55
  Robertson, pp. 9-10. 
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Table 1 Expansion of Territorial Sea Claims 
National Claims 
 
1945 1958 1965 1974 1979 1983 1994 1997* 
3 NM**     46 45 32 28 23 25 5   4 
4-11 NM     12 19 24 14 7 5 5   4 
12 NM       2 9 26 54 76 79 119 122 
12+ NM       0 2 3 20 25 30 17   15 
Number of Coastal States     60 75 85 116 131 139 146 151 
 
Source: 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, Table A1-6, p. 100. 
 
* Excludes information on the territorial sea claims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eritrea, Georgia 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 
 
**NM – Nautical Miles 
 
C. UNCLOS III 
 
 The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS III, began in 
1973 and during the course of the nine years that elapsed before the 1982 LOS Convention 
was signed on 10 December 1982, the entire law of the sea was re-examined.  Reflecting the 
breadth of the issues dealt with at UNCLOS III, the treaty contains 320 articles and nine 
annexes (containing 125 additional articles).56  Many of the provisions of the 1982 LOS 
Convention duplicate similar provisions in the four 1958 treaties and other provisions codify 
customary law.  Nevertheless, the treaty comprehensively deals with legal divisions of the 
oceans and airspace above and the relations, activities and interests of States relating to the 
use of the world’s seas.  The Appendix explains the legal divisions of the oceans and airspace 
above the oceans under the 1982 LOS Convention. 
 
IV. The Status of the 1982 LOS Convention During Armed 
Conflict 
 
Professor Oxman has written that, “To the extent one continues to divide public 
international law into the two classic categories—the laws of war and the laws of peace—the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea would doubtlessly fall into the latter category.”57  Or, as 
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  There are several excellent treatises on the 1982 LOS Convention, including Churchill and Lowe.  
 
Chapter Four: The Modern Law of the Sea Regime and Naval Warfare 
Mundis 159 
Professor Lowe has noted, “Neither the 1958 nor the 1982 Law of the Sea Conventions make 
any provision for their continuation, modification, or abrogation in time of war or armed 
conflict.”58  Although the 1982 LOS Convention does not govern armed conflict at sea, it does 
contain several provisions that are applicable to naval operations.  For example, Article 301 
sets forth a general requirement that States refrain from maritime activities that are 
inconsistent with the U.N. Charter and especially from any threat or use of force.59   
It is of little significance that the 1982 LOS Convention is not regarded as among the 
treaties or law governing the conduct of hostilities, however.  This follows from the fact that 
declarations of war have become historical anachronisms,60 a fact which calls into question 
whether any legal consequences follow from describing a particular conflict as a “war.”61  
Historically, war was a legal condition between States and the legal distinction between war 
and peace was so great that once war was declared between States the law of war governed 
their relationship until peace was restored.62  As noted by Greenwood, prior to World War II, 
war had four main consequences under international law: 
 
1.  The laws of war became applicable to govern the conduct of 
hostilities between the parties; 
 
2.  The non-hostile relations of the parties, such as the application 
of treaties between them, were affected; 
 
3.  Relations between the belligerents and other States became 
subject to the laws of neutrality; and 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
57
  Oxman, p. 811.  However, as Professor Christopher J. Greenwood has pointed out, it is no longer 
certain whether the concept of war continues to exist under international law in light of the UN Charter.  
See Greenwood Concept of War, pp. 33-34, 56-59 and the sources cited therein.  See also Elihu 
Lauterpacht, “The Legal Irrelevance of the ‘State of War,’” 62 Proceedings of the ASIL (1968), pp. 58-
83. 
 
58
  Lowe July 1988, p. 289. 
 
59
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 301.  For an analysis of the peaceful purposes provisions of the 1982 
LOS Convention, see Boleslaw A. Boczek, “Peaceful Purposes Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,” 20 Ocean Development and International Law, pp. 359-389 (No. 4, 
1989) 
 
60
  There have been no formal declarations of war since World War II.  Greenwood Concept of War, p. 33. 
 
61
  Ibid., p. 58.  See also Australian Manual, para. 7.2, citing to Greenwood Concept of War, in support of 
the notion that “the international legal character of war has ceased to have any real effect.” 
 
62
  Greenwood Concept of War, p. 34. See also H.H.G. Post, “Some Curiosities in the Sources of the Law 
of Armed Conflict Conceived in a General International Law Perspective,” 25 Netherlands YBIL 83, p. 
90. 
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4.  The creation of a state of war acquired added significance in 
relation to a belligerent’s obligations to the international 
community as a whole.63 
 
All four of these consequences will be discussed in the present work.  The second point, 
however, is relevant with respect to the effect of the 1982 LOS Convention on naval warfare.   
Unlike the effect of armed conflict on treaties between the belligerents, the outbreak of 
war does not result in the suspension of treaties between belligerent and neutral States.  
Traditionally, one of the most important legal consequences of a state of war was the 
automatic termination or suspension of treaty obligations between the belligerents,64 although 
armed conflict falling short of war did not have the same result.65  One commentator has 
written, “The legal effect of the outbreak of hostilities between parties to a treaty is still 
uncertain, and the only comprehensive treatment of the subject is now out of date.”66  
However, the characterisation of a conflict as war has “no special legal significance in 
relation to the termination or suspension of treaties.”67  Since the designation of an armed 
conflict as war signifies conflict on a large scale, it would follow, ipso facto, that armed 
conflict which does not rise to the level of intensity associated with war would likewise have 
no legal effect with respect to terminating or suspending treaty obligations.   
Moreover, it appears to be settled that during times of armed conflict, treaties 
“creating special regimes or fixing boundaries will continue in force, although their practical 
application may be affected by military operations.”68  The 1982 LOS Convention certainly 
establishes a regime, and, insofar as it delineates areas of the world’s oceans, it may be 
compared to treaties fixing boundaries.  Lowe has written that there is “widespread 
                                                
 
63
  Greenwood Concept of War, pp. 46-47. 
 
64
  In general, see Delbrück, pp. 310-315; McNair, pp. 695-728; and Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s 
International Law, Vol. 2 (7th ed., 1952), para. 99. 
 
65
  Greenwood Concept of War, pp. 48-49. 
 
66
  Aust, p. 243.  The outdated text that the author refers to is McNair.  See also Oppenheim Vol. 1, p. 
1310, para. 655. 
 
67
  Greenwood Concept of War, p. 49.  See also Aust, p. 243.  Moreover, the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties does not deal specifically with the outbreak of hostilities, other than stating in Article 
73 that, “The provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge any question that may arise in 
regard to a treaty … from the outbreak of hostilities.”  Since 2005, the International Law Commission 
has been working on a project entitled, “Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties.” 
 
68
  Aust, p. 244; Delbrück, p. 312; McNair, pp. 704-715. 
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agreement” for the proposition that those rules concerning the delimitation of maritime zones 
“should remain unaffected by the outbreak of war.”69 
Nevertheless, in the event that the parties to the treaty intended it to apply only during 
times of peace, or if the maintenance of peace is essential to the effectiveness of the treaty, 
suspension of the treaty during periods of war or lesser forms of hostility may still be 
warranted.70  Neither of these conditions applies during episodes of armed conflict at sea.  
That is, there is no indication that the 1982 LOS Convention was intended to apply only 
during periods of peace.  In fact, it may be inferred from the numerous provisions outlining 
navigational rights for warships that its provisions were intended to apply during both times 
of peace and during periods of armed conflict, including war (in the event that concept still 
has any meaning).   
With respect to the second situation in which treaty obligations may be suspended, the 
1982 LOS Convention does not, and cannot, require the maintenance of peace in order to be 
effective.  The 1982 LOS Convention is nearly universal in its acceptance and most of its 
provisions reflect custom.  Moreover, by its nature, it governs a significant portion of the 
world’s surface, and affects the majority of the world’s States.  For belligerents to suspend its 
terms during armed conflict would lead to an unconscionable result.  
Finally, one of the primary purposes of international humanitarian law is the 
protection of the individual during armed conflict.  Pursuant to Article 60(5) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a 
consequence of its breach by another party is not permissible with respect to treaties of a 
humanitarian character relating to the protection of individuals.71   
Based on the above analysis, the provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention apply both 
during peace and during periods of armed conflict.  In the words of Professor Oxman: 
 
[I]t would be contradictory to conclude that the maritime powers 
that strove so long, hard and successfully to preserve maximum 
freedom for military activities at sea in times of peace envisaged 
that the new regimes of the law of the sea entailed significant 
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  Lowe July 1988, p. 296. 
 
70
  Greenwood Concept of War, p. 49, citing to resolution of the Institut de Droit International, adopted at 
the Helsinki session, 1985.  See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/Conf. 
39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AJIL 875 (1969), 8 ILM 679 (1969), Article 62. 
 
71
  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 60(5).  See also Lowe July 1988, p. 289. 
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restrictions on their freedom of operation in times of armed 
conflict.72 
 
At the same time, the comments of Professor Green should be kept in mind.  In noting that it 
is “impossible to ignore” the 1982 LOS Convention, “it must be constantly remembered that 
this Convention was drafted with peacetime use of the seas in mind with little or no attention 
paid to the issue of belligerent activities or rights.”73 
 
V. Regions of Naval Operations During Armed Conflict 
 
 The modern law of the sea regime classifies the world’s waters into several categories:  
 
[S]overeign waters (i.e., internal waters, territorial sea, and 
archipelagic waters), international straits and archipelagic sea-
lanes (distinguishing between transit and archipelagic sea-lanes 
transit and innocent passage), the EEZ and continental shelf, and 
the high seas and seabed beyond national jurisdiction.74 
 
The permissible scope of naval operations in each of these areas is described below75 and 
Figure 1 will be of assistance in understanding these divisions. 
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  Oxman, p. 812. 
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  L.C. Green, Comment No. 8, in Robertson Bochumer Schriften, p. 99. 
 
74
  J. Ashley Roach, “The Law of Naval Warfare at the Turn of Two Centuries,” 94 AJIL 64 (No. 1, 
January 2000), p. 68 (footnote omitted). 
 
75
  There is a vast literature on the impact of the 1982 LOS Convention on naval warfare.  See, for 
example, Francioni; Francesco Francioni, Peacetime Use of Force, Military Activities, and the New Law 
of the Sea, 18 Cornell International Law Journal, 203-226 (No. 2, Summer 1985); David L. Larson, 
Security Issues and the Law of the Sea: A General Framework, 15 Ocean Development & International 
Law, pp. 99-146 (No. 2, 1985); Vaughan A. Lowe, The Impact of the Law of the Sea on Naval Warfare, 
14 Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce, pp. 657-698 (No. 4, 1988); Lowe July 1986; 
Lowe July 1988; R.W.G. de Muralt, The Military Aspects of the UN Law of the Sea Convention, 32 
Netherlands International Law Review, pp. 78-99 (No. 1, 1985); and Oxman.  See also Part Two of 
John Norton Moore and Robert F. Turner (eds.), Readings in International Law from the US Naval War 
College Review 1978-1994, 68 U.S. NWC International Law Studies, which contains sixteen chapters 
on law of the oceans and seapower.  
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Figure 1 Law of the Sea Delineations and Terminology 
Source: Canadian Manual, Figure 8-1, p. 8-1 
 
 
A. Territory and Waters of the Belligerent Parties 
 
 It is well-settled that naval warfare may be conducted in and on the territory, internal 
waters, territorial sea, EEZ, continental shelf, archipelagic waters (where applicable), and in 
the airspace over these land and sea areas of the belligerent parties.76  Such acts of warfare 
include both actual armed attack on persons and objects, and means of economic warfare at 
sea including, inter alia, visiting and searching; ordering a vessel to take a specific course; 
capture of ships; requisitioning of cargo; confiscating or bringing a vessel into port; and 
blockade.77  Thus, with respect to the internal and territorial waters of the belligerents, these 
are legitimate areas for belligerent operations. 
 
                                                
 
76
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.2.1; U.K. Manual, para. 13.6; Soviet Manual, pp. 
417-419; Canadian Manual, para. 804.1; German Manual, paras. 1010, 1013; Interim New Zealand 
Manual, para. 703.1; San Remo Manual, para. 10(a). 
 
77
  German Manual, para. 1014. 
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B. Internal Waters, Territorial Sea and Archipelagic Waters of Neutrals 
 
Belligerents must respect the sovereign rights of neutral States78 and therefore, naval 
warfare must not be conducted in the internal waters, territorial seas and archipelagic waters 
of neutral States or in the airspace above such territory.79  Pursuant to Article 2 of the 1982 
LOS Convention, subject to the right of innocent passage for foreign ships, the territorial sea 
is under the authority of the coastal State.  As Professor Lowe has noted, “From this it follows 
that the coastal State has complete control over the use of the territorial sea for the 
deployment of weapons systems and other military devices.”80  The expansion of the 
permissible breadth of the territorial sea to 12 nautical miles has had no effect on the legal 
regime of neutrality as such.81  However, it has had a significant practical effect on naval 
armed conflict in that it has removed 3,000,000 square miles of ocean from the area in which 
belligerent forces may conduct offensive combat operations.82  
Belligerent forces are prohibited from using neutral waters as a sanctuary or base of 
operations against enemy forces or on persons or objects located outside neutral waters or 
territory and other prohibited acts of war within neutral waters and territory include, inter 
alia, attack on or capture of persons or objects; laying of mines; or the visit, search, diversion 
or capture of vessels.83  
In general, passage through or entrance to neutral waters by belligerent warships and 
auxiliary vessels may be restricted or prohibited, provided that such restrictions or 
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  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 1.  See also U.K. Manual, paras. 13.8-13.9; Canadian Manual, 
para. 806; German Manual, para. 1118.  Although the 1907 Hague Convention XIII is not universally 
ratified, and several important maritime States (including the United Kingdom) are not parties, most of 
its provisions are declaratory of international law.  Dietrich Schindler, Commentary on Hague 
Convention XIII,in Ronzitti, pp. 211-222 at pp. 215, 221.  For a succinct summary of the traditional 
scope of the rights and duties of neutral States pursuant to the 1907 Hague Convention XIII, see 
Robertson, pp. 13-15.  The law of neutrality is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 2.  See also 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 
7.3.3-7.3.7; U.K. Manual, para. 13.8; Canadian Manual, para. 806; German Manual, para. 1119; Interim 
New Zealand Manual, paras. 703.1, 706.1 and San Remo Manual, paras. 15-18.  
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  Lowe July 1986, p. 173.  For a general discussion of military issues related to innocent passage, see 
ibid., pp. 173-176. 
 
81
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.4.1 and Robertson, pp. 16-17. 
 
82
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.4.1. 
 
83
  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Articles 2, 5; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.4; U.K. 
Manual, para. 13.9; Canadian Manual, para. 807; German Manual para. 1120; Interim New Zealand 
Manual, paras. 706.1-706.2; San Remo Manual, paras.16-17. 
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prohibitions are non-discriminatory,84 and that the territorial sea does not lead to an 
international strait.85  Nevertheless, without jeopardising its neutrality, and consistent with the 
duty of impartiality, a neutral State may permit belligerent States to undertake certain acts.  
These acts include passage through the territorial sea and archipelagic waters (if applicable);86 
replenishment by belligerent warships or auxiliaries of food, water and fuel sufficient to reach 
a port in its own territory;87 and any repairs necessary to make the belligerent warship or 
auxiliary vessel seaworthy.88  The duration of passage through the territorial sea or presence 
for replenishment or repair must not exceed 24 hours, unless “unavoidable on account of 
damage or of the stress of weather.”89  While the ban on actual combat in neutral waters 
remains good law, the “24-hour rule” has not been taken seriously by either belligerents or 
neutrals that have engaged in extensive armed conflict at sea since 1945, thus calling into 
question whether this rule has fallen into desuetude—at least when considering the practice of 
the major naval powers.90   
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  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.4; Canadian Manual, para. 808; Interim New 
Zealand Manual, para. 706.5; San Remo Manual, para. 19. 
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  1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 13; 1982 LOS Convention Articles 25(3) and 45(2); 1995 U.S. 
Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.4; Robertson, p. 18. 
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  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.4; Canadian Manual, para. 809(a); San Remo 
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  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 7.3.2.2, 7.3.4; Canadian Manual, para. 809(b); San 
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Canadian Manual, para. 810; San Remo Manual, para. 21. 
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  Although the 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook (at para. 7.3.2.1.), the Canadian Manual (at 
para. 810.1), the German Manual (at para. 1127) and the San Remo Manual (at para. 21), reiterate the 
24-hour rule, the practice of the United States and the United Kingdom during both the Vietnam War 
and the Falklands War, seem to run contrary to the spirit—if not the actual obligations—of the 1907 
Hague Convention XIII, Articles 12-13.  The U.K. Manual clearly takes the view that this rule is “no 
longer applicable in view of modern State practice.”  U.K. Manual, para. 13.4.  See also Steven Haines, 
“The United Kingdom’s Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict and the San Remo Manual: Maritime 
Rules Compared,” 36 Israel YB on Human Rights (2006), pp. 89-118, at pp. 103-104.  But see 
Heintschel von Heinegg San Remo, at pp. 141-142 (“despite allegations to the contrary, the 24-hours 
rule also belongs to those essentialia neutralitatis”).  Schindler considers the rule to be customary 
international law.  Dietrich Schindler, Commentary to Hague Convention XIII, in Ronzitti, pp. 211-222 
at p. 218. 
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Neutral States have a duty to ensure that belligerents do not violate the regime of 
neutral waters.91  In the event the neutral State fails in this duty, the opposing belligerent must 
so notify the neutral State, providing a reasonable time for the neutral State to correct the 
violation.  If this fails, and the violation constitutes an immediate threat to the opposing 
belligerent, then that belligerent may use such force as is necessary to respond to the threat 
that the violation poses, in the absence of any alternative.92  
Belligerent military and auxiliary aircraft may not enter neutral airspace and should 
they do so, the neutral State may take action to require the aircraft to land on its territory and 
intern the air crew for the duration of the armed conflict.93   
 
C. Operations in Archipelagic Waters Outside Archipelagic Sea Lanes94 
 
The issue of archipelagic waters outside archipelagic sea-lanes are particularly 
problematic, although as Ronzitti has noted, State practice is almost non-existent regarding 
the status of such waters,95 as reflected in the 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook: 
 
The balance of neutral and belligerent rights and duties with 
respect to neutral waters is, however, at its most unsettled in the 
context of archipelagic waters. 
 
Belligerent forces must refrain from acts of hostility in neutral 
archipelagic waters and from using them as a sanctuary or a base 
of operations.96 
 
                                                
 
91
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3; U.K. Manual, para. 13.8; Canadian Manual, para. 
811; German Manual, para. 1109; San Remo Manual, paras. 15 and 22. 
 
92
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3; Canadian Manual, para. 811.2; German Manual, 
para. 1109; San Remo Manual, para. 22. 
 
93
  San Remo Manual, para. 18.  The neutral State may attack the aircraft (unless it is a medical transport 
aircraft) in the event the order to land is disobeyed.  See also 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, 
paras. 7.3, 7.3.7.1; U.K. Manual, para. 12.17; German Manual, paras. 1149-1155. 
 
94
  Robertson has identified several potential issues with respect to armed conflicts in archipelagic waters 
in the future.  Robertson, p. 32.  See also Rauch, pp. 32-33. 
 
95
  Ronzittit, Comment No. 16, in Robertson Bochumer Schriften, pp. 132-133 (“the status of neutral 
Archipelagic Waters in time of war is destined to remain for the time being a moot point, since State 
practice on the matter is almost not existent and it is still to be ascertained whether belligerents would 
be ready to accept the equation between archipelagic waters and neutral waters”).  Shearer argues that 
the concept of archipelagic is a sui generis regime and thus further characteristics of such waters remain 
to be developed “in accordance with the classic processes of customary law creation.”  Shearer, 
Comment No. 17, in ibid., p. 135. 
 
96
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.6, see also ibid, para. 2.3.4.2; San Remo Manual, 
paras. 16-17.  Compare 1907 Hague Convention XIII, Articles 1, 2 and 5. 
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Operations in archipelagic waters thus pose particularly difficult legal and logistical issues 
both for belligerent naval forces and for neutral archipelagic States which must ensure that the 
inviolability of its neutral waters are respected.97  The legal character of archipelagic waters is 
“essentially identical to that of the territorial sea”98 and the San Remo Manual provides that 
subject to the provisions of the archipelagic sea lanes passage, “the archipelagic waters of 
neutral States should be equated to the territorial sea.”99  Therein lays the difficulties in terms 
of naval operations, since as Professor Shearer notes:  
 
This is a very difficult problem, because the temptation for one 
belligerent to take unlawful sanctuary in archipelagic waters and 
for the other to launch an attack there will be very great.  Not only 
are the sea lanes in question extensive—in some cases very large 
indeed—a number of archipelagic States are poor and have little or 
no capability to enforce neutrality laws.100 
 
Given the strategic importance of certain archipelagic waters (such as those of Indonesia), 
Greenwood has questioned whether:  
 
[T]he use by belligerent warships of archipelagic waters outside 
archipelagic sea lanes (or, if no sea lanes have been declared, 
outside established international shipping routes) should always be 
regarded as an attempt to use neutral waters as a base, or cloak for 
hostile operations?”101 
 
There are also logistical and financial considerations that confront naval powers when 
operating in these waters.  From this point of view, it is worth considering the following 
example that the closing of the Indonesian archipelago to transiting naval forces could have 
on the U.S. Navy.  Assume that a six-ship conventionally-powered carrier battle group were 
steaming from Yokosuka, Japan, to Bahrain and that these vessels were prevented from 
transiting the Indonesian archipelago and Straits of Malacca, forcing them to detour around 
Australia.  The U.S. government has estimated that this detour would add 5,800 nautical miles 
to the journey, requiring an extra 15 days of transit time.  The extra fuel costs associated with 
                                                
 
97
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.6; San Remo Manual, para. 22; 1907 Hague 
Convention XIII, Article 25.  With respect to innocent passage through archipelagic waters outside 
archipelagic sea lanes, see 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 2.3.4.2. 
 
98
  Robertson Bochumer Schriften, p. 46. 
 
99
  San Remo Manual, para. 15 and Explantion, para. 15.2. 
 
100
  I.A. Shearer, Comment No. 17 in Robertson Bochumer Schriften, p. 135. 
 
101
  Christopher Greenwood, Comment No. 9 in Robertson Bochumer Schriften, p. 107 (emphasis added). 
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this detour would amount to more than $3 million.102  Moreover, requiring such a detour 
during armed conflict would be more dangerous in that such a route would be predictable to 
enemy forces. 
Finally, with respect to archipelagic waters it should be pointed out that several major 
Pacific naval battles of the Second World War, including the Battle of the Coral Sea, the 
Battle of the Java Sea and the Battle for Leyte Gulf, occurred in waters that would be 
characterised as archipelagic waters under the 1982 LOS Convention.103  Consequently, it is 
difficult to imagine how a modern conflict at sea could be waged in certain areas of Southeast 
Asia without infringing the prohibition on naval operations within neutral archipelagic waters.  
For example, it is not inconceivable that a naval conflict could erupt between India and China 
in the future.  If either the Philippines or Indonesia were to remain neutral in such a future 
naval conflict, it is possible that the regime of neutral archipelagic waters with respect to 
those States would not survive, given the strategic sea lanes in which those States are 
located.104    
 
D. International Straits, Archipelagic Sea Lanes, Man-Made Canals105 
 
 Transit passage through international straits and archipelagic sea lanes passage 
through archipelagic waters are similar from a legal point of view.106  Belligerent warships, 
military aircraft and auxiliary ships and aircraft may exercise the right of transit passage 
through, under and over neutral international straits and archipelagic sea lanes passage during 
periods of armed conflict.107  Neither transit passage through international straits nor innocent 
                                                
 
102
  This figure is in 1994 dollars.  U.S. Defense Department, “National Security and the Law of the Sea,” 
(GPO: Washington, DC, 1994), p. 10. 
 
103
  The Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines and Indonesia, for example, have declared 
archipelagic status pursuant to Part IV of the 1982 LOS Convention.  See 1995 U.S. Navy 
Commander’s Handbook, p.105, Table A1-9; see also Churchill and Lowe, p. 122. 
 
104
  Alternatively, the burdens imposed on the neutral State may increase the likelihood that the archipelagic 
State is drawn into the conflict.  Robertson, p. 35.   
 
105
  For an excellent overview, see Heintschel von Heinegg; Lewis M. Alexander, “International Straits,” in 
Law of Naval Operations, pp. 91-108. 
 
106
  Robertson, p. 34.  However, from an operational point of view, there are significant differences between 
operating in international straits, which tend to be relatively small areas of water and operating in 
archipelagic waters, which tend to cover vast areas of the sea.  See ibid.  See also Robertson Bochumer 
Schriften, pp. 17, 49-51. 
 
107
  U.S. Commander’s Handbook, paras. 2.3.4.1, 7.3.5; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.10-13.20; Canadian 
Manual, paras. 812, 816-818; German Manual, para. 1126; San Remo Manual, paras. 23, 27 and 31; 
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passage through archipelagic waters by a belligerent warship, military aircraft or auxiliary 
vessel or aircraft jeopardises the neutrality of either a State bordering the international strait or 
the archipelagic State concerned.108   
Vessels exercising archipelagic sea lanes passage must not deviate more than 25 
nautical miles from either side of the axis lines designating the sea lanes and must approach 
no closer than 10 percent of the distance between the nearest islands.109  Figure 2 depicts a 
hypothetical designated archipelagic sea lane. 
 
 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding the apparent proscriptions of hostile actions in waters through which 
archipelagic sea lanes passage may be exercised, Professor Oxman has written that the 
breadth of permissible passage was partially the result of military considerations: 
 
These broad sea lanes were designed, inter alia, with a view to 
accommodating the needs of military task forces traversing such 
extended and exposed routes to employ evasive tactics and to 
                                                                                                                                                   
Robertson, pp. 21-22, 33; Heintschel von Heinegg, p. 266. Heintschel von Heinegg asserts that Article 
38 reflects customary international law, although he acknowledges that not all States would concur.  See 
ibid., and footnote 32 therein.  Similarly, the vessels of neutral States, including military vessels and 
aircraft, may exercise the passage rights provided under international law through, under and over 
belligerent international straits and archipelagic waters.  See San Remo Manual, paras. 26 and 32.   
 
108
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 2.3.2.1; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.11, 13.12; Canadian 
Manual, paras. 813-814; San Remo Manual, paras. 24-25.  Military aircraft and auxiliary aircraft may 
not exercise the right of innocent passage through international straits.  See also 1982 LOS Convention 
Article 17.   
 
109
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 53(5).  Thus, the sea lane is actually 50 nautical miles wide. 
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Source: 1995 U.S. 
Navy Commander’s 
Handbook, p. 129, 
Figure 2-1 
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disperse broad defensive screens of ships, helicopters and fixed-
wing aircraft around the heart of the task force.  Both the transiting 
State and the archipelagic State have an interest in avoiding the 
creation of a tempting target.110  
 
 With respect to transit and archipelagic sea lanes passage for warships,111 there is no 
requirement that such passage be innocent.112  Nor is there a specific requirement (similar to 
Article 20 of the 1982 LOS Convention with respect to innocent passage) requiring 
submarines to surface when exercising transit passage.113  However, neutral States may not 
“suspend, hamper or otherwise impede” the right of transit passage or the right of archipelagic 
sea lanes passage.114  In addition, “the right of non-suspendable innocent passage ascribed to 
certain international straits by international law may not be suspended in time of armed 
conflict.115   
Belligerent forces in transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage must undertake 
such passage without undue delay and must refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
neutral littoral or archipelagic State.116  Moreover, the transiting warship must comply with the 
generally accepted regulations, procedures and practices regarding navigational safety.117   
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  Oxman, pp. 860-861 
 
111
  The U.S. Government position is that transit passage reflects customary international law.  See 1995 
U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.5.  For a general discussion of military issues related to 
transit passage through international straits, see Lowe July 1986, pp. 177-178.  
 
112
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 38(2).  Green questions whether “a belligerent warship can ever be said 
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Green, Comment No. 8, in Robertson Bochumer Schriften, p. 101.  See also ibid., pp. 101-102. 
 
113
  Regarding archipelagic sea lanes passage for military vessels and aircraft in general, see Oxman, pp. 
858- 861 and Lowe July 1986, p. 177, in which Lowe sets forth the argument that the text of 1982 LOS 
Convention Article 39(1)(c) supports the position that submarines may exercise transit passage while 
submerged, a view shared by John Norton Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea,”” 74 AJIL p. 77 (January 1980), p. 95; Horace B. Robertson, Jr., 
“Passage Through Straits: A Right Preserved in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea,” 20 Virgina JJIL p. 801, pp. 843-846; and Robertson, pp. 20-21; See also Rauch, pp. 45-46 and 
William T. Burke, “Submerged Passage Through Straits: Interpretations of the Proposed Law of the Sea 
Treaty Text,” 52 Washington Law Review, 193 (1977).   
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  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.5.; U.K. Manual, para. 13.16; Canadian Manual, 
para. 817.1; 1982 LOS Convention, Article 44; San Remo Manual, para. 29; Regarding the transit 
passage regime as it relates to warships and military aircraft, see Oxman, pp. 856-858. 
 
115
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.20.; Canadian Manual, para. 820.3; San Remo Manual, para. 33. 
 
116
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 39(1); 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.5.; U.K. 
Manual, para. 13.17.; Canadian Manual, para. 818.1; San Remo Manual, para. 30. 
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Hostile actions by belligerent naval forces are prohibited in neutral waters constituting 
an international strait and those waters in which the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage 
may be exercised.118  Belligerent forces exercising transit passage through international straits 
and archipelagic sea lanes may engage in activities that are incident to their normal mode of 
continuous and expeditious passage: 
 
Belligerent forces in transit may … take defensive measures 
consistent with their security, including the launching and recovery 
of aircraft, screen formation steaming, and acoustic and electronic 
surveillance.  Belligerent forces may not use neutral straits as a 
place of sanctuary nor as a base of operations, and belligerent 
warships may not exercise the belligerent right of visit and search 
in those waters.119 
 
During the course of such passage, belligerent forces must refrain from conducting offensive 
operations against enemy forces or using the neutral waters as a sanctuary or base of 
operations.120   
 However, there are no such restrictions on the conduct of hostilities “in and over 
international straits completely overlapped by the territorial seas of the parties to an 
international armed conflict.”121  Heintschel von Heinegg, a leading expert on armed conflict 
at sea, has written that:  
 
[A]t first glance there seem to exist no restrictions on the conduct 
of hostilities in and over international straits completely 
overlapped by the parties to an international armed conflict.  
Indeed, subject to the applicable maritime jus in bello, enemy 
vessels and aircraft in such straits may be attacked, and enemy and 
neutral merchant vessels may be visited, stopped and captured.”122   
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  1982 LOS Convention, Articles 39(2), 42.  
 
118
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 7.3.5, 7.3.6; Canadian Manual, para. 818; San Remo 
Manual, paras. 15-17 and 30. 
 
119
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.5 (footnotes omitted), see also ibid., p. 379, para. 
7.3.6. regarding transit through archipelagic sea lanes; U.K. Manual, para. 13.18.; Canadian Manual, 
para. 819.  See also 1982 LOS Convention, Article 53(3); San Remo Manual, para. 30.  The phrase 
“normal mode,” permits submarines to exercise the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage while 
submerged. 
 
120
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 7.3.5, 7.3.6.; U.K. Manual, para. 13.20; Canadian 
Manual, para. 819.1; San Remo Manual, para. 30. The commentary on the provisions of the San Remo 
Manual dealing with transit passage by belligerents through international straits or archipelagic waters 
states that this was one of the “most seriously debated provisions” during the drafting process.  San 
Remo Manual, para. 30 and Explanation, pp. 106-107. 
 
121
  Heintschel von Heinegg, p. 264 (emphasis added).  See also Rauch, pp. 40-44; Robertson, p. 41.   
 
122
  Heintschel von Heinegg, pp. 264-265; see also Rauch, p. 44, Bothe, p. 403. 
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Article 35(c) of the 1982 LOS Convention provides for an exception to the transit 
passage regime for certain international straits “in which passage is regulated in whole or in 
part by long-standing international conventions in force specifically relating to such straits.” 
The Turkish Straits (Dardanelles and Bosporus) are under such a special regime pursuant to 
the 1936 Montreux Convention, which is beyond the scope of the present work, but which 
limits the number and types of warships that may use the Turkish Straits, both in peace and 
during armed conflict.  Under the terms of the Montreux Convention during periods of armed 
conflict when Turkey is not one of the belligerents, transit passage is guaranteed for neutral 
vessels.  However, transit passage of belligerent warships is prohibited, except in exceptional 
circumstances specified in the Convention.123  In the event Turkey is a party to the conflict, 
that State has complete discretion as to transit passage for vessels of other belligerents.124 
Other States have advanced claims that certain international straits fall within the 
ambit of 1982 LOS Convention Article 35(c), but such claims seem to have been 
unsuccessful, with the exception of the Strait of Magellan.125  
Man-made canals used for international navigation, such as the Panama Canal, Suez 
Canal and Kiel Canal, fall outside the definition of international straits and are generally 
governed by specific treaties that provide details regarding passage of both neutrals and 
belligerents.126  For example, with respect to the Panama Canal, the relevant treaty provides 
that “in time of peace and in time of war it shall remain secure and open to peaceful transit by 
the vessels of all nations on terms of entire equality.”127  Other canals have been closed or 
have had limitations established during armed conflicts.  For example, the United Kingdom 
closed the Suez Canal to convoy shipping during both the First and Second World Wars. 
 
E. The High Seas, including Exclusive Economic Zones  
  
The high seas and EEZs were discussed supra in Chapter 1, section II.   
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  Robertson, p. 22; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.5. 
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  Robertson, p. 22; Heintschel von Heinegg, p. 264. 
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  Robertson, p. 22; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 2.3.3.1, footnote 36; Heintschel von 
Heinegg, pp. 275-279.  Rauch takes the view that only the Turkish Straits are covered by Article 35(c).  
Rauch, p. 53. 
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  See, for example, the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty and the 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, 
para. 2.3.3.1, footnote 36, for the relevant excerpts from the treaties governing passage through the 
international canals cited. 
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  1977 Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty, Article II.  See also 1977 Panama Canal Neutrality Protocol. 
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F. The Seabed 
 
 The issue of military uses of the seabed during periods of armed conflict merits brief 
mention.  Although ships and aircraft, including warships and military aircraft, enjoy freedom 
of navigation on and over the high seas, belligerent States conducting such military operations 
on the high seas should avoid disrupting the exercise by neutral States of the rights of 
exploration and exploitation of the resources of the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil thereof.128  
Moreover, care should be exercised by belligerent States to avoid damaging the submarine 
cables and pipelines laid on the seabed that do not exclusively serve the belligerents.129 
As a legal concept, the international seabed is that part of the seabed that is “beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction,”130 i.e., seaward of the continental shelf of the coastal State 
as defined in the 1982 LOS Convention, except in the rare instance of an isolated 
uninhabitable rock.131  Thus, the international seabed begins at furthest seaward point that is 
200 nautical miles from the baseline or the outer edge of the continental margin.132  
Consequently, since the area covered by the international seabed lies entirely beneath the 
waters of the high seas, there is nothing in the 1982 LOS Convention regarding the seabed 
that significantly impacts upon naval operations on the high seas.133 
The 1971 Seabed Arms Control Treaty,134 prohibits the emplacement of nuclear 
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction135 on the seabed and ocean floor beyond 12 
miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured, pursuant to the 1958 
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  U.K. Manual, para. 13.22; Canadian Manual, para. 823; San Remo Manual, para. 36. 
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  U.K. Manual, para. 13.23; Canadian Manual, para. 824; San Remo Manual, para. 37. 
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  1982 LOS Convention, Article 1(1)(1). 
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  Such rocks possess neither a continental shelf nor an EEZ, per 1982 LOS Convention Article 121.  See 
also Oxman, pp. 832-835; and Tullio Treves, “Military Installations, Structures and Devices on the 
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  1982 LOS Convention, Article 76. 
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  Oxman, pp. 833, 835; Robertson, pp. 35-36. 
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  Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass 
Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, 11 February 1971, TIAS 7337, 
23 UST 701. 
 
135
  No arms control treaty defines “weapons of mass destruction.” 
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Territorial Sea Convention.136  This treaty also prohibits construction of structures, launching 
installations or other facilities specifically designed for testing, storing or the use of such 
weapons.137  Thus, although this treaty prohibits the use of nuclear mines that are attached to 
the seabed, ocean floor or subsoil thereof, it does not proscribe the use of naval nuclear 
weapons, such as nuclear-armed depth charges or torpedoes, so long as such weapons are not 
implanted or emplaced on the seabed.  Similarly, a submarine resting on the ocean floor 
would not be prohibited from launching nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, on the grounds that 
such submarines are not affixed to the ocean floor.  
 
G. Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, the law of the sea regime provides for a detailed division of the world’s 
oceans into zones and therefore effectively partitions area in which naval forces may operate 
and conduct hostilities.  Although the 1982 LOS Convention is primarily designed for 
conditions of peace, the treaty remains operable during time of armed conflict.  Belligerent 
naval forces may conduct hostile operations in, on and above the territory, internal waters, 
territorial seas, EEZs and continental shelves of other belligerent States.  With respect to the 
territory of neutral States, the belligerents must (with minor exceptions) refrain from hostile 
actions and attacks.  The problem presented by “neutral waters” is that the extent of such 
waters in terms of belligerent naval operations is unsettled.   
 Although the rights of neutrals are the topic of discussion in the following chapter, a 
few conclusions regarding neutral rights relating to neutral waters and ports may be stated at 
this point.  While the bulk of the modern law governing the rights and duties of neutrals vis-à-
vis belligerents in the context of naval warfare are based on customary international law and 
treaties that have codified those customary rules, such as 1907 Hague Convention XIII, the 
law of the sea regime and state practice have necessitated modernisation of certain rules.  
Modern military manuals and the San Remo Manual have summarised these rules as follows: 
 
• Within and over neutral waters, hostile actions (to include 
launching attacks, laying mines, visit, search, diversion or capture) 
by belligerent forces are not allowed.138  
                                                
 
136
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  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.8.-13.9; Canadian Manual, 
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• Belligerent forces may not use neutral waters as a sanctuary or base 
for conducting military operations.139 
 
• All ships, including warships, may exercise the right of innocent 
passage, which must be continuous and expeditious, through the 
territorial waters of all States.140 
 
• Belligerent vessels may exercise the right of innocent passage 
through neutral international straits and archipelagic waters.141 
 
• On a non-discriminatory basis, a neutral State may impose 
conditions, restrictions (such as the employment of local pilots) or 
even prohibitions on the entry to, or passage through, its neutral 
waters by belligerent warships and auxiliary vessels,142 except that: 
 
o Neutral States may not suspend, hamper or otherwise 
impede the right of transit passage nor the right of 
archipelagic sea-lanes passage;143 and  
 
• On a non-discriminatory basis, a neutral State may close its ports 
and roadsteads to belligerents to belligerent warships and 
auxiliaries,144 and certain limitations exist concerning permissible 
actions within such ports and roadsteads: 
 
o Belligerent warships are forbidden to remain in neutral 
ports for longer than 24 hours unless unable to depart 
due to weather or unseaworthiness.145  
 
o Belligerent vessels or auxiliaries may take on food, 
water and sufficient fuel to reach a port in its own 
territory.146  
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to close their ports and roadsteads to belligerents); Canadian Manual, para. 809; German Manual, para. 
1137; Australian Manual, paras. 10.8-10.11; San Remo Manual, para. 20. 
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  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.2.1; Canadian Manual, para. 810.1; German 
Manual, para. 1127; Australian Manual, para. 10.9; San Remo Manual, para. 21.  The 24-hour rule does 
not apply to passage through international straits and archipelagic sea-lanes passage. 
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o Belligerent vessels and auxiliaries may undertake 
repairs to make them seaworthy if the neutral State finds 
such repairs necessary, although such repairs may not 
restore or increase their fighting strength.147 
 
• Belligerent vessels in transit passage through, under and over a 
neutral international strait or in archipelagic sea-lanes passage 
through, over and under neutral archipelagic waters must proceed 
without delay, and while such vessels may take defensive measures 
during transit passage, they are precluded from conducting 
offensive operations against enemy forces or using such neutral 
waters as a place of sanctuary nor as a base of operations.148  
 
• Belligerent military (and auxiliary) aircraft may not enter neutral 
airspace and the neutral State has a duty to use all means at its 
disposal require the aircraft to land within its territory, after which 
time the aircraft and its crew shall be interned.  Aircraft (other than 
medical aircraft) that fail to follow instructions to land are liable to 
be attacked by the neutral State.149 
 
In the EEZs and on the continental shelves of neutral States, the parties to the armed 
conflict may conduct military operations, but must respect the rights of neutrals with respect 
to exploration and exploitation of marine resources.  As a result, and taking practical matters 
into consideration, including the presence of vessels engaged in such exploration and 
exploitation of marine resources, EEZs may be “no go” areas in terms of belligerent naval 
operations, depending on the location.  On the other hand, there is no blanket prohibition on 
the establishment of NEZs in EEZs of neutral States.   
On the high seas, the belligerent parties must refrain from prejudicing the rights of 
neutrals to explore and exploit the resources of the seabed and must not damage submarine 
cables or pipelines unless such cables or pipelines exclusively serve other belligerents, but 
may otherwise engage in naval operations.   
 
                                                                                                                                                   
146
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.2.2; Canadian Manual, para. 809.1(b); German 
Manual, paras. 1130-1131; Australian Manual, 10.10; San Remo Manual, para. 20(b).  
 
147
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.2.2; Canadian Manual, para. 809.1(c); German 
Manual, paras. 1128-1129; Australian Manual, para. 10.10; San Remo Manual, para. 20(c). 
 
148
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.6; U.K. Manual, para. 13.18; Canadian Manual, 
paras. 818-819; San Remo Manual, para. 30.  
 
149
  San Remo Manual, para. 18.  See also 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3.7; U.K. 
Manual, paras. 12.17, 12.17.1; German Manual, paras. 1149-1155.   
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Chapter 5 
 
Neutrals and Naval Warfare 
 
“The law of neutrality … was not made … from the top-down by 
scholars and commentators, but rather from the bottom-up by 
statesmen, generals, admirals and traders.  It was a fact of life first, 
and an institution of law only later.”1 
 
“No state, since 1945, has ever considered itself bound by the law of 
neutrality in the case of a state of war recognized by parties to a 
conflict.”2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The effects of exclusion zones obviously do not fall entirely upon the warships and 
merchantmen of the belligerents; the establishment of such zones also affects neutral States 
and their interests.  This chapter examines how belligerents have historically impacted upon 
neutral States and interfered with their rights, particularly concerning commercial uses of the 
seas and freedom of navigation.  One of the distinguishing characteristics of naval warfare is 
the extent to which belligerents may interfere with neutral commerce, and this factor has 
played a very important role in the development of the permissible scope of activities in 
which belligerents may lawfully engage upon the high seas. 
Neutral States have always had to acquiesce in the needs of belligerents in certain 
circumstances and the challenge posed is how to balance the rights of neutral States to trade 
freely while allowing belligerents to control such trade so that neutral States do not assist or 
re-supply opposing belligerent forces.  This balancing act lies at the heart of the system 
permitting belligerents to exercise visit and search so as to prevent the shipment of war goods 
to enemy forces by neutral merchant vessels.   
After briefly exploring the current state of neutrality under the U.N. Charter, this 
chapter turns to the nature of neutrality as that concept relates to a number of issues, including 
interference with neutral shipping, such as visit, search, diversion and capture.3  The law 
                                                
1
  Neff, p. 7. 
 
2
  Schindler, p. 375. 
 
3
  Although slightly dated, Tucker remains the most authoritative source on the law of neutrality as it 
relates to naval warfare.  Neff sets forth a comprehensive history of neutrality from its medieval roots to 
the present. 
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governing the targeting of neutral merchant ships in general is discussed in Chapter 6, while 
the law governing blockade is discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
II. Neutrality: Pre-Charter History 
 
A. Pre-20th Century 
 
 The notion that neutrality could be a legal concept was alien to medieval just war 
theorists on the grounds that to be neutral in a conflict between the forces of good and evil 
was immoral.  By the late 16th and early 17th Centuries, however, leading jurists began 
expanding upon the concept of neutrality, in response to the emerging reality that “a war 
could be just on both sides when considered from the human standpoint, even if not from the 
divine one.”4  Thus Gentili, in his 1598 treatise On the Law of War, and Grotius, in his 1625 
On the Law of War and Peace, both addressed neutrality.  The law of neutrality—which 
applied only when war erupted between sovereign States—had a “fixed and uncontested place 
within the law of nations”5 until the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations. 
In terms of rights, the neutral had an inherent natural law right to trade with any 
belligerent, on the ground that the neutral was not in a state of war.  For the same reason, 
belligerents were not entitled to direct combat actions against neutrals.  From these principles, 
several “rules” developed.6  First, while belligerents were entitled to capture the property of 
their enemies on the high seas, the property of neutrals was inviolable.  Second, since 
belligerents could not attack the property of neutrals—including the vessels of neutral 
states—a belligerent was prohibited from attacking neutral vessels even when such vessels 
were carrying enemy property.  Third, in the event that a belligerent captured a neutral vessel 
that was carrying enemy property, the capturing belligerent was required to pay the neutral 
carrier any freight that was due.7  Thus, the character of the cargo played the crucial role in 
                                                
4
  Neff, p. 9. 
 
5
  Schindler, p. 367. 
 
6
  These principles are reflected in the Consolato del Mare, a document initially relating to maritime 
trading in Spain in the 13th Century, which was subsequently accepted by the leading European 
maritime powers.   
 
7
  The Consolato contained rules governing a variety of situations.  For example, the belligerent State 
could remove the enemy property from the neutral vessel on the high seas, or if the vessel was mainly 
(or exclusively) carrying enemy goods, the belligerent could require the neutral vessel to proceed to port 
for the purpose of unloading the goods.  If the neutral vessel master refused, the belligerent was entitled 
to sink the ship, once the belligerent took measures to protect the crew of the merchantman.   
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determining whether cargo at sea could be subject to capture.  Enemy cargo8 would always be 
subject to capture—whether carried on board enemy or neutral vessels, but if the enemy 
property were captured from a neutral vessel, then freight would be owed.    Neutral cargo 
would never be the subject of lawful capture.9   
These determinations were often fraught with practical difficulties.  For example, how 
was the character of the property captured at sea to be determined?  The rule developed that it 
was the nationality of the consignee of the goods, rather than of the title-holder that was the 
determining factor in whether the goods were neutral or enemy property.  Of course, this is 
virtually impossible to determine without recourse to examining the ship’s papers.  This led to 
the development of the right of belligerents to visit and search neutral vessels on the high seas 
to determine whether the cargo is subject to capture.10  Resistance to visit and search could 
result in the ship being sunk (after the crew was placed out of harm’s way).  Partially to 
alleviate this rather draconian approach, the leading maritime powers of the age, England and 
France, developed rules concerning prize11 and legal institutions known as prize courts to 
ensure that the rights of interested parties were enforced.12  Under this regime, rather than 
capturing cargo or sinking the vessel on the high seas, the belligerent captors were required to 
put crews aboard neutral vessels and escort such vessels into belligerent ports where prize 
courts were sitting. 
                                                
8
  Particular problems arose with respect to what came to be known as contraband—arms, ammunition 
and other materiel necessary for conducting war.   
 
9
  In the mid-16th Century, France—and then England—adopted a policy known as “infection,” by which 
a neutral vessel would lose that status if it was carrying any enemy cargo, resulting in all cargo being 
considered to be enemy property.   
 
10
  Only if the ship’s papers provided a cause for suspicion, could the ship’s holds be searched. 
 
11
  These rules were subsequently codified in Articles 21 through 23 of 1907 Hague Convention XIII, and 
may be summarised as follows.  Prize vessels may only be brought into neutral ports due to 
“unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or provisions” and must depart as soon as the 
circumstances justifying its entry into port have ended.  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 21.  Any 
prize brought into a neutral port for any other reason must be released by the neutral power.  In the 
event that the prize vessel does not so depart following an order to do so by the authorities of the neutral 
State, the prize and its crew shall be released and the prize crew shall be detained.  Ibid.  Although the 
treaty permits neutrals to allow belligerents to send prizes to neutral ports for sequestration pending 
decisions by prize courts, this provision is controversial and found little use by any States during the 
two World Wars of the 20th Century.  Ibid., Article 23; see also Dietrich Schindler, Commentary on 
1907 Hague Convention XIII, in Ronzitti, pp. 211-222 at p. 219 and the sources cited in footnote 16 
therein. 
 
12
  Neff argues that prize courts served two primary functions: “to compile an official inventory of captured 
goods, to ensure that the government received its full share of any booty,” and to provide “important 
protections to neutrals against arbitrary and oppressive conduct by zealous belligerents on the high 
seas.”  Neff, p. 25. 
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It should be stressed that, although neutrals were afforded certain legal protections, 
this was not the result of a clearly developed concept of the rights of neutrals.  Rather, this 
situation reflected two parallel developments.  First, the “rights” of neutrals to engage in trade 
was based on the natural law and not on a positive law guaranteeing neutral trading.  Second, 
the constraints imposed on belligerents vis-à-vis neutrals were based on the laws of war 
limiting attacks to those States actively engaged in hostilities and not against third parties.13  
Moreover, notwithstanding the apparent simplicity of the general rules governing neutrality 
during the medieval era, one commentator has written that the reality was quite different: 
 
[I]t is fairer to say that the so-called “rights” of neutrals consisted 
of the freedom to exercise any of their general natural-law rights 
that lay beyond the reach of the rights of belligerents.  This meant 
that the whole law of neutrality was seen, fundamentally, from the 
standpoint of the belligerents.  It was belligerents, not neutrals, 
who had rights properly speaking under the laws of war.  Neutrals 
simply had whatever freedom of action was “left over” (so to 
speak) when the prerogatives of belligerents came to a halt.14  
 
 Unlike the situation with respect to the “rights” of neutrals (which did not derive from 
the status of the neutral State per se), medieval European jurists embraced the notion that 
neutrals had two duties: to abstain from hostilities and to remain impartial as between the 
belligerents.  This is not to suggest, however, that these concepts were easy to apply in 
practice.  On the contrary, the application of these neutral duties “was beset with conceptual 
difficulties, uncertainties, fine distinctions and unanswered questions.”15  Nevertheless, these 
twin duties, as formulated by the end of the 17th Century, remain a core component of the 
concept of neutrality from that period to the present. 
 In part because the law of neutrality developed rather sporadically based on State 
practice, the self-help measures of belligerent reprisals and necessity played an important role 
in this process, if only because the neutral vessel was often the target of the act of reprisal.  
For example, Neff cites to the controversial 16th Century “infection” policy16 as an example of 
                                                
13
  Grotius, p. 783. 
 
14
  Neff, p. 11.   
 
15
  Neff, p. 14. 
 
16
  This policy had two results: first, a neutral ship would be treated as a belligerent merchantman and 
would thus forfeit its neutral status, if it was carrying any cargo owned by the enemy; second, as a 
result, all cargo would be treated as enemy cargo, regardless of actual ownership, due to the “infection.”  
Neff, p. 16.  See also Heintschel von Heinegg Bochumer Schriften, p. 4. 
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how reprisals influenced the law of neutrality and affected the rights of neutrals.17  The 
principle of necessity in the context of neutrality often arose where one belligerent relied on 
this principle to interdict all trading between neutral and enemy States.  Unlike the situation 
with respect to belligerent reprisals, there is no requirement of a prior unlawful act for a State 
to exercise the right of necessity.  Rather, the State seeking to exercise that right must be 
facing an emergency that can only be resolved by infringing upon the legitimate rights of 
another State.  Like reprisals, however, acts of necessity are governed by the principle of 
proportionality.  Necessity has been characterised as “a sort of juridical ‘wild card’ which 
allows a State to ‘trump’ the normal rights of other States in times of desperation—and 
wartime contains many such occasions.”18   
 
B. Developments in the Law of Neutrality: 1900-1945 
 
Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, it was a classical rule of international law 
that in the event war broke out, a State had the free choice to enter the conflict as a belligerent 
or to remain outside the war, in which case it would be bound by the law of neutrality.  Hague 
Convention XIII of 1907 changed the situation to the extent that it substituted the concept of 
strict neutrality for the “intermediate forms of benevolent neutrality” that had been practised 
in earlier periods.19 
 The intense efforts to codify the laws of war at the turn of the 20th Century included 
the laws governing naval warfare in general and the law of neutrality in particular, as 
demonstrated by the 1907 Hague Convention XI, the 1907 Hague Convention XIII and the 
1909 London Declaration.  Although many of these codified rules are more precise than their 
customary counter-parts, the treaty rules all reflect customary principles.  Moreover, while the 
1907 Hague Convention XIII deals with the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents in 
neutral ports and neutral waters only,20 the 1909 London Declaration contains provisions that 
relate to belligerent actions with respect to neutral vessels on the high seas, and sets forth 
                                                
17
  Neff, p. 16. 
 
18
  Ibid., p. 17. 
 
19
  Schindler, p. 371. 
 
20
  Two regional treaties, the 1928 Havana Convention and the 1938 Nordic Rules of Neutrality, contain 
specific provisions on the rights and duties of belligerents in neutral waters and ports covered by those 
conventions.   
 
Chapter Five: Neutrals and Naval Warfare 
Mundis 182 
detailed rules on several topics, including blockade,21 contraband,22 “unneutral service,”23 and 
enemy character.24   
 
1. Rights of Neutrals 
 Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Convention XIII sets forth the basic principle that 
belligerents are required to respect the rights of neutrals in neutral waters and on neutral 
territory and to abstain from any act that would constitute a violation of neutrality.25  Article 2 
prohibits belligerent warships from acts of hostility, including capture26 and the exercise of the 
right of search, in the territorial waters of a neutral State.  Belligerents are prohibited from 
using neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations against their adversaries27 and 
may not establish prize courts on neutral territory or on vessels in neutral waters.28  Although 
neutral States are prohibited from supplying—either directly or indirectly—a belligerent State 
with any war materiel,29 Article 7 of the 1907 Hague Convention XIII specifically permits a 
neutral to allow the export or transit of military equipment and supplies to belligerent States.  
Read together, these provisions permit individuals or companies in neutral States to supply 
belligerents, even though the neutral State itself is precluded from providing military goods. 
 
                                                
21
  Chapter I, Articles 1-21. 
 
22
  Chapter II, Articles 22-44. 
 
23
  Chapter III, Articles 45-47. 
 
24
  Chapter VI, Articles 57-60. 
 
25
  Article 26, 1907 Hague Convention XIII, provides that a State does not lose its neutral status by 
exercising any of its neutral rights against a belligerent. 
 
26
  In the event that a ship is captured in the territorial waters of a neutral State, Article 3, 1907 Hague 
Convention XIII, requires the neutral State to release the prize and its crew (interning the prize crew) if 
the prize is still within its jurisdiction.  If the prize is no longer under the jurisdiction of the neutral 
State, the captor State must liberate the prize and crew on the demand of the neutral State.   
 
27
  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 5.  This article specifically precludes the establishment of any 
systems for communicating with belligerent forces on land or at sea. 
 
28
  Ibid., Article 4.   
 
29
  Ibid., Article 6.   
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2. Duties of Neutrals 
 The duties of abstention, prevention and impartiality were incorporated into the 1907 
Hague Convention XIII, and many of these provisions remain in force today.30  As noted 
above, neutrals must abstain from supplying military goods to belligerents and must also use 
the means at their disposal to prevent the “fitting out or arming of any vessel within its 
jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise, or engage in hostile 
operations, against a Power with which that Government is at peace.”31  Article 9 of the treaty 
requires the neutral state to impartially apply to belligerents whatever conditions, restrictions, 
or prohibitions made by that State with respect to the admission into its waters or ports of 
belligerent warships or their prizes.32  
 A neutral State does not lose that status simply because the warships or prizes of 
belligerent States pass through the neutral’s territorial waters,33 and a rather elaborate system 
of rules governs this aspect of the law of neutrality.34  Thus, belligerent warships may not 
remain in the ports, roadsteads or territorial waters of neutral States for more than 24 hours 
unless otherwise provided for in the 1907 Hague Convention XIIII.35  In the event that a 
warship has suffered damage or during periods of inclement weather, the belligerent warship 
may extend its stay in the neutral port, roadstead or territorial waters until such time as the 
damages are repaired or the weather improves.36  In the absence of national legislation to the 
                                                
30
  The concluding section of Chapter 4 contains the citations to many of the relevant provisions of the 
military manuals of the leading maritime nations and of the San Remo Manual relating to these rules.  
See also German Manual, paras. 1118-1148. 
 
31
  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 8.   
 
32
  In the event that one belligerent has failed to follow the orders or regulations imposed by a neutral State, 
or has violated the neutrality of that State, the neutral may forbid the warships of that belligerent from 
entering its ports or roadsteads.  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 9.   
 
33
  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 10.  Schindler argues that although this rule is “uncontested,” its 
limits are controversial.  In support of this position, he cites to the Altmark incident of February 1940.  
See Dietrich Schindler, Commentary on 1907 Hague Convention XIII in Ronzitti, pp. 211-222 at pp. 
216-217.   
 
34
  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 24 establishes the regime for violation of these provisions and 
permits the neutral State to detain the warship and crew.   
 
35
  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 12.  This article specifically allows for a neutral power to adopt 
special provisions to the contrary in its domestic legislation.  See also Article 13, which requires the 
neutral State to inform the belligerent warship of the requirement to depart within 24 hours once the 
neutral State becomes aware of the outbreak of hostilities.  See Chapter 4, section V.B., for a discussion 
concerning the continuing viability of the 24-hour rule.  
 
36
  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 14.  The second clause of this provision exempts “warships 
devoted exclusively to religious, scientific, or philanthropic purposes.”  It is far from clear what types of 
warships would fall within this exemption, however.  Article 17 limits the repairs to those which are 
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contrary, no more than three belligerent warships may remain simultaneously in the ports, 
roadsteads or territorial waters of the neutral State,37 and when warships belonging to both 
belligerents are simultaneously present in a neutral port, a period of not more than 24 hours 
must elapse between the departure of the ship belonging to one belligerent and the departure 
of the ship belonging to the other belligerent.38  Moreover, a belligerent warship may not leave 
a neutral port or roadstead until 24 hours after the departure of a merchant vessel under the 
flag of its adversary.39   
Article 25 of the 1907 Hague Convention XIII imposes a duty of prevention on neutral 
States and requires a neutral power to employ the means at its disposal to prevent belligerent 
States from violating its neutrality and one of the thorniest problems concerning the law of 
neutrality concerns the potential action that one belligerent could take against another when 
the neutral State violated its duties of impartiality and prevention.  Assuming that the neutral 
State took the steps required by Article 25, is it responsible for the ineffectiveness of its 
measures?40  Difficulties can also arise when a neutral State has failed to use the means at its 
disposal to prevent a belligerent from using its waters unlawfully, such as when a belligerent 
uses neutral waters as cover or when it violates the 24-hour rule. 
The San Remo Manual takes a cautious approach in outlining the actions that are 
required in this situation.  There is an obligation on neutral States to “take the measures 
necessary to terminate” a violation by a belligerent that occurs in the neutral waters of that 
State.41  If the neutral State fails to terminate the violation, by one belligerent, the opposing 
                                                                                                                                                   
“absolutely necessary” to render the vessel seaworthy and specifically precludes any repairs that would 
add to the fighting capacity of the warship.  The local authorities of the neutral power may determine 
which repairs meet this requirement.  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 17.  Similarly, Article 18 
prohibits the belligerent warship from replenishing or increasing its war supplies or arms, or from re-
crewing while in neutral ports, roadsteads or territorial waters. 
 
37
  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 15.   
 
38
  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 16.  The order of departure is determined by the date of arrival, 
unless the first ship to arrive is “so circumstanced that an extension of its stay is permissible” 
(presumably on account of the need for repair under Article 17 or to refuel under Article 19). 
 
39
  1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 16.  Articles 19 and 20 govern the provisioning and refuelling of 
belligerent warships. 
 
40
  According to Schindler, “A belligerent in such case is not allowed to take hostile measures against an 
enemy making unlawful use of neutral waters unless it becomes the victim of an armed attack 
originating in neutral territory or in neutral waters (Article 51 of the Charter).”  Dietrich Schindler, 
Commentary to Hague Convention XIII, in Ronzitti, pp. 211-222 at pp. 218; see also Schindler, pp. 
382-383. 
 
41
  San Remo Manual, para. 22.  See also 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.3; Canadian 
Manual, paras. 811.1-811.2. 
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belligerent should notify the neutral State and give the authorities of that State reasonable 
time to terminate the violation.42  If that fails and the violation “constitutes a serious and 
immediate threat to the security of the opposing belligerent,” that belligerent may then “in the 
absence of any feasible and timely alternative, use such force as is strictly necessary to the 
threat posed by the violation.”43 
In the process that led to the drafting of the San Remo Manual, Robertson took a more 
direct approach:  
 
Should a neutral State be unwilling or unable to enforce its neutral 
obligations with respect to hostile military activities by belligerent 
naval forces within its neutral waters, the opposing belligerent may 
use such force as is necessary within such neutral waters to protect 
its own forces and to terminate the violation of neutral waters.44 
 
Thus, while there is no doubt that if a neutral state permits belligerents to violate the law, the 
opposing belligerent may use force against that enemy even if in neutral waters, 
commentators have disagreed about the legal basis for such action.  For example, Tucker and 
Heintschel von Heinegg present the traditional argument that when a neutral State fails to 
meet its obligations to prevent one belligerent from unlawfully using its territorial waters, the 
offended belligerent may employ force against the offending belligerent forces on the grounds 
that such use of force is an act of reprisal against the neutral State that failed in its duty.45  
Reflecting the fact that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter has affected the right of 
reprisal, Greenwood argues that the concept of necessity, rather than reprisal, is a better way 
of justifying belligerent action against an enemy who violated neutral waters.46 
 
III. Neutrality in the Era of the United Nations Charter 
 
The 1920 League of Nations Covenant imposed some limitations on the rights of 
States to to resort to the use of force vis-à-vis other members of the League.47  Prior to the 
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, however, States were generally free to conduct war as a means of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
42
  San Remo Manual, para. 22.  See also Canadian Manual, paras. 811.1-811.2. 
 
43
  Ibid. 
 
44
  Robertson Bochumer Schriften, pp. 65-66.  
 
45
  Tucker, pp. 218-224; Heintschel von Heinegg, Comment No. 10, in Robertson Bochumer Schriften, pp. 
112-115.  See also the Note on Belligerent Reprisals, Chapter 6. 
 
46
  Greenwood, Comment No. 9, in Robertson Bochumer Schriften, p. 108. 
 
47
  See, for example, 1920 League of Nations Covenant, Articles 10-12. 
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furthering national policies, and under customary international law, all States had “the option 
to refrain from participation in an armed conflict by declaring or otherwise assuming neutral 
status.”48  To a certain extent, the U.N. Charter has modified this aspect of customary 
international law and the threshold issue concerning the continuing viability of the law of 
neutrality therefore concerns the effect that the U.N. Charter has had on this body of law.  
Tucker has written, “[T]he rules regulating the behaviour of neutrals and belligerents remain 
strictly dependent for their operation upon the existence of a state of war.”49  Some authors, 
such as Schindler, take the view that the U.N. Charter has fundamentally altered the law of 
neutrality: 
Article 2(4) has the consequence that States, in case of an armed 
conflict between other States, can no longer choose freely between 
neutrality and belligerency.  Their choice is limited by the 
Charter.50 
 
Schindler goes on to note that Article 51 of the Charter has had an even greater impact on the 
law of neutrality, arguing that as a result of this provision: 
The dualism neutrality-belligerency has … been abolished.  States 
not wishing to take part in the armed conflict on the victim’s side 
are no longer obliged to apply the law of neutrality.  Benevolent 
neutrality or non-belligerency have become legally admitted 
attitudes.  Neutrality has become purely optional.  State practice 
since 1945 shows that States have in fact assumed a great variety 
of intermediate positions regarding armed conflict between other 
States.51 
 
Other writers, however, including Greenwood, take the opinion that neutrality in the 
era of the Charter remains an option in light of State practice: 
[T]here have been numerous cases in which States have elected to 
be treated as neutrals and have thus voluntarily subjected their 
relations with the combatant states to the law of neutrality.  Except 
when the Security Council has authoritatively identified the 
aggressor in a conflict and adopted measures against that State, 
there appears to be no reason why a State which does not wish to 
                                                
 
48
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.2 (footnote omitted). 
 
49
  Tucker, pp. 199-200.  See also Greenwood Concept of War, p. 50 et seq.  (“It is in the operation of the 
law of neutrality that the most important legal consequences may flow from the decision that a 
particular conflict constitutes a war.”  Ibid., p. 50.) 
 
50
  Schindler, p. 371. 
 
51
  Ibid., p. 373. 
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become involved in the hostilities should not choose the status of 
neutrality with the rights and duties which that implies.52 
 
Notwithstanding these changes in the jus ad bello, Greenwood maintains the view that the law 
of neutrality, like the rest of the law of armed conflict, applies to any international armed 
conflict, whether or not there is a formal state of war.53 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 Historically, there have been tensions between the rights of neutrals and belligerents 
during periods of armed conflict at sea and the law has developed and codified the rights and 
duties of both neutrals and belligerents when operating in a maritime environment.  A number 
of tactics, including visit and search, capture or diversion, have been developed to ensure that 
neutrals do not aid one side to the conflict at the expense of the other.  Nevertheless, each of 
these concepts impedes upon the rights of neutrals to use the seas without interference.  Most 
neutral merchant vessels undoubtedly consider these belligerent means to be costly both in 
terms of delay (to include delay as the result of re-routing) and in excess fuel and labour costs.  
As seen from the perspective of the belligerent, however, these tactics are necessary—if time-
consuming and labour intensive—evils designed to ensure that an opponent is denied access 
to the goods and logistical support necessary to carry out the war.  Moreover, while the 
neutral merchant captain undoubtedly considers any of these tactics to pose major 
inconvenience and obstacles in completing his journey, many naval commanders probably do 
not think the law goes far enough in permitting them to engage such vessels on the high seas, 
notwithstanding the lack of resources to fulfil this mission properly. 
Neutrals have the inviolable right to engage in commerce, but have the reciprocal 
duties to remain impartial as to the belligerents, to abstain from trading with them and to 
prevent their sovereign territory from being used by any of the belligerents.  They must also 
permit belligerents to exercise their rights, including visit and search.  Belligerents have the 
right to insist that neutrals fulfil their duties, while respecting the legitimate rights of neutral 
States to engage in commerce without unreasonable restrictions.  Thus, neutral merchant 
                                                
52
  Greenwood Concept of War, pp. 51-52 (citation omitted).  See also ibid at p. 54 (“The law of neutrality 
is brought into operation by the acts of neutral States, not the belligerents.  While a declaration of war 
may lead other States to proclaim themselves neutral, it does not, as it used to, oblige them to chose 
between neutrality and belligerency.”)  See also 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 7.2 
and 7.2.1.   
 
53
  Greenwood, Comment No. 9, in Robertson Bochumer Schriften, p. 107.  
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vessels must be left unhindered to engage in trade, subject to certain qualifications.  They 
must not resist visit and search; they must avoid hauling contraband to belligerent States; they 
should avoid sailing under convoy of belligerent warships or military aircraft; and they should 
respect lawfully established and notified blockades.  Roach has succinctly summarised the 
reciprocal rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents in a helpful table, which are set forth 
in Table 2.54 
 
 
Table 2 Reciprocal Rights and Duties of Neutrals and Belligerents 
 
 Neutrals Belligerents 
Rights Inviolability 
 
Commerce 
 
Insist on: 
 
• Impartiaility 
 
• Abstention 
 
• Prevention 
 
Enforcement rights 
 
Duties Impartiality 
 
Abstention 
 
Prevention 
 
Acquiesence 
 
Respect neutral inviolability and 
commerce 
 
Sources: J. Ashley Roach, Comment No. 15, in Robertson Bochumer Schriften, p. 132, 
adapted and reprinted in 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, p. 400, Table A7-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
54
  See also Schindler, pp. 377-381. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Legal Principles Governing Naval Warfare and Targeting 
 
“Nations adhere to the law of armed conflict not only because they 
are legally obliged to do so but for the very practical reason that it is 
in their best interest to be governed by consistent and mutually 
acceptable rules of conduct.  The law of armed conflict is effective to 
the extent that it is obeyed.  Occasional violations do not 
substantially affect the validity of a rule of law, provided routine 
compliance, observance, and enforcement continues to be the 
norm.”1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 International humanitarian law seeks to prevent unnecessary suffering and destruction 
by regulating and mitigating the effects of hostilities by setting forth minimum standards of 
protection to combatants, non-combatants and property.  There are no explicit treaty 
provisions that provide that the general principles of international humanitarian law 
applicable to land warfare extend to cover warfare in the marine environment, and as Fenrick 
has cautioned, “[O]ne cannot attempt to indicate the current state of the law of naval warfare 
by relying exclusively on the explication of treaty texts.”2  Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt 
that certain customary principles apply to all forms of armed conflict.3  Perhaps the most 
important such principle is the notion that in any armed conflict, the parties are limited in 
their choices of the methods and means of warfare.4  This chapter explores the basic principles 
relevant to the law of naval warfare.5 
                                                
1
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 6.1 (footnotes omitted). 
 
2
  Fenrick Bochumer Schriften, p. 2.   
 
3
  See Michael Bothe, Commentary on the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, in Ronzitti, pp. 760-767; Fenrick 
Bochumer Schriften, pp. 23-27; and German Manual, para. 1017.2 concerning the applicability to naval 
warfare of the principles enshrined in the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
 
4
  See, for example, 1907 Hague Regulations, Article 22; 1977 Additional Protocol I, Article 35(1); 1995 
U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.1; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.2, 13.3, 13.24; Canadian 
Manual, para. German Manual, paras. 401, 1017, 1017.3; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 707.1; 
ICRC Model Manual, para. 1701; San Remo Manual, para. 38. 
 
5
  As they relate to naval warfare, these principles are succinctly set out in Fenrick Bochumer Schriften. 
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II. Principle of Distinction 
 
 Another core value of international humanitarian law is the protection of civilians and 
non-combatants, which is reflected in the principle of distinction (sometimes referred to as the 
principle of identification).  Belligerents at all times are required to make distinctions between 
civilians or other protected persons and combatants and between civilian or exempt objects 
and military objectives.6  The category of protected persons includes the wounded, 
shipwrecked, captured and anyone else who is hors de combat and no such persons may be 
the subject of an attack.7  With respect to objects, military objectives are limited to those 
objects which:  
 
[B]y their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at 
the time, offers a definite military advantage.8 
 
All other objects are civilian objects and are not to be targeted, since only military objectives 
may be the subject of a lawful attack.9  In addition to any specific prohibitions on the means 
and methods of armed conflict, it is forbidden to undertake any acts that are indiscriminate in 
that they are not, or cannot be directed against a specific military objective or which have 
effects that cannot be limited as the law requires.10  Means or methods that are “of a nature” to 
                                                
6
  1907 Hague Regulations, Articles 25, 27(1); 1977 Additional Protocol I, Articles 48, 49(3); Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion, paras. 78-79; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 5.3, 8.1, 
11.1-11.8; U.K. Manual, paras. 2.5-2.5.3, 13.25-13.31; Canadian Manual, paras. 204.1, 403, 411; 
German Manual, paras. 401, 451, 1017; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 205; ICRC Model Manual, 
paras 1104-1107, 1701; San Remo Manual, para. 39. 
 
7
  1977 Additional Protocol I, Articles 50, 51(2), 51(3); 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 
5.3, 8.1, 11.1-11.8; U.K. Manual, para. 9.17; Canadian Manual, paras. 306, 309-316, 403, 404, 406, 
408; German Manual, paras. 502, 601, 603, 704, 1017, 1017.4. 
 
8
  1977 Additional Protocol I, Article 52(2); 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 8.1-8.1.2; 
U.K. Manual, para. 13.26; Canadian Manual, paras. 403, 404, 406-407; German Manual, paras. 441-
443, 446, 1017, 1017.6; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 714.1; ICRC Model Manual, paras. 1104, 
1701(b); San Remo Manual, para. 40. 
 
9
  1977 Additional Protocol I, Articles 52-56; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 8.1-
8.1.2;U.K. Manual, para. 13.27; Canadian Manual, paras. 404, 411; German Manual, paras. 404, 441, 
451, 454-455; Australian Manual, para. 8.5, Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 714.1; ICRC Model 
Manual, para. 1701(b); San Remo Manual, para. 41. 
 
10
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 9.1.2; U.K. Manual, paras. 6.1, 13.28; Canadian 
Manual, paras. 416.1, 509, 827; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 707.4; German Manual, paras. 404, 
454-456; ICRC Model Manual, paras. 1108, 1701(c); San Remo Manual, para. 42.  This reqirement is 
based on Articles 51(4) and 51(5) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, although that provision applies 
only to land warfare pursuant to Article 49(3) of the treaty. 
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cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering are similarly prohibited,11 as are orders that 
there should be no survivors.12  
 
III. Principle of Proportionality 
 
 The principle of proportionality requires “that the losses resulting from a military 
action should not be excessive in relation to the expected military advantage.”13  This 
principle balances the potentially conflicting concepts of military necessity (discussed below) 
and the humanitarianism reflected in the law of armed conflict.  The 1977 Additional Protocol 
I is the first convention to set forth this principle with any degree of specificity and the 
relevant articles of this treaty prohibit attacks that may be expected to “cause incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected.”14   
Applying the proportionality principle in practice—particularly the term “concrete and 
direct”—can be difficult,15 as can be adjudicating cases involving the principle.16  The U.K. 
Manual defines “concrete and direct” to mean that: 
 
[T]he advantage to be gained is identifiable and quantifiable and 
one that flows directly from the attack, not some pious hope that it 
might improve the military situation in the long term.  In this sense 
                                                
 
11
  1977 Additional Protocol I, Article 35(2); 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 9.1.1; U.K. 
Manual, paras. 6.1, 13.28; Canadian Manual, paras. 502-503, 506; German Manual, paras. 401-402; 
Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 707.2; San Remo Manual, para. 42. 
 
12
  1907 Hague Regulations, Article 23(d); 1913 Oxford Manual, Article 17.3; 1977 Additional Protocol II, 
Article 40; Von Ruckteschell, p. 83; ICRC Model Manual, para. 1701(d); San Remo Manual, para. 43; 
Mallison, pp. 133-134.   
 
13
  U.K. Manual, para. 2.6.  See also ibid., paras. 2.6.1-2.8.2, 5.33-5.33.5; Canadian Manual, paras. 204.4-
204.6; German Manual, para. 509; Australian Manual, paras. 7.9-7.10, 8.3.  In the paragraph of the U.S. 
Standing ROE governing self-defence, the proportionality principle is defined as “the requirement that 
the use of force be in all circumstances limited in intensity, duration and scope to that which is 
reasonably required to counter the attack or threat and to ensure the continued safety of U.S. forces.”  
1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, Annex A4-3, pp. 277-285, para. 5d. 
 
14
  1977 Additional Protocol I, Articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b). 
 
15
  See, for example, the hypothetical situations described in the Canadian Manual, para. 204.6 and U.K. 
Manual, paras. 2.7-2.7.3, 5.33.4.  See also 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 5.2, footnote 
7; ICRC Additional Protocols Commentary, para. 1979.  
 
16
  See, for example, Galić Judgement, paras. 33-62, and especially para. 58, where the Trial Chamber 
adopts an objective approach to evaluating whether the proportionality principle is upheld.  
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it is like the term “definite” used in the definition of military 
objects.17  
 
A number of sources indicate that this phrase refers to the advantage to be gained from the 
“specific military operation of which the attack is a part taken as a whole and not from the 
isolated or particular parts of the operation.”18 
 
IV. Military Necessity 
 
 Closely related to the principles of distinction and proportionality is the concept of 
military necessity.19  Military necessity permits the use of that force which is required to 
accomplish a lawful purpose, and as such, it is complementary to the principle of 
proportionality, which prohibits the use of force that is not essential for achieving a legitimate 
military purpose.20  In the Hostages Case, the U.S. military tribunal explained military 
necessity as follows: 
 
Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, 
to apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete 
submission of the enemy with the least possible expediture of time, 
life and money.  It general, it sanctions measures by an occupant 
necessary to protect the safety of his forces and to facilitate the 
success of his operations.  It permits the destruction of life of 
armed enemies and other persons whose destruction is incidentally 
unavoidable to armed conflicts of war; it allows the capturing of 
armed enemies and others of peculiar danger, but it does not permit 
the killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the 
satisfaction of a lust to kill.  The destruction of property to be 
lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.  
Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law.  
There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction 
of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces.21 
 
                                                
17
  U.K. Manual, para. 5.33.3. 
 
18
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 5.2, footnote 7, citing to Bothe, Partsch and Solf, New 
Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict, p. 311.  This position reflects the interpretations stated by a 
number of States in ratifying the 1977 Additional Protocol I.  See German Manual, para. 509.8, footnote 
7; Canadian Manual, para. 415.  See also ICRC Additional Protocols Commentary, paras. 2208, 2219. 
 
19
  See 1863 Lieber Code, Article 14; U.K. Manual, paras. 2.1-2.3; Canadian Manual, paras. 202.1-202.4; 
German Manual, paras. 131-132; Australian Manual, para. 8.3; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 202.   
 
20
  In the paragraph of the U.S. Standing ROE governing self-defence, the necessity principle is defined as 
“the requirement that a use of force be in response to a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.”  
1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, Annex A4-3, pp. 277-285, para. 5d. 
 
21
  The Hostages Case, p. 66. 
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Military necessity is not a justification for disregarding the laws of armed conflict, and 
tribunals have rejected the defence that military necessity can somehow justify departing from 
well-established legal prohibitions protecting core values.22  There are, however, other rules of 
international humanitarian law protecting less important values that are subject to the 
requirements of military necessity,23 or which may be modified or even disregarded if 
required by military necessity.24  The modern view is that military necessity is inherent in the 
law of armed conflict in the sense that military necessity has been considered in formulating 
the relevant rules.  Thus, military necessity is an important principle that should not be 
ignored when examining the legality or practicality of establishing NEZs. 
 
V. Attack Precautions 
 
 The principles of distinction and proportionality require those who plan, decide upon 
or execute an attack to exercise precaution prior to launching an attack or otherwise engaging 
a target.25  In applying the principles of attack precautions, military commanders must:26  
 
                                                
22
  See, for example, Galić Judgement, paras. 33-62 (rejecting earlier ICTY cases that had found that 
“prohibited attacks are those launched deliberately against civilians and civilian objects in the course of 
armed conflict and are not justified by military necessity”) and especially ibid., para. 44, footnote 76 
(“Under no circumstances are civilians to be considered legitimate military targets.  Consequently, 
attacking civilians or the civilian population as such cannot be justified by involing military 
necessity.”). See also Krupp, p. 1347: 
 
It is an essence of war that one or the other side must lose, and the experienced 
generals and statesmen knew this when they drafted the rules and customs of 
land warfare.  In short these rules and customs of warfare are designed 
specifically for all phases of war.  They comprise the law for such emergency.  
To claim that they can be wantonly—and at the sole discretion of anyone 
belligerent—disregarded when he considers his own situation to be critical, 
means nothing more or less than to abrogate the laws and customs of war 
entirely. 
 
 See also U.K. Manual, para. 2.3; Canadian Manual, para. 202.4. 
 
23
  See, for example, 1949 Geneva Convention II, Articles 8(3), 28 and 30(1).  But see U.K. Manual, para. 
2.3, footnote 6. 
 
24
  See, for example, 1907 Hague Regulations, Article 23(g).  But see U.K. Manual, para. 2.3, footnote 6.  
 
25
  Galić Judgement, para. 58; U.K. Manual, paras. 2.5.3, 13.32; German Manual, para. 510; ICRC Model 
Manual, paras. 1108, 1701(f); San Remo Manual, para. 46. 
 
26
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.32; Canadian Manual, paras. 204.2, 417-421, 521.4(b); German Manual, paras. 
457, 510, 1017, 1017.7; Interim New Zealand Manual, paras. 205, 714.2; San Remo Manual, para. 46.  
These requirements are similar to Article 57 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, although that provision 
applies only to land warfare pursuant to Article 49(3) of the treaty.  A naval commander may consider a 
number of options in choosing an attack that would minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage, 
including the choice of weapons and weapons platform, the timing or angle of attack, and the fusing of 
the ordnance.  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.1.2.1, footnote 20. 
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• [T]ake all feasible measures to gather the information needed to 
determine whether or not objects that are military objectives are 
present in the area of attack;  
 
• [D]o everything dfeasible to ensure that attacks are limited to 
military objectives, based on the information available;  
 
• [T]ake all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods 
to ensure that collateral casualties or damage is avoided or at least 
minimised;  
 
• [N]ot launch the attack if it is expected to cause collateral 
casualties or damage that would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack 
as a whole; 
 
• [C]ancel or suspend an on-going attack as soon as it becomes 
apparent that the collateral casualties or damage would be 
excessive.  
 
Additional precautionary rules apply to civil aircraft.27 
 It will be noted that the attack precautionary principle refers to “collateral casualties or 
damage.”  It is not unlawful to cause incidental injury to civilians or collateral damage to 
civilian objects during an attack upon a legitimate military objective.28  Reflecting the 
requirements of the proportionality principle, however, such incidental injury or damage must 
not be excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated by the attack.29   
 With respect to those components of the attack precautionary principle based on the 
proportionality principle, the U.S. Navy adopts an approach that is more subjective from the 
persepective of the military commander than the approach set forth above and which focuses 
on mission accomplishment and force protection: 
 
Naval commanders must take all reasonable precautions, taking 
into account military and humanitarian considerations, to keep 
civilian casualties and damage to the minimum consistent with 
mission accomplishment and the security of the force.  In each 
instance, the commander must determine whether incidental 
injuries and collateral damage would be excessive, on the basis of 
an honest and reasonable estimate of the facts available to him.  
Similarly, the commander must decide, in light of all the facts 
known or reasonably available to him, including the need to 
conserve resources and complete the mission successfully, whether 
                                                
27
  U.K. Manual, paras. 12.45-12.50; Canadian Manual, para. 711.3; San Remo Manual, paras.72-77. 
 
28
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 8.1, 8.1.2.1; German Manual, para. 445. 
 
29
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.1.2.1. 
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to adopt an alternative method of attack, if reasonably available, to 
reduce civilian casualties and damage.30  
 
VI. Self-Defence 
 
 In accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, any exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defence must be consistent with the principles of military 
necessity and proportionality.31  The Explanation to paragraph 3 of the San Remo Manual 
succinctly describes the legal requirements relating to self-defence as follows: 
 
The effect of these principles is that a State which is the victim of 
an armed attack is entitled to resort to force against the attacker but 
only to the extent necessary to defend itself and to achieve such 
defensive goals as repelling the attack, recovering territory and 
removing threats to its future security.  These principles do not 
require that a State which is attacked use only the degree and kind 
of force that has been used against it but that the force employed 
by the State acting in self-defence be proportionate to what is 
required for the achievement of legitimate objectives of self-
defence.32 
 
Inherent in the right of self-defence is the notion that proportionate and necessary acts 
undertaken in self-defence may nevertheless be unlawful if they exceed what the law of self-
defence permits the State to achieve by force.33  This reflects the fact that once the armed 
attack has been repelled and the security of the victim State has been re-established, no further 
hostile actions are required.34  Moreover, only in exceptional circumstances (if even then) can 
a State exercising the right of self-defence seek the total submission of the enemy, since this 
course of action is likely to exceed the permissible boundaries of self-defence.35  
                                                
30
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.1.2.1 (footnotes omitted).  The explanations for these 
differences, which are based on statements made by certain NATO States at the time the 1977 
Additional Protocol I was signed, are set forth in ibid., footnotes 18-20.  See also ibid., paras. 8.1, 11.2. 
 
31
  Military And Paramilitary Activities, para. 194; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 4.3.2-
4.3.2.1.  The provisions of the U.S. Standing ROE governing self-defence specifically refer to these 
principles, as do the U.S. Navy Regulations. Ibid., Annex A4-3, pp. 277-285, para. 5d.  See also 
Australian Manual, paras. 7.1, 7.13-7.14, 7.19-7.23; San Remo Manual, paras. 3-5, Explanation, paras. 
3.1-5.2; 
 
32
  San Remo Manual, Explanation, para. 3.3. 
 
33
  San Remo Manual, para. 4, Explanation, para. 4.2.  See also Christopher J. Greenwood, “The 
Relationship Between Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello, in Greenwood Essays, pp. 13-31, ad passim. 
 
34
  San Remo Manual, para. 4, Explanation, paras. 4.1-4.6.  But see 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s 
Handbook, para. 5.2. 
 
35
  San Remo Manual, para. 5, Explanation, paras. 5.1-5.2.   
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The establishment of NEZs can be an important aspect of self-defence and in this 
respect, the U.K. Manual makes two interesting points.  First, the provisions on NEZs make 
specific reference to self-defence, stating that zones are “legitimate means of exercising the 
right of self-defence.”36  Second, the U.K. Manual specifically cites to the Falklands War (in 
which exclusion zones were used extensively) as an example of the exercise of self-defence.37  
 Of course, the commander of a naval vessel also exercises “unit self-defence,” the 
right to protect his vessel and crew.38  This form of self-defence, which must also meet the 
proportionality and necessity tests, may “only be undertaken in response to the commission of 
a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.”39  The Australian Manual indicates that the 
Caroline principles apply to this form of self-defence, and thus for an act of unit self-defence 
to be lawful, there must be “an instant and overwhelming necessity for self defence leaving no 
choice of means and no moment for deliberation.”40 
 
VII. Naval Targeting in General 
  
Due to the nature of naval warfare, the principle of distinction raises slightly different 
problems than those typically encountered by commanders engaged in land or air warfare, 
with the exception of sea-based attacks on land targets.41  Unlike land or air warfare, which 
increasingly occurs in and around urban areas, combat often occurs in areas where there are 
significant concentrations of civilians and civilian objects.  By comparison, there are 
significantly fewer civilians and civilian objects in most maritime environments.  Fenrick has 
noted the following with respect to the problems presented by naval targeting:  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
36
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.77.1. 
 
37
  U.K. Manual, para. 3.2.2, footnote 4 (“The UK’s actions in recovering the Falklands Islands in 1982 
were based throughout on self-defence.”)  See also German Manual, para. 204. 
 
38
  The provisions of the U.S. Standing ROE governing unit self-defence stipulate that a commander has 
the “obligation” to protect his unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity.  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s 
Handbook, Annex A4-3, pp. 277-285, para. 2a.  See also Australian Manual, paras. 7.5-7.13. 
 
39
  See Australian Manual, paras. 7.8. 
 
40
  Australian Manual, paras. 7.6, 7.12. 
 
41
  This is not to suggest that targeting decision are not occasionally made on the basis of faulty or 
inadequate intelligence or that targeting accidents do not occur in armed conflict at sea, but rather, for 
the reasons that follow, naval warfare is not beset with many of the difficulties facing ground 
commanders or military pilots with respect to distinguishing between legitimate and unlawful targets. 
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It is quite understandable that naval officers tasked with making 
targeting decisions would prefer “bright line” rules which draw 
easily identifiable distinctions between permissible and 
impermissible objects of attack.  Unfortunately, just as reality in 
the form of the irregular combatant makes “bright line” rules 
difficult to draw in the law of land warfare, so reality in the form of 
the merchant ship may or may not be providing support for the 
belligerent war effort makes “bright line” rules difficult to draw in 
the law of naval warfare.  The existence of a refractory reality does 
not mean that one abandons the search for “bright line” rules.  It 
does mean, however, that the search may be difficult.42 
 
One of the major problems encountered in naval warfare is target identification.  
Vessels are generally categorised into warships (and auxiliaries) and merchant vessels, with 
the latter category further subdivided into enemy and neutral merchantment.  As Fenrick has 
written: 
 
Naval commanders have weapons available to them which they 
can use to attack targets which are beyond visual range (BVR) or 
even over the horizon (OTH).  The naval commander can attack 
and destroy targets at ranges where it is difficult or impossible for 
him to confirm that the target is a legitimate military objective. … 
Commanders must make targeting decisions on the basis of an 
assessment of probabilities.43 
 
The targeting rules set forth in this chapter apply to all aspects of naval warfare, and 
the general legal principles set forth above are applicable to all aspects of naval targeting.  
After each engagement, all possible measures should be taken without delay to search for and 
collect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick; dead bodies should be recovered.44  This duty is 
subject to military exigencies and reflects the potential dangers that await any warship that 
lingers in the area after an attack or engagement.45  Although submarines may be particularly 
vulnerable in such circumstances, they remain nuder a similar duty, although if to meet this 
obligation, the submarine would face “undue additional hazard” or be unable to accomplish 
its military mission, the location of possible survivors should be passed to surface vessels, 
aircraft or shore facilities that are capable of performing the necessary search and rescue 
                                                
42
  Fenrick Bochumer Schriften, pp. 4-5.   
 
43
  Fenrick Bochumer Schriften, p. 37. 
 
44
  1907 Hague Convention X, Article 16; 1949 Geneva Convention II, Article 18; 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, Article 33; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.2.1; U.K. Manual, para. 
13.129; Canadian Manual, para. 904; German Manual, paras. 1017, 1017.8; Interim New Zealand 
Manual, para. 724. 
 
45
  Operational necessity, however, can never excuse the unlawful killing of survivors.  Peleus.   
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mission.46  Military aircraft have a similar obligation to conduct searches and in the event 
military exigencies do not permit such a search, the location of possible survivors must be 
passed to units that can render assistance.47 
 
VIII. Targeting of Enemy Warships and Military Aircraft 
  
 One of the few areas of naval targeting that allows for “bright line” rules concerns 
enemy warships (both surface vessels and submarines), military aircraft and naval and 
military auxiliaries.48  These categories of vessels and aircraft may be attacked, destroyed or 
captured without warning by surface vessels, submarines or military aircraft in any area 
outside neutral territory or neutralised zones.49  The German Manual reflects a minority 
position and takes a more restrictive approach, explicitly stating that the principles of naval 
warfare: 
 
[T]hose peculiar to naval warfare as well as the general principles 
of the laws of armed conflict, may, however, in specific cases 
oblige belligerents to refrain from destroying or sinking such ships 
and aircraft.  This would be the case, for example, if in relation to 
the military advantage anticipated sinking or destruction were 
unnecessary or disproportionate.  A geographical limitation of the 
conflict may also be of significance in so far as hostilities beyond a 
certain area may not take place even if directed at military 
objectives.50 
 
The attacker has an obligation to cease the attack once the enemy warship or auxiliary 
indicates a readiness to surrender.51  The officers and crews of warships that have surrendered, 
                                                
46
  1907 Hague Convention X, Article 16; 1949 Geneva Convention II, Article 18; 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, Article 33; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 8.2.1, 8.3; U.K. Manual, para. 
13.129; Canadian Manual, para. 904.1; German Manual, paras. 1017, 1017.8; Interim New Zealand 
Manual, para. 724; Mallison, pp. 134-139. 
 
47
  1949 Geneva Convention II, Article 18; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.4; U.K. 
Manual, para. 13.129; Canadian Manual, para. 904.1. 
 
48
  Fenrick Bochumer Schriften, p. 30. 
 
49
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 8.2.1, 8.3, 8.4; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.44-13.45; 
Canadian Manual, para. 833; German Manual, para. 1021; Australian Manual, para. 8.4; Interim New 
Zealand Manual, para. 715; San Remo Manual, paras. 65-66. 
 
50
  German Manual, para. 1021.2 (footnotes omitted).  The footnote accompanying the final sentence of the 
quoted section cites to the sinking of the Belgrano.  Even though the German Manual indicates that this 
sinking was lawful, it notes (in ibid., footnote 103) that, “The reactions in State practice as well as in 
legal writings show, however, that in geographically limited conflicts even the sinking of warships is 
subject to more legal restrictions than in a conflict of a general nature.” 
 
51
  See the following section.  Although the same rule applies in principle to the surrender of military 
aircraft, it is much more difficult for aircraft to signal an intention to surrender and given today’s 
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as well as any survivors from ships that have been attacked, are to be accorded the status of 
prisoners of war.52 
 
IX. Targeting: Exempt Vessels 
  
Reflecting the distinction principle, there are a number of types of vessels that are 
exempt from attack, in addition to vessels that have surrendered53 and persons who have taken 
to life boats,54 including the following:55  
 
• Passenger liners carrying only civilians and civilian aircraft56 
 
• Hospital ships, medical transports, medical aircraft and small 
coastal vessels engaged in search and rescue operations57 
                                                                                                                                                   
modern surface-to-air and air-to-air weaponry, the chances that an aircraft would be hit and be in any 
condition to indicate a willingness to surrender is remote, to say the least.  See 1995 U.S. Navy 
Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.2.1, footnotes 31-33. 
 
52
  1949 Geneva Convention II, Article 16; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.2.1; German 
Manual, paras. 1021, 1021.3; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 725. 
 
53
  1907 Hague Regulations, Article 23(c); 1913 Oxford Manual, Article 17.2; 1977 Additional Protocol II, 
Article 41; Von Ruckteschell, p. 82; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.2.1; U.K. 
Manual, para. 13.33(j); German Manual, paras. 1017, 1017.8; Canadian Manual, para. 828.1(h); Interim 
New Zealand Manual, para. 719.2; ICRC Model Manual, para. 1703(i); San Remo Manual, para. 47(i), 
Explanation, paras. 47.56-47.57; Mallison, p. 134.   
 
54
  1949 Geneva Convention II, Articles 12, 18; 1977 Additional Protocol I, 8(b); Llandovery Castle; 
Peleus; Von Ruckteschell; Moehle; U.K. Manual, para. 13.33(k); Canadian Manual, para. 828.1(i); 
ICRC Model Manual, para. 1703(j); San Remo Manual, para. 47(j), Explanation, para. 47.58. 
 
55
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.2.3; U.K. Manual, para. 13.33; Canadian Manual, 
para. 828.1; German Manual, para. 1034; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 718.1; ICRC Model 
Manual, para. 1703; San Remo Manual, paras. 47, 136.  To this list, the Interim New Zealand Manual 
(at para. 718.1[e]) adds “vessels and aircraft exempt by proclamation, operation plan, order or other 
directive.”  With respect to types of aircraft that are immune from attack, see U.K. Manual, paras. 
12.28-12.33; San Remo Manual, paras. 53-58.  See also Fenrick Bochumer Schriften, pp. 28-29.  
Although these categories of exempt vessels are generally described as “exempt enemy vessels,” it 
follows that if these types of vessels are exempt from attack as enemy vessels, similar types of neutral 
vessels are also exempt, since greater protection is afforded to neutral vessels.  Of course, as is the case 
with exempt enemy vessels, exempt neutral vessels may lose exemption if they violate the rules set 
forth below.  
 
56
  The general view is that while passenger vessels are not subject to attack, they are liable to capture.  See 
1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.3.2, p. 418; U.K. Manual, para. 13.33(f); Canadian 
Manual, para. 828.1(e); German Manual, paras. 1004, 1034.6; ICRC Model Manual, para. 1703(h).  
Reflecting, at least in part, the views of Heintschel von Heinegg and Doswald-Beck (see Heintschel von 
Heinegg Bochumer Schriften, p. 95), however, the San Remo Manual takes a more restrictive approach.  
San Remo Manual, paras. 47(e), 53(c), 56.   
 
57
 1949 Geneva Convention II, Articles 22-35; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.2.3, 
footnotes 62-71; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.33(a). 13.33(d), 13.33.1, 13.35-13.37; Canadian Manual, paras. 
828.1(a), 828.1(b); German Manual, paras. 1054-1064; Australian Manual, paras. 8.10(a)-8.10(b); 
Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 718.1(b); ICRC Model Manual, paras. 1703(a), 1703(b); San Remo 
Manual, para. 47(a), Explanation, paras. 47.1-47.17; Tucker, pp. 97, 123-134; Mallison, pp. 124-125; 
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• Vessels and aircraft designated for and engaged in the exchange of 
prisoners of war (often referred to as “cartel vessels”)58 
 
• Vessels and aircraft that have been guaranteed safe conduct by 
agreement of the belligerents59 
 
• Vessels engaged in religious, non-military scientific or 
philanthropic missions or carrying cultural property60 
 
• Small coastal (but not deep-sea) fishing vessels and small boats 
engaged in coastal trade61 
 
• Vessels specifically designed for responding to maritime pollution 
incidents62 
 
• Vessels protected by the U.N. flag63 
 
The above categories will remain exempt from attack provided they: (1) are innocently 
engaged in the specific roles that are the source of the exemption; (2) they refrain from taking 
part in the hostilities or otherwise assisting any of the belligerents (including intelligence-
gathering); (3) they do not hamper the movement of military vessels or aircraft; (4) they 
                                                                                                                                                   
Richard J. Grunawalt, “Hospital Ships in the War on Terror: Sanctuaries or Targets,” 58 NWCR (No. 1, 
Winter 2005), pp. 89-119.  See also the Dover Castle and Llandovery Castle cases, both of which 
involved the sinking of British hospital ships by German submarines in the First World War. 
 
58
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.33(c)(1); Canadian Manual, para. 828.1(c); German Manual, para. 1034.5; 
Australian Manual, para. 8.10(c)(1); Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 718.1(a); ICRC Model 
Manual, para. 1703(c)(1); San Remo Manual, paras. 47(c), 136(c), Explanation, paras. 47.18-47.23; 
Tucker, pp. 97-98; Mallison, p. 126. 
 
59
  These agreements typically relate to the provision of essential humanitarian supplies.  U.K. Manual, 
para. 13.33(c)(2); Canadian Manual, para. 828.1(c); Australian Manual, para. 8.10(c)(2); Interim New 
Zealand Manual, para. 718.1(d); ICRC Model Manual, para. 1703(c)(2); San Remo Manual, paras. 
47(c), 136(c), Explanation, paras. 47.24-47.29; 
 
60
  1907 Hague Convention XI, Article 4; 1954 Cultural Property Convention, Articles 12-14; U.K. 
Manual, para. 13.33(e); Canadian Manual, paras. 828.1(d), 828.1(f); German Manual, paras. 923-925, 
1034.3, 1034.4; Australian Manual, paras. 8.10(d)-8.10(d); Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 
718.1(c); ICRC Model Manual, paras. 1703(d), 1703(e); San Remo Manual, paras. 47(f), 136(e), 
Explanation, paras. 47.30-47.32, 47.37-47.44.  According to Mallison (at p. 128) and Tucker (at pp. 96-
97), the practice has been to interpret this provision narrowly and often express agreements are entered 
with respect to these categories of vessels.  
 
61
  1907 Hague Convention XI, Article 4; U.K. Manual, para. 13.33(h); Canadian Manual, para. 828.1(g); 
German Manual, para. 1034.2; Australian Manual, para. 8.10(f); Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 
718.1(f); ICRC Model Manual, para. 1703(f); San Remo Manual, paras. 47(g), 136(f), Explanation, 
paras. 47.45-47.55; For examples of instances where small coastal fishing craft were used illegitimately 
for mine-latying and logistical support in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, respectively, see Cagle and 
Manson, pp. 296-297; O’Connell Influence, p. 177. 
 
62
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.33(i); Australian Manual, para. 8.10(g); ICRC Model Manual, para. 1703(g); San 
Remo Manual, para. 47(h), Explanation, paras. 47.52-47.55. 
 
63
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.33(l). 
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submit to any identification and inspection regimes developed by the belligerents; and (5) 
they obey all orders to leave the area where combat is occurring when issued.64  Special rules 
apply for attacking a vessel that is otherwise exempt, but which loses that exemption for any 
of the above reasons.65   
With respect to merchantmen, the general rule is that merchant vessels and civil 
aircraft are considered civilian objects unless they fall into certain specified categories or 
undertake specific acts that cause them to be military objectives.66  The following two sub-
sections discuss how belligerents may lawfully engage enemy merchant vessels and neutral 
merchant vessels, respectively. 
 
X. Targeting of Enemy Merchant Vessels67 
 
 The 1936 London Protocol prohibited the destruction of enemy merchant vessels by 
belligerent surface ships unless the safety of the crew and any passengers was assured, unless 
the merchant vessel engaged in active resistance to capture or failed to stop after being 
ordered to do so.68  Belligerents on both sides widely and notoriously ignored this prohibition 
during World War II, attacking and sinking neutral merchantment without warning and 
without making any effort to provide for the safety of crews or passengers.69  Reprisals were 
                                                
64
  1907 Hague Convention XI, Article 4; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.2.3; U.K. 
Manual, para. 13.34; Canadian Manual, para. 829.1; German Manual, para. 1035; Australian Manual, 
para. 8.12; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 718.1; ICRC Model Manual, para. 1703.1; San Remo 
Manual, para. 48, Explanation, paras. 48.1-48.14.  With respect to the loss of exemption of hospital 
ships, see U.K. Manual, paras. 13.35-13.37; Canadian Manual, paras. 42, 830; German Manual, para. 
1062; ICRC Model Manual, para. 1704; San Remo Manual, paras. 49-51 and the corresponding 
paragraphs of the Explanation.  Concerning the loss of exemption for the other categories of vessels, see 
U.K. Manual, para. 13.34; ICRC Model Manual, para. 170.5; San Remo Manual, para. 52, Explanation, 
paras. 52.1-52.2.   
 
65
  Such vessels may be attacked only if diversion or capture is impossible; if there is no other method for 
establishing control over the vessel; when the circumstances of non-compliance are sufficiently grave 
that vessel has become, or is reasonably assumed to be, a military objective; and when the expected 
collateral casualties or damage are proportionate to the military advantage gained or expected.  U.K. 
Manual, para. 13.38; Canadian Manual, para. 832; German Manual, para. 1035; San Remo Manual, 
para. 52.  With respect to the situations in which a hospital ship may be attacked, see U.K. Manual, 
para. 13.37; Canadian Manual, para. 831; German Manual, para. 1062; San Remo Manual, para. 51. 
 
66
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.27; Canadian Manual, para. 407.2; German Manual, para. 1004; San Remo 
Manual, para. 41.   
 
67
  In general, see Grunawalt; Fenrick Bochumer Schriften, pp. 30-37. 
 
68
  1936 London Protocol, Rule 2. 
 
69
  In general, see Tucker, pp. 55-70; Mallison, pp. 106-121; Mallison and Mallison, pp. 85-103. 
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the initial justification for such policies, but as the war continued, most merchant vessels 
became increasingly integrated into the war-fighting or war-sustaining efforts of the 
belligerents.70  Given the global scope of the Second World War, these policies meant few 
merchant vessels sailed under protection of the law: “Only those few neutral merchant vessels 
engaged in genuine inter-neutral trade were immune from attack.”71  In short, enemy 
merchantmen were widely regarded as legitimate military objectives subject to attack on 
sight. 
 Enemy merchant vessels may only be attacked if they meet the criteria of a military 
objective72 and a survey of the modern military manuals reveals that enemy merchant vessels 
may be attacked (with or without warning) in the following circumstances:73 
 
• When the enemy merchant vessel if engaged in acts of war, such as 
laying mines, mine-sweeping, or attacking other merchant vessels 
or warships. 
 
• When the enemy merchant vessel persistently refuses to stop upon 
being ordered to do so. 
 
• When the enemy merchant vessel actively resists visit and search or 
capture.74 
 
• When the enemy merchant vessel is sailing under convoy of enemy 
warsips or military aircraft. 
 
• When the enemy merchant vessel is armed with weapons that could 
inflict damage to a warship.75 
                                                
70
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.2.2.2. 
 
71
  Mallison and Mallison, p. 90. 
 
72
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.40; Canadian Manual, para. 834.1; German Manual, paras. 1025-1025.1; 
Australian Manual, para. 8.5; ICRC Model Manual, para. 1706; San Remo Manual, para. 59. 
 
73
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 8.2.2.2, 8.3.1; U.K. Manual, para. 13.41; Canadian 
Manual, paras. 718.2, 834.2; German Manual, paras. 1025-1025.6; Australian Manual, paras. 8.5, 8.8-
8.9; Interim New Zealand Manual, paras. 716.3-716.6.  See also ICRC Model Manual, para. 1706.2; 
San Remo Manual, para. 60, Explanation, paras. 60.1-60.14. 
 
74
  While enemy merchant vessels may exercise self-defence, it entails “considerable risks because it 
conflicts with the warship’s right of capture.”  German Manual, para. 1025.2.  Perhaps the best-known 
example is the Fryatt case, in which the captain of the unarmed British steamer Brussels was tried and 
executed as an unlawful combatant by the Germans in 1916 for his attempt to ram a German U-Boat 
that had ordered him to stop and show his colours and surrender in 1915.  Fryatt, pp. 865-866; Garner, 
Vol. I, pp. 407-413.  Captain Fryatt was acting pursuant to Admiralty Instructions that British merchant 
vessels should forcibly resist German U-Boats.  See also 1913 Oxford Manual, Article 12. 
 
75
  The United States holds the position that any armed enemy merchant vessel is subject to attack, 
regardless of the type of weapons the merchantmen carries.  See 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s 
Handbook, para. 8.2.2.2, and footnote 54, which notes that in light of modern weapon systems: 
 
[I]t is impossible to determine, if it ever was possible, whether the armament on 
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• When the enemy merchant vessel is incorporated into or otherwise 
assisting the intelligence-gathering system of the enemy. 
 
• When the enemy merchant vessel is serving in any capacity as a 
naval or military auxiliary to the enemy. 
 
• When the enemy merchant vessel is integrated into the enemy’s 
war-fighting or war-sustaining effort and to comply with the 1936 
London Protocol would place the warship in imminent danger or 
would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment.76 
 
• When the enemy merchant vessel is breaching or attempting to 
breach a blockade.77 
 
As a general rule, military aircraft may also launch attacks against enemy merchant ships 
under the same circumstances.78 
 
XI. Targeting of Neutral Merchant Ships 
 
Although as a general rule, some belligerents have reduced their reliance on certain 
aspects of economic warfare at sea in recent conflicts, others have turned to policies that may 
be characterised as “unrestricted sinking” of neutral merchant vessels.79  This section explores 
instances when neutral vessels may be lawfully targeted and also looks at State practice—
whether lawful or otherwise—concerning such targeting in recent naval conflicts.   
In short, neutral merchant vessels that fail to meet their obligations may, under certain 
conditions, find themselves liable to attack.  The modern military manuals and the San Remo 
                                                                                                                                                   
merchant ships is to be used offensively against an enemy or merely 
defensively.  It is unreaslitic to expect enemy forces to be able to make that 
determination.   
 
 See also ibid., for additional sources on earlier conflicting views concerning armed merchant vessels, 
and San Remo Manual, para. 60(f), Explanation, para. 60.14.  
 
76
  The description of this category is from 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 8.2.2.2 and 
8.3.  The drafters of the San Remo Manual rejected this approach as being too broad for a residual 
category.  Consequently, the San Remo Manual (and those military manuals based on that document) 
phrase the residual category as permitting attacks on enemy merchant vessels that are “otherwise 
making an effective contribution to military action, e.g., carrying military materials.”  See San Remo 
Manual, Explanation, paras. 60.10-60.12.  
 
77
  The German Manual (at para. 1025.1, footnote 122) refers to blockade-running as a possible 
justification for attacking enemy merchant vessels, without reference to providing prior warning.  Other 
manuals indicate that merchant vessels (without distinguishing between neutral and enemy 
merchantmen) that are breaching or attempting to breach a blockade may be attacked after warning 
when resisting capture if they are military objectives.  See U.K. Manual, para. 13.70; Canadian Manual, 
para. 847; San Remo Manual, para.98.  
 
78
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.4 
 
79
  Heinstchel von Heinegg Bochumer Schriften, p. 1. 
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Manual set forth the rules that govern when neutral merchant vessels may be the object of a 
lawful attack.  Such vessels may not be attacked unless:  
 
• They engage in belligerent acts on behalf of an enemy; act as 
auxiliaries to enemy forces; are incorporated or act on behalf of 
enemy intelligence; sail under convoy of enemy warships or 
military aircraft; or otherwise make an effective contribution to the 
enemy’s military action;80 or 
 
• They are reasonably believed to be carrying contraband or 
breaching a blockade and they fail to heed a warning to stop or 
intentionally and clearly resist visit, search or capture.81  
 
Any attack on neutral merchant vessels must otherwise comply with the general rules of 
international humanitarian law that are set forth above and the mere fact that a neutral vessel 
is armed is not justification for attacking it.82  
There are three clear situations when neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft may 
be attacked without warning:83 
 
• When they engage in acts of war on behalf of the enemy;84  
 
• When they act as de facto auxiliaries to the enemy’s armed forces;85 
and 
 
• When they are incorporated into, or assist the eneny’s intelligence 
gathering.86  
 
                                                
80
  San Remo Manual, paras. 67(b)-(f). 
 
81
  Ibid., para. 67(a). 
 
82
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.48; Canadian Manual, para. 835.2; German Manual, paras. 1004, 1025; San 
Remo Manual, para. 69. 
 
83
  Any attack on such vessels must otherwise comply with the general rules of international humanitarian 
law that are set forth in Chapter 6.  See San Remo Manual, paras. 38-46, 68; Tucker, pp. 319-321. 
 
84
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.5.1; U.K. Manual, para. 13.47(b); Canadian Manual, 
para. 835.1(b); Australian Manual, para. 8.12(b); Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 717.4(a); San 
Remo Manual, paras. 67(b), 70(b), Explanation, paras. 67.1, 67.10, 67.23-67.24, 70.3. 
 
85
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.5.1; U.K. Manual, para. 13.47(c); Canadian Manual, 
para. 835.1(c); Australian Manual, para. 8.12(c); Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 717.4(b); San 
Remo Manual, paras. 67(c), 70(c), Explanation, paras. 67.1, 67.10, 67.23, 67.25, 70.3. 
 
86
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.47(d); Canadian Manual, para. 835.1(d); Australian Manual, para. 8.12(d); San 
Remo Manual, paras. 67(d), 70(d), Explanation, paras. 67.1, 67.10, 67.23, 67.26, 70.3.  This provision is 
to be strictly interpreted so as to cover only those situations where neutral merchant vessels are 
primarily engaged in intellugence-gathering and have special equipment and personnel on board.  See 
ibid., para. 67.26, referring to the sinking of the Argentine fishing trawler Narwal by British forces 
during the Falklands War.  Narwal was regularly engaged in reporting the location of Royal Navy 
warships and carried an Argentine Navy detachment.   
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These are among the activities that have historically been referred to as engaging in 
“unneutral service.”87  The U.S. Navy takes the position that by engaging in any of the above 
activities, “neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft acquire enemy character and may be 
treated by a belligerent as enemy warships and military aircraft.”88  These acts may be 
distinguished from other acts of neutral merchant vessels or civil aircraft, such as those that 
operate “directly under enemy control, orders, charter, employment or direction” or which 
resist “an attempt to establish identity, including visit and search.”89  These acts will result in 
the neutral merchant vessel or civil aircraft acquiring the character of an enemy merchant 
vessel or civil aircraft, rendering them liable to capture and potentially destruction, as 
described in the preceding section.90 
 Determining that a neutral merchant vessel or civil aircraft is engaged in any of the 
above-mentioned activities may prove difficult to establish.  Making such a determination 
pales, however, in comparison with the final clause of paragraph 67 of the San Remo Manual, 
namely that neutral merchant vessels may be attacked if they: 
 
[O]therwise make an effective contribution to the enemy’s military 
action, e.g., by carrying military materials and it is not feasible for 
the attacking forces to first place passengers and crew in a place of 
safety.  Unless circumstances do not permit, they are to be given a 
warning, so that they can re-route, off-load, or take other 
precautions.91 
 
According to the drafters of the San Remo Manual, this residual category includes most 
imports that could be used for military operations or for the production of military goods, but 
                                                
87
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.5.1, footnote 112.  See also ibid., para. 7.10 for other 
examples of engaging in unneutral service; see also Australian Manual, paras. 8.12-8.13; Tucker, pp. 
318-331. 
 
88
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.5.1.   
 
89
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.5.2.  The first category includes sailing under convoy 
of belligerent warships or military aircraft.  See also Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 717.1(g). 
 
90
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 7.5.2, 8.2.2-8.2.3.   
 
91
  San Remo Manual, para. 67(f).  See also U.K. Manual, para. 13.47(f); Canadian Manual, para. 835.1(f).  
A slightly different rule applies to neutral civil aircraft, as set forth in the San Remo Manual, para. 70(e) 
and Explanation, para. 70.4.  Pursuant to paragraph 70(e), neutral civil aircraft are subject to attack if 
they: 
 
[O]therwise make an effective contribution to the enemy’s military action, e.g., 
by carrying military materials, and, after prior warning or interception, they 
intentionally and clearly refuse to divert from their destination, or intentionally 
and clearly refuse to proceed for visit and search to a belligerent airfield that is 
safe for the type of aircraft involved and reasonably accessible.  
 
 See also U.K. Manual, paras. 12.43-12.44; 
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would exclude the exportation of materials that might be used to finance the war on the 
grounds that the nexus between such exports for financial purposes and the armed conflict 
would be too remote.92 
According to the San Remo Manual commentary, paragraph 67(f) was based on a 
proposal put forward by the special rapporteur and then the discussion leader of this section of 
the manual.93  This proposal would have permitted attacks without warning on neutral 
merchant vessels that were integrated into either the enemy’s “war-fighting” or “war-
sustaining” efforts when it was not feasible for the attacking ship to place passengers and 
crew in a place of safety.94  This proved to be controversial during the drafting process, with 
the majority of the experts concluding that these were inadequate justifications for attacking 
neutral merchantmen.95  It was finally decided to replace the proposed language with the 
phrase “effective contribution to military action,” which corresponds to the language used in 
Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.96 
Nevertheless, the rejected position reflects the position that had been advanced by 
Mallison, who argued for what has been characterised as a “flexible approach”97 with respect 
to targeting neutral merchant vessels that are “integrated into the enemy war effort:” 
 
Historically, neutral merchant ships have not been claimed as 
objects of direct military attack to as great a degree as have enemy 
merchant vessels.  It is clear that this situation was drastically 
changed during the World Wars. 
 
… 
 
It seems clear on the basis of moral and legal principles as well as 
on the customary law developed in both World Wars, that neutral 
merchant vessels which are integrated into the enemy war effort 
may be lawfully accorded the same treatment as enemy merchant 
vessels which are integrated.  It has been demonstrated that the 
                                                
92
  Fenrick Bochumer Schriften, Discussions, p. 166; see also San Remo Manual, Explanation, para. 67.27. 
 
93
  William Fenrick was the special rapporteur and was the drafter of this proposal.  See Fenrick Bochumer 
Schriften, pp. 42-43 and Bring, Comment No. 1, ibid., pp. 45-46.  It appears that Heintschel von 
Heinegg was the discussion leader for this apect of the San Remo Manual.  See Discussions, ibid., pp. 
141-169. 
 
94
  San Remo Manual, Explanation, paras. 67.1, 67.10-67.20, 67.27.  The text of the proposed rules are set 
forth in ibid., para. 67.1. 
 
95
  Fenrick Bochumer Schriften, Discussions, pp. 158-167; see also San Remo Manual, Explanation, para. 
67.20. 
 
96
  Fenrick Bochumer Schriften, Discussions, p. 166; see also San Remo Manual, Explanation, para. 67.20. 
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  A. Gioia, “Iraq: Commentary,” in De Guttry and Ronzitti, p. 68. 
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[1909 London] Protocol does not protect enemy merchant ships 
which are participating in the war or hostilities.  There is no reason 
in either experience or logic why the [1909 London] Protocol 
should be interpreted as protecting neutral merchant ships which 
are engaged in the same functional activities that result in lack of 
protection for an enemy merchant ship.98 
 
This approach had been advanced by a number of American and Canadian military lawyers, 
including Grunawalt99 and Fenrick.100 
Evaluating state practice from the First and Second World Wars concerning the 
targeting of merchant vessels is particularly troublesome for a number of reasons.  First, as 
recognised in the Dönitz Judgement, the practice of unrestricted submarine warfare directed at 
neutral vessels was widespread,101 although both Dönitz and Räder were found guilty of 
waging unrestricted warfare against neutral shipping, no sentence was imposed for this 
unlawful practice, a form of tu quoque in mitigation.102  Second, the British, in particular, had 
adopted policies that “allowed for virtual total government control of its civilian merchant 
fleet, as well as the trading practices of many neutral States,” including the arming of British 
merchantmen and the requirement that neutral merchant vessels operating in waters controlled 
                                                
98
  Mallison, pp. 129-130.  See also ibid., pp. 117-123, 129-132. 
 
99
  Richard J. Grunawalt, The Rights of Neutrals and Belligerents, 19 Ocean Development and 
International Law, p. 303 (1988), at p. 308 (“the law ought to recognize that neutral shipping that 
sustains a belligerent’s warfighting capability may be subject to interdiction by whatever platforms and 
weapons systems are available to the other side”). 
 
100
  Fenrick, pp. 106:  
 
In a general war, the true merchant vessel is rarely to be found because the 
belligerent States normally assume such a degree of control over their own 
vessels and neutral vessels engaged in trading with them as to convert them into 
de facto naval auxiliaries.  As such, they should be subject to the same treatment 
as de jure naval auxiliaries, that is, they may be sunk on sight outside neutral 
waters. 
 
 See also Fenrick Merchant Vessel, pp. 438-442. 
 
101
  The British zone of the Skaggerak and the U.S. Pacific Ocean zone particularly influenced the tribunal 
in this respect.  Fenrick notes that “before the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in 1945, there was 
significant neutral merchant traffic to and from the Pacific coast of the Soviet Union which passed 
through the United States declared Pacific War Zone and was not molested by the United States 
submarines.” Fenrick Merchant Vessel, p. 434.  Of course, the U.S. and Soviets were Allies, which 
might explain why such shipping went unmolested.  The fact that the Soviets had not declared war on 
Japan would not have altered this conclusion. 
 
102
  Dönitz Judgement, pp. 558-559; Räder Judgement, p. 563.  The Nürnberg Tribunal did, however, 
convict Dönitz with respect to the Laconia Order, which Fenrick notes is “inconsistent with the earlier 
finding exonerating Dönitz on a charge concerning the conduct of submaribne warfare against 
belligerent merchant vessels.”  Fenrick Merchant Vessel, p. 432.  Robertson has argued that the finding 
regarding the Laconia Order applies exclusively to neutral merchant vessels.  Horace B. Robertson, Jr., 
“Submarine Warfare,” JAG Journal, (1956) pp. 7-25, cited in Fenrick Merchant Vessel, p. 432. 
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by Britain to report all sightings of German submarines.103  Thus, the line between belligerent 
and neutral merchant shipping was sufficiently blurred with respect to the 1936 London 
Protocol.  As a result, the Nürnberg Tribunal avoided the issue of the “compatability of the 
London Protocol Rules with the demonstrated conduct of neutral merchant shipping when 
such shipping was used in a manner functionally indistinguishable from the use of belligerent 
merchant shipping.”104   
During the Korean War, the U.S. Navy conducted carrier operations from the high 
seas and there are no recorded incidents of attacks on neutral merchant vessels.105  In the 
Vietnam War, the U.S. Navy again conducted carrier-based air operations from the high seas 
and “scrupulous regard [was] paid to the territorial sea or contiguous zone limits as the 
boundaries of military action.”106  As a result of this approach, and because there was little 
international shipping along the Vietnamese coast, there were no significant problems 
affecting what little neutral shipping occurred in the area; there were no incidents involving 
neutral merchant shipping on the high seas.107   
During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, there were two incidents involving neutral 
merchant vessels.  First, on 8 December 1971, the Indian Navy launched an attack against the 
port of Karachi, during which a British cargo vessel, Harmattan, a Greek tanker, the Gulf 
Star, and a Panamanian vessel were hit and sunk, apparently collateral damage on the 
otherwise lawful attack.108  As noted above, a Liberian-registered ship, the Venus Challenger, 
was sunk more than 25 miles out to sea, although it is unclear if the vessel was deliberately 
targeted or whether it was sunk accidentally during combat between the belligerents.109 
Primarily because the location where it was fought does not include major sea-lanes of 
communication, the Falklands War—as destructive as it was to the fleets of the British and 
Argentine Navies—had a minimal impact on neutral merchant shipping with one notable 
exception, the Argentine Navy’s ill-conceived idea to sink the Hercules, a supertanker.  As a 
                                                
103
  Russo, p. 387. 
 
104
  Fenrick Merchant Vessel, p. 431.   
 
105
  Fenrick Bocumer Schriften, p. 17. 
 
106
  O’Connell Influence, pp. 124-125.  See also Fenrick Bochumer Schriften, p. 18. 
 
107
  O’Connell Influence, pp. 124-126.  See also Fenrick Bochumer Schriften, p. 18. 
 
108
  O’Connell Influence, pp. 86-87; Politakis, p. 69. 
 
109
  O’Connell Influence, pp. 86-87, 129-130.  There were reports that the Venus Challenger was carrying 
ammunition for the Pakistani forces.  
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result of the on-going naval conflict in the South Atlantic, and in order to protect neutral 
merchant vessels, the U.S. Government had informed the parties that a number of U.S.-
flagged vessels (or those in which the U.S. had an interest, such as Hercules) would be 
traversing the South Atlantic.110  Nevertheless, Argentine forces attacked the ship when she 
was several hundred miles from both the Falklands Islands and the Argentine coastline.111  
This is the only example of a neutral merchant ship being attacked in that conflict112 and was 
clearly unlawful. 
Neutral merchant shipping is particularly vulnerable when naval armed conflict occurs 
in geographically limited areas, as was the case during the Iran-Iraq War, when fighting at sea 
took place in one of the world’s busiest sea lanes—the Persian Gulf.  This conflict also 
presents the “sole major post-World War II conflict in which a sustained maritime anti-
commerce campaign was conducted.”113  This conflict is particularly interesting in this context 
since neutral powers had the naval force to “demonstrate that they were not willing to tolerate 
any interference with their economic interests.”114 
 One of the unfortunate characteristics of the Iran-Iraq War was the targeting of neutral 
merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf.115  Based on a number of sources,116 Russo accumulated 
the following statistics in 1988, which paint an interesting—if grim—picture of the effects of 
the Iran-Iraq War on shipping in the Persian Gulf:  
 
Throughout the eight year curse of the Gulf War, Iran and Iraq have 
attacked more than 400 commercial vessels, almost all of which 
were neutral State flagships.  Over 200 merchant seamen have lost 
their lives because of these attacks.  In material terms, the attacks 
have resulted in excess of 400 million dead weight tons of damaged 
shipping.  Thirty-one of the attacked merchants were sunk, and 
another 50 declared total losses.  For 1987 alone, the strikes against 
commercial shipping numbered 178, with a resulting death toll of 
108.  In relative terms, by the end of 1987, write-off losses in the 
                                                
110
  Amerada Hess, p. 424. 
 
111
  Ibid., pp. 421, 423. 
 
112
  Fenrick, p. 112. 
 
113
  Fenrick Merchant Vessel, p. 434. 
 
114
  San Remo Manual, Explanation, para. 67.4. 
 
115
  In general, see Walker Tanker War; A. Gioia, “Iraq: Commentary,” in De Guttry and Ronzitti, pp. 61-
66. 
 
116
  See the sources cited in Russo, p. 397, footnote 1. 
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Gulf War stood at nearly half the tonnage of merchant shipping 
sent to the bottom in World War II.  In all, ships flying the flags of 
more than 30 different countries, including each of the permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council, have been 
subjected to attacks.117 
 
Notwithstanding this grim portrayal, only about 1% of the 26,000 ship voyages undertaken in 
the period 1984-1988 were targeted, which says as much about the huge size of the typical 
modern tanker and the scope of shipping in the Persian Gulf as it does about the scale of the 
attacks on neutral merchantment.118 
Although some of the Iraqi attacks on merchantmen occurred prior to the 
announcement of that State’s war zones, many occurred inside these zones.119  Moreover, as 
that armed conflict dragged on, when Iran shifted its oil export operations from Kharg Island 
to facilities in the southern parts of its territorial waters, Iraq began targeting oil tankers in this 
area, without declaring it to be a “war zone.”120  In effect, Iraq was targeting neutral vessels 
both inside and outside of its declared zones.121  Consequently, an analysis of the legality of 
the Iraqi attacks on merchant shipping in that war sheds little light on the issue of the legality 
of attacks on neutral merchant vessels in NEZs.122   
As is clear from the above discussion, even on the high seas, the rights of neutrals are 
subject to interference—including visit and search, capture, diversion and even attack—by 
belligerent forces during armed conflict.  One commentator has noted that international law 
has “never legitimized attacks upon neutral merchant vessels simply because they ventured 
into a specified area of the high seas,” and thus Iran’s attempts to justify the targeting of such 
vessels because they failed to comply with the Iranian exclusion zone “could not operate to 
excuse Iran from its legal obligations to avoid attacks on protected vessels wherever 
located.”123  The law is clear with respect to the crucial determining factor in the 
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  Russo, p. 381. 
 
118
  Ibid., p. 397, footnote 1. 
 
119
  A. Gioia, “Iraq: Commentary,” in De Guttry and Ronzitti, p. 62. 
 
120
  A. Gioia, “Iraq: Commentary,” in De Guttry and Ronzitti, pp. 62-63. 
 
121
  With respect to the war zones established by the parties to the Iran-Iraq War, see the official documents 
published in De Guttry and Ronzitti, pp. 37-38, 83-95, 133-142.  See also ibid. pp. 20-23, 72-76; 
Walker Tanker War, pp. 394-415, 433-434, 615-616; Fenrick, pp. 118-122. 
 
122
  A. Gioia, “Iraq: Commentary,” in De Guttry and Ronzitti, p. 63. 
 
123
  John H. McNeill, “Neutral Rights and Maritime Sanctions: The Effect of Two Gulf Wars,” 31 Virginia 
JIL 631 (1991), p. 636. 
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determination of whether a neutral merchant vessel is a legitimate target: it is the ship’s 
function relative to the on-going conflict—and not its mere location—that renders the 
merchantman a lawful target.124   
 
XII. Note on Belligerent Reprisals 
 
Reprisals are acts that would otherwise be unlawful, but which are taken to punish or 
redress a wrong and are proportionate to the wrong sought to be addressed.125  They are, 
therefore, a means of self-help for the enforcement of international law, although by their 
nature, reprisals may lead to abuses or situations where their application by the belligerents 
can spin out of control.  There are numerous categories of persons and objects that may not be 
the subject of reprisals126 and if the present trend continues, “it must be asked whether there is 
any future for belligerent reprisals as an institution of international law.”127   
As Greenwood points out, there are four requirements that must be established if an 
act is to be considered lawful as a belligerent reprisal: 
 
1. It must be in response to an unlawful act which is imputable to the 
State (or in some circumstances, to an ally of that State) against 
which the reprisal is directed; 
 
2. It must be proportionate to the unlawful act; 
 
3. It must be undertaken in order to put an end to the enemy’s 
unlawful conduct and to prevent future illegal acts and not for 
revenge; and  
 
4. No other means of redress must be available.128 
 
With respect to naval warfare, the scope of permissible reprisals is broader than in 
land warfare, and includes the possibility of reprisals against enemy merchant vessels.129  The 
                                                
124
  Russo, p. 390. 
 
125
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 6.2.3-6.2.3.2; U.K. Manual, paras. 16.16-16.19.2; 
Canadian Manual, para. 1507; German Manual, paras. 476-479; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 
1606.  On belligerent reprisals, see Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals (1971); Greenwood 
Belligerent Reprisals; Derek W. Bowett, “Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force,” 66 AJIL 1 
(1972); R. Barsotti, “Armed Reprisals,” in Antonio Cassese, ed., The Current Legal Regulation of the 
Use of Force, 79-103; 10 Whiteman, pp. 879-913. 
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  Including inter alia the wounded, sick and shipwrecked; prisoners of war; the civilian population; and 
civilian objects.  See, for example, 1949 Geneva Convention II, Article 47; 1977 Additional Protcol I, 
Articles 20, 51(6), 52(1), 53(c), 54(4). 
 
127
  Greenwood Belligerent Reprisals, p. 296.  See also ibid., pp. 315-321 
 
128
  Greenwood Belligerent Reprisals, p. 299.  See also ibid., pp. 299-309. 
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concept of belligerent reprisals has played a role in the development of NEZs, since 
belligerent reprisals were the legal justifications invoked for the establishment of long-
distance blockades and for unrestricted submarine warfare policies during the First and 
Second World Wars.  Moreover, many commentators rely upon the notion of belligerent 
reprisals as a means for explaining and arguing either for or against the legality of the zone 
concept, which makes the identification of rules of customary international law more difficult. 
 
XIII. Conclusion 
 
 The legal principles described in this chapter apply to all forms of naval warfare, 
including those instances where a belligerent takes the decision to establish an exclusion zone, 
and consequently, a belligerent may not avoid these legal obligations through the 
establishment of an exclusion zone.  These fundamental principles may influence the decision 
to establish an exclusion zone and will set the parameters of permissible behaviour within 
those zones.  For example, self-defence is often cited as one of the primary justifications for 
establishing NEZs.  Notwithstanding this justification, however, naval commanders must 
continue to apply the principles of distinction and precaution.  They may rely upon the 
concept of self-defence, as defined by the geographic scope of the zone, to attack any vessel 
or aircraft entering the zone indiscriminately, or to otherwise disregard the precautionary 
principles that they are otherwise required to follow.  
From the policy and operational standpoint, the decision to establish a zone should be 
made after a thorough analysis of the legal and military principles of warfare to determine if 
likelihood of mission accomplishment will be increased through the adoption of this method 
of naval warfare.  When the synergies afforded by coupling the applicable legal principles 
with the military principles of warfare are maximised, the potential for military success 
should increase correspondingly.  
 Enemy warships and military aircraft are subject to attack on sight (whether inside or 
outside the zone); merchant vessels (whether enemy or neutral) may be attacked if they meet 
the criteria of a military objective; and certain categories of vessels and aircraft are immune 
from attack, provided they meet certain minimum requirements, such as being innocently 
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  Natalino Ronzitti, “The Crisis in the Law of Naval Warfare,” in Ronzitti, pp. 48-50.  See also 
Greenwood Belligerent Reprisals, p. 313 (noting that Article 49(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 
which seems to permit reprisals in ship-to-ship or ship-to-air combat [unless such combat has an 
incidental effect on civilians or civilin objects on land], is “scarcely a model of clarity”).    
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engaged in the specific roles that give rise to the exemption and refraining from taking part in 
the hostilities or otherwise assisting any of the belligerents. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Naval Warfare: Means and Methods 
 
“Naval warfare has never been limited to the military subjugation 
of the enemy.  Its overall aim is sea denial and sea control.  
Methods necessary for sea control do not merely affect the parties 
to an international armed conflict but also states which are neutral 
or states not party to the conflict.”1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 As a sui generis method of naval warfare, the conceptual development of the NEZ 
relied heavily on other established methods of warfare.  This chapter examines how areas 
subject to blockades, naval mining, and submarine warfare have influenced the development 
of the zone.  At the same time, it will be apparent that although these methods contributed to 
the development of the zone, there are significant differences between these methods and 
NEZs. 
It is clear that NEZs can pose significant hardships on commercial shipping, both in 
terms of re-routing to avoid such zones and also as a result of the potential risks posed by 
zones.  As the following section makes clear, however, commercial maritime shipping has 
always been subject to interference by belligerents.  These measures, including visit, search, 
diversion and capture, may seem irrelevant to the primary purpose of this study.  They are 
included, however, to show the limits of such interference with commercial shipping by 
belligerents and to explore whether these measures have influenced the concept of the NEZ.    
 
II. Note on Modern Merchant Vessels 
 
 Since the end of the Second World War, the shipping industry has undergone a 
revolution in terms of the size and types of ships that are used for commercial purposes.  
These fundamental changes have profound implications on how naval forces conduct 
operations, such as visit, search and seizure.  Photos 1-4 give a general overview of the 
differences in size between merchant vessels used in World War II and those in use today. 
                                                
1
  German Manual, p. 405, Chapter 10, Preliminary Remarks. 
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Source: Merchant Marine at War, www.usmm.org 
Photo 2 
Liberty Ships 
Liberty Ships were 441 feet long and 56 feet 
wide, powered by a three-cylinder, reciprocating 
steam engine, fed by two oil-burning boilers, 
which produced 2,500 hp and a speed of 11 
knots.  These ships had five holds that could 
carry over 9,000 tons of cargo, plus airplanes, 
tanks, and locomotives lashed to its deck.  A 
Liberty could carry 2,840 jeeps, 440 tanks, or 
230 million rounds of rifle ammunition. 
Photo 1 
S.S. Tiberton 
At 04.05 hours on 19 Feb, 
1940, the The S.S. Tiberton, 
which was unescorted, was hit 
by one torpedo from the 
German submarine U-23, 
broke in two and sank in 30 
seconds east of the Orkney 
Islands.  The master and 32 
crew members were lost.  The 
steamship, which had a 
capacity of 5.225-8,500 dead-
weight tons, was 414.5 feet 
long with a beam measuring 
42.4 by 28.4 feet.  She was 
powered by 397 horsepower 
triple expansion engines and 
was capable of making 11.0 
knots. 
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Source: Wikipedia 
 
 As can be adduced from a comparison of Photos 1 and 2 with Photo 3, the very nature 
of commercial shipping has changed dramatically in the six decades since the major naval 
conflicts of World War II, with cargo today being carried primarily in standardised containers 
on vessels (or in tankers or other bulk carriers) which are truly astonishing in terms of size, as 
demonstrated by Photo 4, which depicts the Emma Maersk, the largest container ship 
currently operating.   
These factors have a number of significant effects on the ability of naval forces to 
conduct searches of such vessels.  First given the immense size of these modern vessels, the 
only way to board them while they are underway is by helicopter.  The notion that a sea-borne 
boarding party could approach such a vessel with the aim of conducting a search is 
unrealistic.  Once the issue of landing a boarding party by air is resolved, however, the 
problem remains how to actually conduct the search.  As Photo 3 above demonstrates, the 
way that such containers are loaded on these vessels makes it impossible to access—let alone 
to search—the overwhelming majority of the containers.  Even if it was possible to access the 
containers, though, it is not possible to search the contents since there is simply no room on 
the deck of the ship to place the contents of the containers in order to physically search them.
Photo 3 
Modern Container Vessels 
Container capacity is measured in 
“transport equivalent units” (TEU).  
A transport equivalent unit is a 
measure of containerized cargo 
capacity equal to one standard 20 ft 
(length) × 8 ft (width) × 8 ft 6 in 
(height) container.  In metric units 
this is 6.10 m (length) × 2.44 m 
(width) × 2.59 m (height), or 
approximately 38.5 m³.   
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Source: Wikipedia 
 
Moreover, it is virtually impossible for the master of such vessels to have confidence 
in the precise cargo that his ship is carrying.  The ship’s master must rely upon the manifests 
provide by the shipper or forwarding agent.  There is simply no practical way to determine 
with any degree of precision what type of cargo is carried in any of the thousands of 
containers on the vessel.  Thus, the boarding party must simply rely on the information 
provided by the vessel’s master. 
On the other hand, the immense size of these modern merchant vessels makes the 
identification of such ships relatively easy even from long distances.  This means that it 
should be much easier for naval forces to distinguish such vessels from warships which are 
Photo 4 
Emma Maersk 
The Emma Maersk is currently the largest container vessel in operation.  
Officially, Emma Maersk is able to carry around 11,000 TEU in the calculation 
of the Maersk company which is about 1,400 more containers than any other 
ship is capable of carrying.  In normal calculation, her cargo capacity is much 
bigger — between 13,500  and 14,500 TEU.  The difference between the 
official and estimated number results from the fact that Maersk calculates the 
cargo capacity of a container ship by using the number of containers with a 
weight of 14 tons that can be carried on a vessel. For the Emma Maersk, this is 
11,000 containers.  Other companies calculate the cargo capacity of a ship 
according to the maximum number of containers that can be put on the ship, 
independent of the weight of the containers. 
Chapter Seven: Naval Warfare: Means and Methods  
 
Mundis 218 
much smaller.  For example, the world’s largest capital naval vessels are the 10 Nimitz-class 
aircraft carriers operated by the U.S. Navy.  These ships are 333 metres (1092 feet) long, 
76.8-78.4 metres (252 – 257 feet, fiveinches) wide, with a beam measuring 41 metres (134 
feet).  They displace 98,235-104,112 tons of water when fully loaded.  By comparison, the 
Emma Maersk is 397 metres (1302 feet, six inches) long, with a beam measuring 56 metres 
(183 feet, eight inches).2  Thus, the largest merchant ships operating today are larger than any 
naval vessel on the seas, and most navies today do not have any ships that even come close in 
size to a Nimitz-class carrier.  This will lessen the likelihood that a large modern merchant 
vessel could be mistaken for an enemy warship.   
 For the reasons set forth above, the concept of visit and search really plays little or no 
role in modern naval operations, with the obvious exception of smaller coastal vessels.  
Consequently, the discussion below concerning visit and search must be considered with care.  
This discussion is included primarily to demonstrate how this concept influenced the 
development of exclusion zones. 
 
III. Measures Short of Attack: Visit, Search, Diversion and 
Capture 
 
 Prior to the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, States were relatively free to engage in 
war in furtherance of national policy and as Doswald-Beck has noted, “[a]gainst this 
background, and the fact that rules were made for ‘war,’ i.e., all wars, whatever their nature, it 
is not surprising that extensive actions at sea were permissible as being militarily necessary.”3 
To this end, the destruction of the enemy’s ability to wage war was historically one of the 
primary strategic objectives of naval power, or, as Heintschel von Heinegg puts it: 
 
The annihilation of the enemy’s commerce being one of the great 
aims of naval warfare the traditional law provides a set of measures 
of economic warfare which enables belligerents to achieve this 
task.4 
 
As a result, certain rules developed that permit belligerents to interfere with merchant 
shipping on the high seas.  This trade-off between the rights of States, and particularly 
                                                
2
  It is interesting to note that a Nimitz-class carrier has a ship’s crew of 3,200 sailors (excluding the 2,500 
persons associated with the air wing.  The Emma Maersk has space to accommodate 30 crew members, 
but is designed to operate with only 13. 
 
3
  Doswald-Beck, Comment #1 in Heintschel von Heinegg Bochumer Schriften, p. 93. 
 
4
  Heinstchel von Heinegg Bochumer Schriften, p. 6 (footnote omitted). 
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neutrals, to engage in international commerce via the sea and their duty to comply with 
certain established principles that benefit belligerents, that is, the right of belligerents to 
interfere with freedom of the seas, lay at the heart of much of the discussion in this sub-
section.   
 Although economic warfare at sea is an ancient concept, the modern law governing 
this aspect of warfare can be traced to the 1856 Paris Declaration.5  As a result of trade 
between belligerents and neutrals, the notion of contraband6 developed and while neutral 
property was considered inviolable or immune to capture or destruction, the distinction 
between enemy and neutral property led to the development of the right of visit and search.7  
Visit and search, which permits belligerents to stop and search all merchant vessels—whether 
neutral or enemy—and extends to diversion into port when necessary,8 is defined by 
paragraph 7.6 of the 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook as the: 
 
[M]eans by which a belligerent warship or belligerent military 
aircraft may determine the true character (enemy or neutral) of 
merchant ships encountered outside neutral territory, the nature 
(contraband or exempt “free goods”) of their cargo, the manner 
(innocent or hostile) of their employment, and other facts bearing 
on their relation to the armed conflict.9 
 
The right of visit and search is a belligerent right that may be exercised only during periods of 
armed conflict; only outside the territorial seas or archipelagic waters of neutral States; and 
only when reasonable grounds exist to suspect that the vessel is subject to capture.10 
                                                
5
  Ibid., p. 2. 
 
6
  Historically, there were two types of contraband, absolute and conditional.  The 1909 London 
Declaration set forth lists of absolute contraband (Article 22), conditional contraband (Article 24) and 
items that may not be considered as contraband (Article 28).  The distinctions between absolute and 
conditional contraband are of little importance today.  See San Remo Manual, para. 148 and Helsinki 
Principles, paras. 5.2.3 and 5.2.5 for the modern approach.  See also 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s 
Handbook, paras. 7.41-7.42; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.5(h), 13.107-13.110; Soviet Manual, pp. 435-438; 
German Manual, paras. 1029, 1142; Australian Manual, paras. 9.17-9.22; Interim New Zealand Manual, 
para. 721; Tucker, pp. 263-282. 
 
7
  Heinstchel von Heinegg Bochumer Schriften, pp. 2-3.  See also 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s 
Handbook, para. 7.6; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.91-13.92; San Remo Manual, paras. 118-124; Helsinki 
Principles, para. 5.2.1; Tucker, pp. 332-344. 
 
8
  U.K. Manual, paras. 13.92, 13.94; Canadian Manual, para. 861; Australian Manual, para. 9.11; San 
Remo Manual, para. 119. 
 
9
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.6; see also U.K. Manual, paras. 13.92, 13.94; German 
Manual, paras. 1138-1140, 1142-1144; Australian Manual, paras. 9.5-9.6; San Remo Manual, paras. 
118-119, 121; see also 1907 Hague Convention XIII, Article 2; Tucker, pp. 332-333. 
 
10
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.6; U.K. Manual, para. 13.91; German Manual, para. 
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Unless protected by a rule of customary or conventional law,11 private property of the 
enemy, including merchant vessels which are found outside neutral territorial waters, is 
subject to capture and the prior exercise of visit and search is not required.12  Neutral vessels 
and goods, however, are subject to capture only if certain conditions are met.13  As a result, 
the distinction between enemy and neutral vessels and goods has great importance.14  As a 
general rule, the enemy character of a merchant vessel may be determined by reference to the 
flag that the vessel is entitled to fly, while there is no such presumption that vessels flying the 
flag of neutral States are in fact neutral vessels.15  This distinction lies at the heart of the right 
of visit and search, since it is the belligerent warship captain’s suspicions that a neutral-
flagged merchantman actually has enemy character that is the legal justification that permits 
the visit and search.16 
 The first article of the 1856 Paris Declaration outlaws privateering, with the result that 
only commissioned military vessels (including submarines) and aircraft are permitted to 
exercise visit and search.17   
 Enemy merchant vessels may resist the right of visit, search and capture, although to 
do so is to risk the consequences.18  Neutral merchant vessels, on the other hand, must submit 
                                                                                                                                                   
1138; Australian Manual, paras. 9.7, 9.8; San Remo Manual, para. 118. 
 
11
  Certain categories of vessels are exempt, including hospital ships and small coastal fishing vessels.  See 
1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.2.3; U.K. Manual, para. 13.100; Canadian Manual, 
paras. 828, 864-865; San Remo Manual, paras. 136-137. 
 
12
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.2.2.1; U.K. Manual, para. 13.99; Canadian Manual, 
para. 863; Australian Manual, paras. 9.5-9.8; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 716.1; ICRC Model 
Manual, para. 1707; San Remo Manual, para. 135; Tucker, pp. 74-75, 102-103, 108-109; Mallison, pp. 
101-103; Heinstchel von Heinegg Bochumer Schriften, p. 6.  This rule stands in marked contrast to the 
law of land warfare, where the general rule is that the private property of the enemy population may not 
be seized and confiscated. 
 
13
  1856 Paris Declaration, Articles 2-3; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.10; U.K. 
Manual, para. 13.106; San Remo Manual, para. 146. 
 
14
  Concerning the distinctions between enemy and neutral vessels, see 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s 
Handbook, para. 7.5; San Remo Manual, paras. 112-117; Tucker, pp. 76-86.   
 
15
  1909 London Declaration, Article 57; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.5; U.K. 
Manual, paras. 13.85, 13.86, 13.90; Canadian Manual, paras. 858.1, 858.2, 858.6; German Manual, 
para. 1022; San Remo Manual, paras. 112-113, 117, Explanation, paras. 112.1-113.2, 117.1-117.8. 
 
16
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.5; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.87-13.89; Canadian 
Manual, paras. 858.3-858.5; German Manual, para. 1022; San Remo Manual, paras. 114-116, 
Explanation, paras. 114.1-116.1. 
 
17
  See also 1977 Additional Protocol I, Article 43. 
 
18
  Heinstchel von Heinegg Bochumer Schriften, p. 18 (“by the traditional law a deliberate and continued 
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without resistance to visit and search, and if they attempt to avoid visit and search the 
belligerent warship is entitled to use force to stop the resisting merchant vessel.19  Forcible 
resistance to visit and search by the neutral merchant vessel is a hostile act and renders the 
vessel liable to capture and destruction, although this is an exceptional measure and requires 
the belligerent warship to provide the safety of the merchant crew (and any passengers), as 
well as the papers and documents of the merchant vessel.20  The capture or destruction of 
civilian passenger vessels (including enemy passenger liners) is prohibited.21   
 Under the traditional law, neutral vessels travelling under convoy of neutral warships 
of the same flag are exempt from visit and search.22  Neutral merchant vessels under convoy 
of belligerent warships or military aircraft, however, might be military objectives or 
considered to be forcibly resisting visit and search and this practice could result in the neutral 
merchant vessel being captured or attacked.23 
 Doswald-Beck highlights two important humanitarian aspects that underlie this area of 
the law of naval warfare:  
 
[F]irst, the fact that merchant vessels were captured or seized, 
rather than sunk on sight, clearly protected the life of those on 
board.  Secondly, in the exceptional situation where a vessel could 
                                                                                                                                                   
resistance to search is followed by the legal consequence of condemnation (and even destruction) of the 
vessel and her cargo.’)  Heintschel von Heinegg relies on Oppenheim in reaching this conclusion, and 
L.C. Green finds it difficult to reconcile the fact that if the enemy merchant vessel has a “right” to resist, 
why it must suffer any consequences of the exercise of that right.  Green, Comment #5 in Heintschel 
von Heinegg Bochumer Schriften, p. 107.  See also Edwin I. Nwogugu, Commentary on 1936 London 
Procès Verbal, Ronzitti, pp. 353-365 at p. 353. 
 
19
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.10; Australian Manual, para. 8.12(a); Tucker, pp. 
336-337; Heinstchel von Heinegg Bochumer Schriften, pp. 19. 
 
20
  1936 London Protocol, Rule2; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 7.10, 7.10.1; Canadian 
Manual, para. 873; San Remo Manual, paras. 146, 151-152; 1909 London Protocol, Article 22; 
Heinstchel von Heinegg Bochumer Schriften, pp. 19; Tucker, p. 325.   
 
21
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.104; Canadian Manual, para. 868; San Remo Manual, para. 140. 
 
22
  1909 London Declaration, Article 61; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.6; U.K. 
Manual, para. 13.93; Canadian Manual, para. 860; German Manual, paras. 1141, 1147; San Remo 
Manual, para. 120; Helsinki Principles, para. 6.1;Heinstchel von Heinegg Bochumer Schriften, pp. 17-
18. 
 
23
  1909 London Declaration, Article 63; U.K. Manual, para. 13.47(e); Canadian Manual, para. 719.3(e); 
Australian Manual, para. 8.12(e); Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 717.1(g); San Remo Manual, 
para. 67(e); Heinstchel von Heinegg Bochumer Schriften, p. 17.  The U.S. Navy considers neutral 
merchant vessels travelling under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft to have acquired the 
status of enemy merchantmen.  See 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 7.5.2, 8.2.2.1, 
8.2.2.2. 
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not arrange for the prize to be taken to port, the crew and 
passengers had to be safely removed before the destruction.24 
 
She goes on to argue convincingly that these values are at least as important today, as they 
were in earlier periods when economic warfare at sea was more prevalent:   
 
Since the demise of war and neutrality as absolute legal states, and 
the expectation that warfare be limited, neutral nations (in the sense 
here of not party to the conflict), tolerate less the kind of 
interference that was permissible under the old law.  In any event, 
the law as it would in fact function in modern conditions ought not 
to result in neutrals being in a worse condition that they were in 
100 years ago.25 
 
IV. Means and Methods of Warfare: Blockades 
 
The law of blockade deals with the rights of, and limits upon, belligerents to prevent 
an enemy from receiving goods necessary to wage war and the naval blockade is analogous to 
the concept of siege in land warfare.26  As such, blockade is another historic aspect of 
economic warfare conducted at sea and the customary international law rules are set forth 
Articles 1-21 of the 1909 London Declaration.27  For a naval blockade to be lawful, it must be 
effective;28 applied impartially;29 notified and declared;30 and directed only against belligerent 
ports and coasts.31  Pursuant to the 1909 London Declaration, vessels that break out of a 
blockade may be pursued (unless such pursuit is abandoned, in which case capture is 
prohibited)32 and vessels on continuous voyage to a non-blockaded port are not subject to 
capture.33  Vessels found to be in breach of a blockade are subject to condemnation.34   
                                                
24
  Louise Doswald-Beck, Comment #1 in Heintschel von Heinegg Bochumer Schriften, p. 94. 
 
25
  Ibid. 
 
26
  Tucker, p. 283. 
 
27
  See also 1856 Paris Declaration, Article 4; for a good overview of the traditional law of blockade, see 
Tucker, pp. 283-317.  For an interesting discussion on the impact of technology on the practical aspects 
of imposing and maintaining blockades, see Roger W. Barnett, “Technology and Naval Blockade: Past 
Impact and Future Prospects,” 58 NWCR, p. 87 (No. 3, Summer 2005), pp. 87-98. 
 
28
  1909 London Declaration, Articles 2-3; see also 1856 Paris Declaration, Article 4; Tucker, pp. 288-289. 
 
29
  1909 London Declaration, Article 5. 
 
30
  Ibid., Articles 8-16. 
 
31
  Ibid., Article 18. 
 
32
  Ibid., Article 20. 
 
33
  Ibid., Article 19. 
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It should be noted that the U.N. General Assembly, in an effort to flesh out and define 
aggression under the Charter, has determined that “the blockade of the ports or coasts of a 
State by the armed forces of another State” constitutes aggression even in the absence of a 
formal declaration of war.35  Although the drafters of the San Remo debated whether the 
concept of blockade had fallen into desuetude, a majority of the participants concluded 
otherwise, pointing to a number of sources to support the continuing viability of blockade as a 
coercive instrument.36  For example, Article 42 of the U.N. Charter37 and modern military 
manuals governing armed conflict at sea contain provisions on blockade.38  The San Remo 
Manual drafters sought to articulate (and modernise) the rules governing this form of naval 
warfare, after having made the determination that the law of blockade remains viable.39  This 
modern approach requires the belligerent State to meet all of the following rules:  
 
• The blockade must be effective, which is a question of fact.40 
 
• The ports and coasts of neutral States may not be the subject of a 
naval blockade.41   
 
• Blockades may not be declared or established if:42 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
34
  Ibid., Article 21. 
 
35
  UN Doc. A/9631 (14 December 1974) (General Assembly Definition of Aggression Resolution). 
 
36
  San Remo Manual, Explanation, p. 176.  See also Bothe, pp. 397-398. 
 
37
  “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or 
have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, 
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” 
 
38
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.7 et seq.; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.65-13.76; Canadian 
Manual, paras. 844-851; German Manual, paras. 1051-1053. 
 
39
  San Remo Manual, Explanation, p. 176; these rules are set forth in ibid., paras. 93-104.   
 
40
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.7.2.3; U.K. Manual, para. 13.67; Canadian Manual, 
para. 846; German Manual, para. 1053; Australian Manual, paras. 9.13, 9.16; Interim New Zealand 
Manual, para. 722.4; ICRC Model Manual, paras. 1710(a), 1710.1; San Remo Manual, para. 95.  
Reflecting Soviet disapproval of the entire concept of blockade (see Soviet Manual, pp. 430-435) the 
Soviet Manual (at p. 430) rejected the effectiveness requirement: 
 
With the present rapid development and possible utilization of surface ships and 
submarines equipped with nuclear power plants, jet aircraft, missiles, mines and 
torpedoes with nuclear charges, the criterion of effectiveness cannot be the legal 
grounds for determining the legality of a blockade or other combat operations at 
sea. 
 
41
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 7.7.2.5; U.K. Manual, para. 13.71; Canadian Manual, 
para. 848.1(a); Australian Manual, para. 9.13; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 722.5; ICRC Model 
Manual, para. 1710.3; San Remo Manual, para. 99.   
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o The sole purpose of the blockade is to starve the civilian 
population or to deny that population other items essential for 
its survival; or 
 
o The damage to the civilian population is, or is expected to be, 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated from the blockade. 
 
• If the civilian population of the blockaded State has insufficient 
food, medical supplies, or other items essential for its survival, the 
blockading State must provide for the passage of such foodstuffs, 
medical supplies, or other items, although the blockading party has 
the right to establish the technical arrangement concerning such 
passage the distribution of such goods.43 
 
• The rule of impartiality applies to blockades and the blockading 
power may not discriminate by allowing vessels of certain States to 
enter the blockaded area, although it may permit the entry and exit 
of neutral military warships and military aircraft.44 
 
• Military requirements determine the distance at which the force 
maintaining the blockade may be stationed.45 
 
• Legitimate methods and means of warfare may be combined to 
enforce and maintain the blockade, provided such combined 
methods and means are not otherwise inconsistent with the law of 
naval warfare.46 
 
• The blockade must be declared and notified to all belligerent and 
neutral States and the declaration must specify:47   
                                                                                                                                                   
42
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.74; Canadian Manual, para. 850; German Manual, para. 1051.4; Australian 
Manual, para. 9.14; ICRC Model Manual, paras. 1710(c), 1710(d); San Remo Manual, para. 102.  See 
also 1977 Additional Protocol I, Article 54, which prohibits starvation as a means of warfare; and 
Bothe, p. 398.   
 
43
  U.K. Manual, paras. 13.75-13.76; Canadian Manual, para. 851; ICRC Model Manual, para. 1710.5; San 
Remo Manual, paras. 103-104; see also 1977 Additional Protocol I, Article 70; Bothe, p. 398 (“There 
are some indications that Article 54 was not meant to change the traditional law of blockade, but Article 
70 certainly constitutes a serious limitation on the right of a blockading state to bar any access to a 
blockaded port or coast.”)   
 
44
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 7.7.2.4, 7.7.3; U.K. Manual, para. 13.72; Canadian 
Manual, para. 848.1(b); German Manual, para. 1051.2; Australian Manual, para. 9.13; Interim New 
Zealand Manual, paras. 722.6, 722.10; ICRC Model Manual, para. 1710.3; San Remo Manual, para. 
100; 1909 London Declaration, Article 5. 
 
45
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.68; German Manual, para. 1053; Australian Manual, para. 9.16; San Remo 
Manual, para. 96.  In the past, there was considerable debate about the legality of so-called “long-
distance” blockades, but modern practice, bolstered by technological developments that permit a smaller 
number of ships to patrol larger areas of the sea, have led to the rule as stated in the text. 
 
46
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.69; San Remo Manual, para. 97. 
 
47
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 7.7.2.1-7.7.2.2; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.65-13.66; 
Canadian Manual, para. 845; German Manual, para. 1052; Australian Manual, para. 9.13; Interim New 
Zealand Manual, paras. 722.2-722.3; ICRC Model Manual, paras. 1710(b), 1710.2; San Remo Manual, 
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o The commencement, duration, location and extent of the 
blockade; and  
 
o The time period in which neutral vessels must leave the 
blockaded coastline prior to the commencement of the 
blockade. 
 
• If the blockade is terminated, temporarily lifted, re-established, 
extended or otherwise altered, the blockading State must make 
further declarations and notifications.48   
 
• When reasonable grounds exist to believe that merchant vessels are 
breaching a blockade, such vessels may be captured.49 
 
• After prior warning, merchant vessels that clearly resist capture are 
subject to attack.50 
 
Thus, as was the case with neutral vessels that forcibly resist visit and search or which travel 
under convoy of belligerent warships or military aircraft and are thereby subject to attack, 
neutral vessels may be targeted when such ships are attempting to run a blockade and they 
clearly resist capture after being warned to submit.  Bothe succinctly draws the following 
distinctions: 
 
It must be stressed that the means of enforcing the blockade is to 
stop and seize a “blockade runner.”  The essential difference 
between the normal control of neutral shipping and a blockade 
consists in the fact that a blockade runner can be seized for the 
mere breach of a blockade, even if it does not carry contraband.  
The use of force against a blockade runner is permissible to the 
extent necessary to stop and seize it.  A blockade does not give any 
right to destroy neutral ships where no attempt is made to stop and 
seize them.51 
 
 In short, the law of blockade requires a number of steps to be taken, most notably from 
the perspective of the neutral merchant vessel, which must acquiesence to the blockading 
power’s terms.  With respect to the belligerent imposing the blockade, the law requires 
                                                                                                                                                   
paras. 93-94.  The notification should be made by way of a Notice to Mariners and must be 
communicated to the IMO.  This requirement is similar to notification provision regarding the laying of 
naval mines.  San Remo Manual, para. 83.   
 
48
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.73; Canadian Manual, para. 849; San Remo Manual, paras. 101.   
 
49
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 7.7.4, 7.10; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.70, 13.106(f); 
Canadian Manual, paras. 847, 869.2(f); Australian Manual, para. 9.15; Interim New Zealand Manual, 
paras. 722.8-722.9; ICRC Model Manual, para. 1710.4; San Remo Manual, paras. 98, 146(f). 
 
50
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 7.7.4, 7.10; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.47, 13.70, 13.106; 
Canadian Manual, para. 847; Australian Manual, para. 9.15; San Remo Manual, paras. 67(a), 98.  
 
51
  Bothe, pp. 398-399. 
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notification, effectiveness, impartiality and the free passage of foodstuffs and other materials 
at a level to maintain minimal living standards among the civilian population.     
 
V. Means and Methods of Warfare: Naval Mines 
 
 In some respects, areas of the sea that have been mined resemble NEZs and this 
section explores the extent to which such areas have contributed to the development of the 
NEZ as a distinct method of naval warfare and to an understanding of the permissible scope 
of activity within exclusion zones.52  Naval mines may be used in a variety of roles, including 
coastal and harbour defence, blockade, anti-ship (including anti-submarine) warfare and area 
denial.53  In addition to customary international law, naval mine warfare is governed by the 
1907 Hague Convention VIII, to which only a few States are parties and which “provides 
little practical basis for the legal regulation of the use of mines.”54   
 The following restrictions apply to the use of naval mines by parties to an armed 
conflict:55 
 
• International notification of the location of the minefield must be 
made by the party laying the mines, unless the mines can only 
detonate against vessels that are military objectives.56 
                                                
 
52
  For an excellent discussion of the legality of naval mine warfare in general, including a description of 
the various types of naval mines in use, see Busuttil, pp. 12-100.  See also Politakis, pp. 166-266; 
German Manual, pp. 442-446. 
 
53
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 9.2, U.K. Manual, para. 13.52; German Manual, paras. 
1039, 1042; ICRC Model Manual, para. 1709(a); San Remo Manual, para. 80, Explanation, para. 80.2. 
 
54
  Busuttil, p. 78.  Although by its terms. the 1907 Hague Convention VIII refers only to “automatic 
contact mines,” Levie has noted that “it does not appear that any belligerent has ever contended that the 
range of application of the Convention was limited to automatic contact mines and did not extend to the 
subsequently developed other types of mines.”  Howard S. Levie, Commentary on the 1907 Hague 
Convention VIII, in Ronzitti, pp. 140-148, at p. 142.  The Interim New Zealand Manual (at para. 710.2) 
specifically extends the application of the 1907 Hague Convention VIII to other types of mines.  See 
also German Manual, para. 2, pp. 444-445 and Australian Manual, para. 8.23 (both of which take the 
position that the 1907 Hague Convention VIII regulates mining operations carried out by warships 
during armed conflict, regardless of the type of mine employed).  In addition to Levie, Commentary on 
the 1907 Hague Convention VIII, in Ronzitti, pp. 140-148, other analyses of the 1907 Hague 
Convention VIII, may be found in Busuttil, pp. 18-29 and Politakis, pp. 219-228.  The 1971 Seabed 
Arms Control Treaty prohibits the emplacement on, or tethering to, the seabed of nuclear mines.  
O’Connell took the view that low-yield nuclear mines tethered to the seabed for anti-submarine warfare 
might not be covered by the treaty.  O’Connell Influence, pp. 156-157.  The German Manual 
specifically rejects this position.  German Manual, p. 445, para. 3.  
 
55
  With respect to peace-time use of naval mines, see 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 
9.2.2.  Except “under the most demanding requirements of individual or collective self-defence,” naval 
mines may not be sown in international waters prior to the outbreak of armed conflict.  Ibid., at footnote 
24.   
 
56
  1907 Hague Convention VIII, Article 3; Corfu Channel Case, p. 22; Military and Paramilitary 
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• The parties laying the mines must keep detailed records of the 
locations of the mines in order to ensure accurate notification and 
to facilitate the removal or destructions of the mines after the 
armed conflict has been terminated.57 
 
• When belligerents conduct mining operations in the internal waters, 
territorial sea or archipelagic waters of other belligerents, the State 
laying the mines should ensure free exit for neutral vessels.58 
 
• Belligerents may not place mines in neutral waters.59 
 
• Naval mines can be deployed to force neutral shipping traffic into 
specific channels, but may not be used to deny transit passage of 
international straits or archipelagic sea lanes passage by neutral 
ships.60 
 
• Naval mines may not be placed off the coasts and ports of the 
enemy with the sole purpose of interfering with commercial 
shipping, but may be used to enforce a blockade of enemy coasts, 
ports and waterways.61 
                                                                                                                                                   
Activities, paras. 76-80, 215, 292(8); The 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook (at para. 9.2.3), 
adds the phrase “as soon as military exigencies permit.”  This phrase was rejected by the drafters of the 
San Remo Manual as being contrary to general requirements imposed upon belligerents by the law of 
armed conflict to limit as much as possible the effects of hostilities.  See San Remo Manual, 
Explanation, para. 83.3; see also U.K. Manual, para. 13.55; Canadian Manual, para. 838.1; ICRC Model 
Manual, para. 1709(d); San Remo Manual, para. 83.  The issuance of NOTAMs and communication of 
the extent of the minefield to the IMO is generally sufficient, although in some instances, notification 
through diplomatic channels to all States may be appropriate.  San Remo Manual, Explanation, para. 
83.2. 
 
57
  1907 Hague Convention VIII, Article 5; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 9.2.3;  U.K. 
Manual, paras. 13.56, 13.62-13.63; Canadian Manual, paras. 836.1, 842-843; German Manual, para. 
1043; Australian Manual, para. 8.23; ICRC Model Manual, paras. 1709(e), 1709.1; San Remo Manual, 
paras. 84, 90-91.   
 
58
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.57; Canadian Manual, para. 836.1; San Remo Manual, para. 85. 
 
59
  1907 Hague Convention VIII, Articles 1-2; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 9.2.3;  U.K. 
Manual, paras. 13.8, 13.9, 13.58; Canadian Manual, para. 836.1; Australian Manual, para. 8.23; ICRC 
Model Manual, para. 1709(f); San Remo Manual, para. 86. 
 
60
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 9.2.3;  U.K. Manual, paras. 13.8, 13.9, 13.71; Canadian 
Manual, para. 841.1; Australian Manual, para. 8.23; ICRC Model Manual, para. 1709(f); San Remo 
Manual, para. 89. 
 
61
  1907 Hague Convention VIII, Article 2; 1909 London Declaration, Articles 1, 4-5; 1995 U.S. Navy 
Commander’s Handbook, para. 9.2.3; U.K. Manual, paras. 13.69; German Manual, para. 1042.4; 
Australian Manual, para. 8.23; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 710.1; San Remo Manual, para. 97, 
Explanation, para. 97.1.  The 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook asserts (at para. 9.2.3, footnote 
33) that the “international acceptance of the U.S. mine blockade of Haiphong Harbor during the 
Vietnam conflict has established a legal precedent for blockades enforced by mines alone.”   The 
German Manual (at para. 1042.4) states that while mines may be employed to establish and enforce a 
blockade, mines cannot be the sole means of enforcing a blockade, and if mines are so used, the 
belligerent using mines must ensure that warships or other units are in the vicinity to assist any vessels 
in distress as a result of striking a mine.  See also Howard S. Levie, Mine Warfare at Sea, pp. 144-147, 
156-157; Howard S. Levie, Commentary on the 1907 Hague Convention VIII, in Ronzitti, pp. 140-148, 
at p. 143. 
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• International waters may not be mined to an indefinite extent, 
although reasonably limited areas may be mined, provided that an 
alternate route exists for neutral commercial shipping to transit 
around or through the mined area with a reasonable assurance of 
safety.62 
 
• Anchored mines must become harmless as soon as they have 
broken their moorings.63 
 
• Unanchored or free-floating mines that are not attached to or 
imbedded in the seafloor must be directed against a military 
objective and must become harmless within one hour after loss of 
control over them.64 
 
 With respect to State practice concerning the use of naval mines, statistics from both 
the First and Second World Wars demonstrate the full extent of this method of warfare on 
shipping.  In World War I, in which all the belligerents (and many neutrals) laid naval mines, 
it is estimated that at least 250,000 mines were deployed, resulting in hundreds—if not 
thousands—of ships being destroyed.65  Figures for World War II point to between 600,000 
and 1,000,000 mines being sowed, with approximately 3,000-3,500 ships being sunk after 
striking a mine (or mines).66   
 
VI. Means and Methods of Warfare: Submarines 
 
 As the practice of the First and Second World Wars clearly demonstrates, the use of 
mined areas, when combined with submarine warfare, proved particularly devastating to 
commercial shipping.  One of the basic rules of modern naval warfare is that surface vessels 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
62
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 9.2.3;  U.K. Manual, paras. 13.59, 13.60; Canadian 
Manual, paras. 839-840; Australian Manual, para. 8.23; ICRC Model Manual, para. 1709(f); San Remo 
Manual, paras. 87-88. 
 
63
  1907 Hague Convention VIII, Article 1(2); 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 9.2.3;  U.K. 
Manual, paras. 13.53, 13.54; Canadian Manual, paras. 836.1, 837.1; Australian Manual, para. 8.23; 
Interim New Zealand Manual, paras. 710.1; ICRC Model Manual, paras. 1709(b), 1709.1; San Remo 
Manual, paras. 81-82, Explanation, paras. 81.2, 81.3. 
 
64
  1907 Hague Convention VIII, Article 1(1); 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 9.2.3;  U.K. 
Manual, paras. 13.54; Canadian Manual, para. 837.1; Australian Manual, para. 8.23; Interim New 
Zealand Manual, paras. 710.1; ICRC Model Manual, paras. 1709(c), 1709.1; San Remo Manual, para. 
82. 
 
65
  Busuttil, p. 33.  In terms of the number of vessels that struck naval mines, Busuttil cites (at ibid., 
footnotes 192, 193) to sources indicating a wide range of between 966 and 6,679 ships. 
 
66
  Busuttil, pp. 36-37, footnotes 232-236. 
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and submarines—as well as military aircraft—are governed by the same legal rules and 
principles.67  
 For the present purposes, the 1936 London Protocol is the starting point for any 
discussion of submarine warfare, notwithstanding the fact that some commentators have 
expressed the opinion that the State practice indicates that the treaty has fallen into 
desuetude,68 a subject that is beyond the scope of this work.  The 1936 London Protocol 
incorporated verbatim Article 22 of the 1930 London Naval Treaty.  Most of the terms of the 
1930 London Naval Treaty (but not Article 22) expired on 31 December 1936.  However, in 
order to allow the opportunity for States that were not party to the 1930 London Naval Treaty 
to join the submarine regime, the 1936 London Protocol was adopted.69  This treaty sets forth 
only two rules, the first of which requires submarines to conform to the same rules of 
international law that govern the conduct of surface vessels and the second rule, which 
provides that: 
 
[E]xcept in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly 
summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, 
whether surface or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of 
navigation a merchant vessel without first having placed 
passengers, crew and ship’s papers in a place of safety.  For this 
purpose, the ship’s boats are not regarded as a place of safety 
unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the 
existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or 
the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them 
on board. 
 
Although this rule might appear to lay down a bright-line rule concerning attacks on merchant 
vessels, the German Manual cautions that against taking a simplistic or overly restrictive 
approach, noting that merchant vessels that are participating in hostilities lose the right to the 
protection afforded by this rule.70  
                                                
67
  1936 London Protocol, Rule 1; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.3; U.K. Manual, para. 
13.31; Canadian Manual, para. 826.1;German Manual, para. 1046; Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 
709.1(a); San Remo Manual, para. 45.  With respect to submarine warfare in general, see Mallison, 
Busuttil, pp. 101-186; Gilliland; German Manual, pp. 459-462. 
 
68
  See, for example, O’Connell Contemporary Naval Operations, p. 52; Gilliland, pp. 978-979.  Busuttil 
(at pp. 166-182) sets forth a comprehensive summary and analysis of the numerous commentators, 
including service lawyers, who have explored this issue.  See also Howard S. Levie, “Submarine 
Warfare: With Emphasis on the 1936 London Protocol,” in Grunawalt, pp. 28-71. 
 
69
  The 1936 London Protocol is still in force and has 50 States Parties. 
 
70
  German Manual, para. 1025.1. 
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The modern military manuals, therefore, deal with this rule in a number of different 
ways.  For example, the 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook71 and the Canadian Manual 
restate the language of this rule in the sections dealing with submarine warfare and the 
destruction of captured prizes,72 while the U.K. Manual73 and Australian Manual,74 include 
these provisions in their rules on capture, without distinguishing between surface warships 
and submarines.  Interestingly, in the section dealing with submarine warfare, the Australian 
Manual notes that “the confined nature of submarine accommodation makes it impractical to 
place the crew and passengers of a merchant vessel in safety prior to an attack.”75   
The German Manual provisions on submarine warfare also incorporate the language 
set forth in the second rule of the 1936 London Protocol with respect to the safety of crew, 
passengers and the ships’s papers.76  Without distinguishing between enemy and neutral 
merchantmen, this provision also states that:  
 
Merchant ships which meet the requirements of a military 
objective may also be attacked and sunk by submarines without 
prior warning.77   
 
The commentary to this provision, however, refers to enemy merchant vessels and provides 
that such ships may not be attacked if:  
 
[U]nder the prevailing circumstances the sinking of an enemy 
merchant vessel offers no definite military advantage, if less severe 
measures are available, or if the military character of the vessel 
cannot be clearly established.78   
 
                                                
71
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 7.10.1 (destruction of captured neutral prizes), 8.2.2.1 
(destruction of captured enemy prizes) and para. 8.3.1 (interdiction of enemy merchant shipping by 
submarines). 
 
72
  See Canadian Manual, paras. 826.1-826.2.  The Canadian Manual also includes these provisions in the 
sections on the destruction of captured enemy merchantmen (ibid., para. 867.1) and the destruction of 
captured neutral merchantmen (ibid., para. 873.1).  See also; San Remo Manual, paras. 139(a), 151(a). 
 
73
  U.K. Manual, para. 13.104, relating to enemy merchantmen.  The U.K. Manual provisions do not 
specifically provide for the destruction of neutral merchant vessels that  
 
74
  Australian Manual, para. 8.6. 
 
75
  Ibid., para. 8.25.   
 
76
  German Manual, para. 1047. 
 
77
  Ibid. 
 
78
  Ibid., para. 1047.1.  See also ibid., paras. 1025, 1025.1. 
 
Chapter Seven: Naval Warfare: Means and Methods  
 
Mundis 231 
 The most important case dealing with submarine warfare in general is Dönitz 
(discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3), although the Peleus and Moehle cases, which 
involved submarine commanders who had ordered the killing of survivors after sinking 
merchant vessels, are also important precedents.  The IMT found Dönitz guilty of ordering the 
sinking of neutral merchant vessels without warning in the German operational zones, 
contrary to the 1936 London Protocol.  Given the widespread practice of the belligerents in 
both world wars of sinking merchant vessels, however, the IMT judges found Dönitz guilty, 
but declined to impose a sentence on Dönitz for these crimes.  
 Although the 1936 London Protocol was certainly disregarded for the most part by the 
major naval powers in World War II,79 it must be borne in mind that no State renounced that 
treaty.  Rather, States excused their compliance with its rules on the basis of reprisals against 
illegal actions undertaken by other belligerents, such as the arming of merchant vessels, 
convoying merchantmen, ordering merchant vessels to report submarine sightings or ordering 
merchant vessels to ram submarines.  The reliance on reprisals to justify policies in response 
to violations of the 1936 London Protocol suggests that the rules set down in that treaty are 
still valid.   
 
VII. Means and Methods of Warfare: Air War at Sea 
 
Air warfare in general, as well as the sub-set of air warfare at sea, is a broad topic and 
this discussion highlights only the general rules in order to demonstrate how carrier- or land-
based naval aircraft can play a role in patrolling or enforcing NEZs.  The basic rule is that 
aircraft involved in operations superjacent to the seas are bound by the same rules as surface 
warships and submarines.80  Thus, military aircraft may engage enemy warships, military 
aircraft, merchant vessels and civil aircraft pursuant to the same rules that apply to warships.81  
As the 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook notes, it is rare for a ship to surrender to an 
                                                
79
  See Mallison and Mallison, pp. 97-99, for a discussion of crimes committed by U.S. forces following 
the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in March 1943, when aircraft and PT boats strafed and bombed Japanese 
survivors in lifeboats and clinging to the wreckage of ships that had been attacked. 
 
80
  San Remo Manual, para. 45.  See also San Remo Manual, Explanation, para. 45.4, indicating that 
paragraph 45 of the San Remo Manual represents the first time this rule was extended to aircraft and 
that this development “logically follows from the increasingly important role aircraft play in armed 
conflict at sea.”  
 
81
  See, for example, 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 8.4, 8.4.1; U.K. Manual, para. 
13.31; Canadian Manual, paras. 717-724. 
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aircraft, but if the ship surrenders in good faith or indicates a clear intention to surrender, the 
aircraft must refrain from attacking.82   
Hospital zones and neutralised zones should be made immune from aerial 
bombardment pursuant to the terms of any agreement establishing such zones.83 
 
VIII. Means and Methods of Warfare: Naval Missiles 
 
 Unlike other methods of naval warfare, the rules governing the use of naval missiles, 
and particularly anti-ship missiles, have not been the subject of any specific treaties and no 
international courts have rendered decisions on the use of such missiles.84  The overarching 
principle governing the use of naval missiles is that these weapons systems must be used only 
in conformity with the targeting principles set forth in Chapter 6.85  This raises a number of 
issues since these missiles are capable of being used at great distances, where target 
discrimination raises numerous concerns.   
 Anti-ship missile warfare played a relatively important role in both the Falklands and 
Iran-Iraq Wars, with the belligerents in those conflicts employing missiles to sink vessels and 
down aircraft.86  Nevertheless, given the rules governing both the use of anti-missiles and 
NEZs, it is clear that precautionary steps must be taken when using such systems, whether 
they are to be employed inside or outside of the exclusion zone.  This may require, in certain 
circumstances that the attacker take into consideration the possibility that the intended target 
may take defensive measures, such as through the use of chaff or decoys, with the result that 
other vessels not targeted (including neutral merchant ships in the vicinity) may be 
endangered or destroyed.87 
                                                
82
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.4, footnote 103, refers to several instances in the 
Second World War where ships surrendered to aircraft. 
 
83
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 8.5.1.5, footnote 121 (referring inter alia to the Red 
Cross Box utilised in the Falklands War). 
 
84
  On anti-ship missiles in general, see Busuttil pp. 187-207; Pocar; and van Hegelsom Bochumer 
Schriften, pp. 33-37. 
 
85
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 9.9; U.K. Manual, para. 13.50; Canadian Manual, 
paras. 613.1, 827.1; German Manual, para. 1045; San Remo Manual, para. 78, Explanation, paras. 78.1-
78.4.  See als Busuttil, pp. 204-207. 
 
86
  See Fenrick Falklands, pp. 47-49; Busuttil, pp. 194-195.  See also O’Connell Influence at pp. 86-90 
with respect to the sinking of the Venus Challenger, which was probably sunk by anti-ship missiles after 
the missile guidance systems probably malfunctioned during an attack on the Pakistani destroyer 
Khaibar, which was attacked by Indian Navy missile boats and sunk in the vicinity.  
 
87
  Busuttil, p. 207; van Hegelsom, p. 36. 
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IX. Conclusion 
 
 Based upon this survey of the means and methods of warfare, some preliminary 
conclusions can be reached with respect to the impact that these methods have had on the 
development of the exclusion zone as a distinct method of warfare.  Moreover, there are 
certain concepts and principles in these means and methods of warfare that overlap.  For 
example, all of these methods of warfare allow warships and military aircraft to interfere with 
commercial shipping on the high seas.  This interference may take the form of visit, search, 
diversion or capture.  The imposition of a blockade also affects merchant shipping.  
Blockades and minefields may not be employed in neutral waters Submarine and mine 
warfare can result in significant difficulties for merchant vessels and may require re-routing 
and diversion to avoid such areas.  Naval exclusion zones also interfere with commercial 
shipping and in order to avoid NEZs, merchantmen may divert course to avoid the zone, 
increasing travel time and expense. 
In order to minimise the effects and risks to commercial shipping presented by 
blockades and mining operations, the belligerents engaged in these operations are required to 
issue international notifications concerning the scope and duration of these methods of 
warfare.  A similar obligation rests on the belligerent establishing a NEZ.  
Although submarines enjoy certain tactical advantages over surface warships, they are 
bound by the same rules and legal principles, with the effect that some of the advantages 
inherent in submarine warfare are tempered by the law.  Thus, under the modern law, the 
concept of unrestricted submarine warfare—as practiced by the belligerents in both the First 
and Second World Wars—is unlawful and submarines may not practice this form of warfare 
in area of the sea, including within an exclusion zone.  
Table 3 sets forth a comparative analysis of the characteristics of the various means 
and methods of naval warfare and is useful in understanding the similarities and differences 
between these concepts, and also as a means of illustrating the principles that have influenced 
the development of the NEZ as a distinct method of naval warfare.  In the column under the 
specific headings for the various methods of naval warfare, a row of X’s designates the 
primary characteristics of that method of naval warfare, while row of asterisks indicates that 
the rule applies when this method of naval warfare is employed in conjunction with the 
exclusion zone.88  In the column under the “Exclusion Zone” heading, a number of rows have 
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  For example, the asterisks in the first two rows, under the column headings for mine, submarine, aerial, 
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question marks, indicating that while these rules may not be specifically listed in the military 
manuals and restatements dealing with exclusion zones, these characteristics should apply in 
exclusion zones.   
                                                                                                                                                   
and missile warfare indicates that although the corresponding characteristics are not inherent to those 
methods of warfare, these rules apply when those methods are used to enforce a NEZ. 
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Table 3 
Comparative Analysis: Methods of Naval Warfare 
 
XXXXXXX: Defining Characteristic 
**********:  Applicable if employed to enforce a NEZ 
??????????: Not specifically required in NEZs, but should apply 
Characteristics Exclusion Zone Blockade Mine Warfare Submarine and Aerial 
Warfare 
Naval 
Missiles 
The same body of law applies both inside and outside the zone XXXXXXX  ********** ********** ********** 
Adherence to military necessity and the principle of proportionality 
concerning the extent, location and duration of the zone 
XXXXXXX  ********** ********** ********** 
Due regard for the rights of neutrals XXXXXXX  ********** ********** ********** 
Safe passage for neutral vessels and aircraft XXXXXXX     
Requires public declaration and notification XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX   
Must be “effective” ??????????? XXXXXXX    
May not be directed against neutral ports or coasts ??????????? XXXXXXX XXXXXXX   
Must not be directed at the civilian population ??????????? XXXXXXX    
Rule of impartiality applies  XXXXXXX    
Merchant vessels breaching or attempting to breach are subject to 
capture 
 XXXXXXX    
Merchant vessels resisting capture are subject to attack  XXXXXXX    
Military requirements determine distance between blockade and 
vessels enforcing the blockade 
 XXXXXXX    
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XXXXXXX: Defining Characteristic 
**********:  Applicable if employed to enforce a NEZ 
??????????: Not specifically required in NEZs, but should apply 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics Exclusion Zone Blockade Mine Warfare Submarine and Aerial 
Warfare 
Naval 
Missiles 
Legitimate methods and means may be combined to enforce and 
maintain the zone or blockade 
??????????? XXXXXXX ********** ********** ********** 
May not be employed in neutral waters ???????????  XXXXXXX   
May not be used to deny neutral ships transit passage through 
international straits or archipelagic sea lanes 
???????????  XXXXXXX 
 
 
May not be used to an indefinite extent XXXXXXX  XXXXXXX   
May be applied in reasonably limited areas, provided that an 
alternate safe route excists for commercial shipping 
  XXXXXXX   
Generally, must apply the same rules as for surface warships    XXXXXXX XXXXXXX 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusions 
 
“[R]ule-makers should be careful not to create rules that will be 
honoured more in their breach than in their observance.”1 
 
As noted above, the fundamental rule of naval exclusion zones is that if a belligerent 
establishes such a zone, the same body of law applies equally both inside and outside of the 
zone and therefore the legal principles enshrined in international humanitarian law apply in 
NEZs.  Moreover, because the rules governing naval targeting are based on these principles, it 
necessarily follows that the belligerent is bound by the targeting rules described in Chapter 6.  
Consequently, under no circumstances may naval exclusion zones be considered “free-
fire”zones, where a belligerent may target any vessel that enters the zone.  Belligerents may 
not avoid their legal obligation by designating exclusion zones and simply issuing warnings to 
the international community to avoid the area.  On the other hand, a belligerent may decide, as 
a matter of policy, not to target certain ships or aircraft which are legitimate military 
objectives that are outside the zone, while reserving the right to attack those legitimate 
military objectives if inside the zone.2 
Although submarines enjoy certain tactical advantages over surface warships, they are 
bound by the same rules and legal principles, with the effect that some of the advantages 
inherent in submarine warfare are tempered by the law.  Thus, under the modern law, the 
concept of unrestricted submarine warfare—as practiced by the belligerents in both the First 
and Second World Wars—is unlawful and submarines may not practice this form of warfare 
in area of the sea, including within an exclusion zone.  In this respect, the law has certainly 
progressed by taking into account the practice used by the belligerents in the First and Second 
World Wars in waging this form of warfare with the resulting loss of tens of thousands of 
lives and countless wealth. 
 Based upon the brief survey of the means and methods of warfare set forth in Chapter 
7, some conclusions can be reached with respect to the impact that these methods have had on 
the development of the exclusion zone as a distinct method of warfare.  Moreover, there are 
certain concepts and principles in these means and methods of warfare that overlap.  For 
                                                
1
  Robertson Bochumer Schriften, pp. 60-61. 
 
2
  San Remo Manual, Explanation, para. 106.1. 
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example, all of these methods of warfare result in interference by warships and military 
aircraft with commercial shipping on the high seas.  This interference may take the form of 
visit, search, diversion or capture, with the resulting expenses these forms of interference 
necessarily cause.  While blockades and minefields may not be employed in neutral waters, 
the imposition of a blockade or a naval minefield similarly affects merchant shipping and can 
and may require re-routing and diversion to avoid such areas, resulting in increased financial 
burdens, in addition to obviously increasing the risks to life and property.  Naval exclusion 
zones also interfere with commercial shipping and present some of the same problems as 
viewed from the perspective of the bridge of a merchantman. 
In order to minimise the effects and risks to commercial shipping presented by 
blockades and mining operations, the belligerents engaged in these operations are required to 
issue international notifications concerning the scope and duration of these methods of 
warfare.  A similar obligation rests on the belligerent establishing a NEZ.  
Since the rules governing conduct inside the zone are the same as those that apply 
outsid the zone, it may be argued that NEZs do not possess juridical status and the “law of 
naval exclusion zones” therefore does not exist.  While this may be true, depending on one’s 
definition or concept of “law,” there are several important legal and policy considerations to 
be taken into account before rejecting the notion of the exclusion zone as a method of naval 
warfare, notwithstanding the fact that the body of law applicable in such zones is not unique 
to them. 
First, as the preceding chapters of this thesis demonstrate, State practice and opinion 
juris both support the argument that NEZs have emerged as a sui generis form of naval 
warfare.  States which have engaged in warfare at sea have established such zones and in 
doing so proclaimed them to lawful.  The military manuals of the major naval powers have 
incorporated provisions on exclusion zones, as has the San Remo Manual, the most important 
restatement of the law of armed conflict at sea.   
Second, the drafters of the San Remo Manual, in identifying and setting forth the legal 
requirements for naval exclusion zones, noted that such zones should be considered as an 
“exceptional measure” and concluded that setting forth detailed criteria for such zones would 
be a progressive development of the law.3  Admittedly, the fact that the San Remo Manual 
drafters introduced this discussion by indicating that this would contribute to developing the 
law progressively indicates that this area of the law has not yet ripened into custom.  Be that 
                                                
3
  San Remo Manual, para. 106, Explanation, para. 106.1. 
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as it is may, the fact remains that States engaged in naval warfare establish exclusion zones.  
At the very least, we appear to be witnessing the development of customary rules governing 
this method of naval warfare. 
Third, it is likely that in any future conflict at sea one or more of the parties to the 
conflict will seek to establish some form of exclusion zones.  Consequently, naval 
commanders, who must often make split-second decisions while operating in NEZs, and naval 
judge advocates and other legal professionals who must draft the ROE, must have a clear 
understanding of the law applicable to NEZs.  The fact that NEZs have no independent 
juridical status does not mean that there is not a coherent and well-defined body of law 
applicable to such zones.  In the absence of an over-arching modern convention on the means 
and methods of naval warfare, including specific provisions on naval exclusion zones, custom 
plays an important role in determining the law applicable to NEZs and thus any restatement of 
the law applicable to such zones, therefore, will be welcome to those who must plan for, and 
engage in, armed conflict at sea. 
Fourth, although not dispositive of the issue of whether NEZs possess juridical status, 
there are important policy reasons for establishing NEZs, including the limitation of the area 
of armed conflict at sea.  This is a valid reason for promoting the concept of the NEZ and the 
questions posed in the Interim New Zealand Manual provide an excellent starting point for the 
evaluation of NEZs from a policy persepctive.  After stating that “a dogmatic statement that 
exclusion zones are legally acceptable or unacceptable would be inaccurate,”4 the Interim 
New Zealand Manual adopts a case-by-case approach, based on the answers to seven 
enumerated questions. 
1. What is the purpose of the zone? 
 
2. Who or what is excluded from the zone? 
 
3. What is the sanction imposed on vessels or aircraft entering the 
zone without its permission? 
 
4. Where is the zone located? 
 
5. How large an area does the zone occupy? 
 
6. For how long is the zone established? 
 
7. To what extent are neutral States and their shipping affected by 
compliance with the requirements of the State establishing the 
zone?5 
                                                
4
  Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 705.4.  See also San Remo Manual, Explanation, para. 106.2; 
Fenrick, pp. 124-125. 
 
5
  Interim New Zealand Manual, para. 705.4. 
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The Interim New Zealand Manual goes on to state that zones that are established for a brief 
period of time, in relatively limited areas of the sea and which are away from established 
shipping routes are more likely to be considered legal than those of longer duration over wider 
areas of the oceans and which encompass shipping routes.6   
 Fifth, there may be solid military reasons for establishing NEZs.  Based on the above 
restatement and analysis of exclusion zones, several questions emerge.  Since the 
establishment of an exclusion zone does not confer any additional rights upon belligerents and 
does not diminish or affect the duties imposed by the law of armed conflict upon the 
belligerent, what is the point of establishing such a zone?  In other words, if the law does not 
confer any special advantages through the establishment of the NEZ, why should a belligerent 
take this step?   
If the exclusion zone device confers no additional legal rights upon the belligerent 
establishing the zone, and in no way otherwise excuses non-compliance with the law, there 
must be other compelling reasons why States would opt for this method of naval warfare.  In 
this respect, the principles of warfare described in the final section of Chapter 1 are of 
assistance in providing answers.  A belligerent will not establish a zone that does not comply 
with the principles of warfare or advance the likelihood of prevailing in a conflict.  Zones may 
also be a useful way to lure the belligerent’s naval forces into a specified area for the sole 
purpose of engaging such vessels.  In this sense, Goldie has likened zones to a “killing 
ground.”7   
The Interim New Zealand Manual stresses that the decision to establish an exclusion 
zone must be made at the “government level,” precluding naval commanders from 
establishing exclusion zones.8  From the policy and operational standpoint, the decision to 
establish a zone should be made after a thorough analysis of the principles of warfare to 
determine if likelihood of mission accomplishment will be increased through the adoption of 
this method of naval warfare.   
The zones established by the United Kingdom around the Falkland Islands validate 
this point.  The goal of the United Kingdom was to reclaim the Falklands and this would only 
be possible by mounting a sea-based assault.  In order to achieve this strategic goal, the Royal 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
6
  Ibid., para. 705.4, footnote 6 therein.   
 
7
  Goldie, p. 158. 
 
8
  Ibid.   
 
Chapter Eight: Conclusions 
Mundis 241 
Navy needed to ensure unimpeded access to the islands.  By establishing the TEZ, the Royal 
Navy was able to reduce the risks to the ships (and supporting aircraft) that were carrying the 
troops and logistics required to launch the assault.  As such, the zone allowed the British to 
advance the overall strategic objective, to seize the initiative to retake the islands, to mass 
their naval power within the TEZ and to use that power in the most economical manner 
possible.  Moreover, the TEZ provided a certain degree of operational security and since the 
zone had no impact on the maneuverability of the fleet, it contributed to the overall success of 
the campaign.  At the same time, the Argentinian Navy was forced to operate in and around 
the TEZ if their goal to thwart the British invasion was to have any chance of success.   
Sixth, as is the case in virtually every other aspect of warfare, technological 
developments are pushing the need for clearly defined modern legal rules, so that the current 
rules do not become obsolete.  In light of modern military technologies, which permit 
belligerents to perform reconnaissance and surveillance over large areas of the sea, 
operational requirements may necessitate the creation of zones that cover hundreds of square 
miles so that the enforcing warships will not be necessarily confined within a small area.  As 
van Hegelsom has noted, “An approach in which only areas in which hostilities are taking 
place can become MOZs [Maritime Operational Zones], will be unacceptable to 
belligerents.”9   
 Evolving technologies—and how those technologies are harnessed in enforcing 
zones—will thus play an important role in assessing the legality of future zones.  The ability 
to perform reconnaissance and surveillance at longer distances greatly enhances the ability of 
naval commanders to distinguish between merchantmen and enemy warships.  Moreover, in 
the wake of the 9/11 attacks, steps have been taken to enhance the ability to monitor 
commercial shipping.  For example, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Container 
Security Initiative, although designed to prevent the shipment of weapons of mass destruction, 
may be the precursor to the day when the belligerent right of visit and search is no longer 
necessary.10  To the extent that naval commanders can know with a reasonable degree of 
certainty whether or not a given merchantman is carrying cargo that contributes to the 
enemy’s war-fighting efforts, thus rendering the vessel a legitimate military ojective, the less 
the likelihood that the vessel will be mistakenly attacked in the zone.   
                                                
9
  van Hegelsom Bochumer Schriften, p. 52. 
 
10
  See, for example, Roger W. Barnett, “Technology and Naval Blockade: Past Impact and Future 
Prospects,” 58 NWCR, p. 87 (No. 3, Summer 2005), p. 9 (“The PSI [Proliferation Security Initiatve] is 
indicative of the form the ‘modern-day belligerent right of visit and search’ has taken”). 
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Seventh, there is a growing trend among maritime stakeholders towards conferring 
greater legitimacy upon the NEZ as a legal concept.  With respect to the rights of neutrals, one 
naval practitioner has pointed out that the shipping industry generally supports the concept of 
the exclusion zone: 
 
It is important to note, however, that the commercial shipping 
industry—by and large, neutral merchants—has been among the 
most vocal supporters of belligerent war-exclusion zones as a 
means of controlling the area of maritime hostilities.  This is 
indicative of the extent to which the loss of legal protection for 
those neutral vessels trading wth belligerents in economically vital 
goods has gained recognition and acceptability in law and 
practice.11 
 
While the decision to establish a zone need not take into account the views of neutrals (as 
distinct from the obligation to respect the rights of neutrals once the zone is established), 
common sense dictates that the commercial shipping sector would support any steps taken to 
reduce the likely area where armed conflict at sea occurs and to the extent the establishment 
of zones accomplishes this limited goal, zones are likely to find support from merchant 
shipping concerns. 
While naval exclusion zones may serve useful purposes by attempting to limit the 
geographical scope of the armed conflict, thus reducing the possibility that innocent life will 
be lost and neutral shipping will suffer unnecessary interference, zones do not alter the legal 
rights of the parties within such zones.  By no means can exlusion zones be considered “free-
fire” zones where any ship entering the zone is subject to attack on sight.  In short, the 
following legal principles must be respected for an exclusion zone to be legal: 
 
• the applicability of the same body of law both inside and outside 
the zone;12 
 
• the applicability of strict adherence to military necessity and the 
principle of proportionality concerning the extent, location and 
duration of the zone;13 
 
• due regard must be given to the rights of neutrals to enjoy 
legitimate uses of the sea;14 
                                                
11
  Francis V. Russo, Jr., “Neutrality at Sea in Transition: State Practice in the Gulf War as Emerging 
International Customary Law,” 19 Ocean Development and International Law, pp. 381-399 (1988), p. 
391.  Unfortunately, Russo provides no authority to support the quoted statement. 
 
12
 San Remo Manual, para. 106(a). 
 
13
  Ibid., para. 106(b). 
 
14
  Ibid., para. 106(c). 
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• provisions for the safe passage of neutral vessels and aircraft under 
certain circumstances;15 and 
 
• public declarations and notifications concerning the 
commencement, duration, location and extent of the zone, as well 
as the restrictions imposed within the zone.16 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the central issue presented by exclusion zones remain 
extremely difficult to resolve, as O’Connell pointed out: 
 
The rule that neutral shipping may not be denied the right of 
navigation on the high seas is one of the fundamentals of the law 
of war at sea, and it is especially rigid in times of limited wars or 
states of belligerency short of formal war.  Yet it is precisely in 
these circumstances that the problem of positive identification in 
the exercise of self-defence is most acute.  For modern naval 
planning, therefore, the condition of tension between these two 
requirements of the law leads to inevitable perplexity.  If all 
shipping could be excluded from an operational area, or around a 
convoy or task force, the designation of a contact as potentially 
hostile would be easier, and that would tend to solve the problem 
of identification.  But if shipping may not be so excluded, the risk 
of successful attack against such convoy or task force is magnified 
by the latter’s need to take care in identifying a contact.17 
 
It is likely that exclusion zones will feature in any future armed conflict that has a maritime 
component, and undoubtedly the legality of any such zones will be raised.  Despite numerous 
calls in the past for an international conference to draft a treaty revising the law of naval 
warfare in light of State practice and technological advancements, the prospects of this 
occurring are slim—if only because the further refinement of other areas of international 
humanitarian law seem more pressing.18  Nevertheless, as Greenwood wrote during the 
drafting of the San Remo Manual in the early 1990s, “The legal implication of these zones is 
so complex a subject that we may need to return to it at a later date.”19   
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
15
  Ibid., para. 106(d). 
 
16
  Ibid., para. 106(e). 
 
17
  O’Connell Law of the Sea, p. 1109 (footnote omitted). 
 
18
  One need only to think of the issues presented by the “War on Terror,” including non-State actors and 
unlawful combatants as being among the areas of the law that might be considered a higher priority than 
refining the law of naval warfare.   
 
19
  Christopher Greenwood, Comment, van Hegelsom Bochum Schriften, p. 101. 
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Appendix 
 
Legal Divisions of the Seas Under the 1982 LOS 
Convention 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The modern law of the sea regime generally reflects the customary division of the 
oceans into internal waters, territorial sea and the high seas.  The first two categories have 
been characterised as “national waters,” with the latter category characterised as “international 
waters.”1  This is not to imply either that coastal States have exclusive rights or unhindered 
sovereignty over the former category and no rights with respect to the high seas adjacent to 
their territorial seas.  Rather, as will be discussed below, vessels of all States have the right of 
innocent passage through the territorial seas, and States may exercise certain rights in the 
contiguous and exclusive economic zones that are adjacent to the territorial sea. 
 This section will examine the division of the world’s oceans and airspace above under 
the modern law of the sea regime in the following order: internal waters; territorial sea; 
contiguous zones; resource zones; the continental shelf; the high seas; international straits; 
and airspace above the oceans.  Under the 1982 LOS Convention regime, maritime zones, 
including the territorial sea and contiguous and exclusive economic zones are measured from 
baselines.  Consequently, an understanding of how baselines are determined is thus essential 
to grasping the divisions of the ocean under the law of the sea. 
 
II. Baselines2 
 
Article 4 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention was significant because it established 
detailed provisions for establishing baselines3 and incorporated the principles governing 
straight baselines for deeply indented coasts or a fringe of coastal islands set forth by the ICJ 
in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case.  As one prominent commentator has noted: 
                                                
 
1
  The 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, for example, uses these characterisations, while 
acknowledging that international law does not make this distinction.  See ibid, para. 1.4, footnote 27. 
 
2
  This discussion assumes that the claimant State exercises undisputed sovereignty over the land territory 
abutting the shoreline, which may not always be the case.  See, for example, 1995 U.S. Navy 
Commander’s Handbook, para. 1.3, footnote 11.  Regarding baselines in general, see Churchill and 
Lowe, pp. 31-59. 
 
3
  1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Section II, Articles 3-13. 
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The result has been to incorporate large areas that were formerly 
high seas into the internal waters or territorial waters of coastal 
States.  In some cases, the adoption of straight baselines results in 
the appropriation of much larger areas of the high seas than would 
an increase in the breadth of the territorial sea to twelve miles or 
more.4 
 
Articles 4 through 16 of the 1982 LOS Convention elaborate upon the rules established in 
Section II of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention concerning the delimitation of baselines.  
Additionally, there are several important ICJ decisions concerning or impacting on baseline 
calculations.5  
Unless a special rule applies, the normal baseline from which national maritime claims 
are calculated is the coastal low-water line6 as marked on the coastal State’s official large-
scale charts.7  Littoral States may use straight baselines for measuring their territorial sea 
when the coast is deeply indented or when a chain of islands is in the immediate vicinity of 
the shoreline.8  In employing straight baselines, the general rule is that such lines must not 
“depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast.”9  The determination 
of baselines for bays10 is complicated: the water area of the coastal indentation must be greater 
than that of a semicircle with a diameter the length of the line drawn across the mouth of the 
indentation; and the maximum baseline across the mouth of a bay may not exceed 24 nautical 
                                                
 
4
  Robertson, p. 9. 
 
5
  Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case; Gulf of Maine Case; Land, Island and 
Maritime Frontier Dispute Case.   
 
6
  This is the intersection of the plane of low water with the shore.  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s 
Handbook, para. 1.3.1, footnote 12. 
 
7
  1982 LOS Convention Article 5; 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 3.  In 1935, Norway, a State 
with a deeply indented coast with hundreds of small islands lying off its shores, was the first State to 
employ straight baselines.  In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, the I.C.J. approved of this scheme, 
which was then codified in the 1958 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and subsequently in the 1982 LOS 
Convention. 
 
8
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 7; 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 4. 
 
9
  The sea areas contained within the lines must be such that they are subject to the regime of internal 
waters and may not be applied in such a way as to cut off the territorial sea of another State from the 
high seas or from an exclusive economic zone.  1982 LOS Convention, Articles 7(3) and 7(6); compare 
1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Articles 4(2) and 4(5).   
 
10
  For baseline purposes, a “bay” is a “well-marked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to 
the width of its mouth as to contain landlocked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the 
coast.” 1982 LOS Convention Article 10(2); 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 7(2).  These rules 
apply only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single State, pursuant to 1982 LOS Convention 
Articles 10(1) and 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Articles 7(1). 
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miles, and if the mouth exceeds that limit, the State may draw a baseline of 24 nautical miles 
within the bay enclosing the maximum area of water.11   
Archipelagos, which are defined as a group of islands, interconnecting waters and 
other natural features that are so closely inter-related that they form an intrinsic geographical, 
economic and political entity, or which have historically been regarded as such,12 present 
particular difficulties.  Archipelagic States, such as the Philippines or Indonesia, are made up 
of one or more archipelagos and may also include islands not part of the archipelago(s).13.  
Archipelagic States may employ straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the 
outermost islands provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an 
area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land is between 1:1 and 9:1.14 
The waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines are known as archipelagic waters, which is 
an entirely new concept under the 1982 LOS Convention.15  One commentator has written, 
“[O]f the ‘new zones’ recognised in the 1982 LOS Convention, archipelagic waters present 
the most difficult issues.”16  These difficulties mainly arise from the geographic characteristics 
                                                
 
11
  1982 LOS Convention, Articles 10(2), 10(4) and 10(5); 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Articles 7(2), 
7(4) and 7(5); see also 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, Figures 1-1 through 1-3, pp. 9-10.  
Only if both the semicircle and 24 nautical mile tests are met will the body of water constitute a “bay” 
under international law; all water enclosed within the bay are considered internal waters.  There are two 
special situations where the general rules on bays do not apply: when straight baselines are employed 
pursuant to 1982 LOS Convention Article 7 and in the case of so-called “historic bays.”  1982 LOS 
Convention, Article 10(6); 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Articles 4 and 7(6).  In order for a State to 
make a claim to a historic bay, the State must demonstrate its “open, effective, long term, and 
continuous exercise of authority over the bay, coupled with acquiescence by foreign nations in the 
exercise of that authority.”  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 1.3.3.1.  See also ibid., p. 
96, Table A1-4, which contains a list of 38 bays that have been claimed as historic bays by the States 
concerned. 
 
12
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 46(b). 
 
13
  Ibid., Article 46(a).  Part IV of the 1982 LOS Convention sets forth the specific rules governing 
archipelagic States.  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, p. 105, Table A1-9 contains a list of 18 
States which have claimed archipelagic status under the 1982 LOS Convention.  See also ibid., p. 104, 
Table A1-8, p. 104, for a list of multi-island States not qualified for archipelagic status and dependent 
territories which would qualify for archipelagic status if independent.  
 
14
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 47(1).  
 
15
  Ibid., Article 49(1).  Archipelagic waters are those enclosed by archipelagic baselines generally not 
exceeding 100 nautical miles long, joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying 
reefs of the archipelago.  Ibid., Article 47.  Archipelagic States are discussed in Churchill and Lowe, pp. 
118-131.  See also O’Connell Law of the Sea, pp. 236-258.  
 
16
  Robertson, p. 34.  Robertson also notes that, with three apparent exceptions, “[T]he relationship 
between the status of archipelagic waters and the law of armed conflict at sea (including the law of 
neutrality), is largely unexamined in the published legal literature.”  Ibid., p. 35. 
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of archipelagic waters, since the legal character of archipelagic waters is essentially identical 
to that of the territorial sea.17 
 Special rules govern the establishment of baselines for other geographical features and 
Article 14 permits States to combine the different methods of determining baselines to suit 
different conditions.18   
 
III. Internal Waters19 
 
 Internal waters are those bodies of water on the landward side of the baseline of the 
territorial sea,20 including, inter alia, lakes, harbours, some bays, some canals, and rivers.21  
Archipelagic States may draw closing lines for the delimitation of internal waters.22  States 
may exercise the same degree of sovereignty over their internal waters as they exercise over 
their land territory.  Thus, there is no right of innocent passage in internal waters and ships 
and aircraft may not sail upon or fly over a State’s internal waters without the permission of 
that State, unless when rendered necessary by force majeure or when in distress.23   
 
                                                
 
17
  Robertson, p. 31. 
 
18
  For example, with respect to rivers flowing directly into the sea, a straight baseline extending across the 
mouth of the river between the points on the low-water line of the riverbanks is employed.  1982 LOS 
Convention, Article 9; 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 13.  In the case of islands situated on 
atolls or islands with reefs, the territorial sea baseline is the seaward low-water line of the reef.  1982 
LOS Convention, Article 6.  When harbour works, such as ports, form an integral part of the harbour 
system, they are regarded as part of the coast for the purpose of establishing the baseline.  1982 LOS 
Convention, Article 11; 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 8. 
 
19
  See Churchill and Lowe, pp. 60-70. 
 
20
  1982 LOS Convention, Articles 2(1) and 8(1); 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 5(1). 
 
21
  With the exception of rivers that flow between or traverse two or more States and are generally 
considered to be international rivers.  See 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 1.4.1, 
footnote 30. 
 
22
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 53.  Such closing lines must conform to Articles 9-11 of the 1982 LOS 
Convention. 
 
23
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, paras. 1.4.1, 2.3.1; O’Connell Law of the Sea, pp. 853-858. 
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IV. Territorial Sea24 
 
A. Breadth 
 
 Notwithstanding the considerable controversy surrounding the breadth of the territorial 
sea, agreement was finally reached on this issue at UNCLOS III and pursuant to Article 3 of 
the 1982 LOS Convention, coastal and archipelagic States may claim a territorial sea up to a 
limit not exceeding twelve nautical miles from the baseline.  The world’s major naval powers 
all claim a twelve-mile wide territorial sea, while a few States claim territorial seas of less 
than twelve miles and some claim more than twelve miles, including ten States that claim 200 
nautical miles.25  Islands, rocks and low-tide elevations have their own territorial seas, with 
baselines determined in the same manner as for other land territory.26  
The claiming State exercises sovereignty over its territorial sea to the same extent that 
as its sovereignty over land territory, subject to international law and other provisions of the 
1982 LOS Convention.  In this respect, the 1982 LOS Convention sets forth certain 
navigational rights for other States, such as innocent passage27 and the right of archipelagic 
sea lanes passage.28 
As a result of both the expansion of the breadth of the territorial sea to 12 miles and 
the use of straight baselines, the area of waters subject to coastal State sovereignty has 
quadrupled under the 1982 LOS Convention when straight baselines are employed.29  
However, pursuant to Article 8(2) of the 1982 LOS Convention, when straight baselines are 
employed which have the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas that were not considered 
as such previously, a right of innocent passage shall exist in those waters.30 
 
                                                
 
24
  See Churchill and Lowe, pp. 71-101. 
 
25
  See 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, p. 97, Table A1-5. 
 
26
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 121(2); 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 10(2).  Islands are 
defined as “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.” 
1982 LOS Convention, Article 121(1); 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 10(1). 
 
27
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 2(1); 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 1(1). 
 
28
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 53. 
 
29
  Robertson, p. 16. 
 
30
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 8(2); 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 5(2). 
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B. Innocent Passage31 
 
The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention included an ambiguous article on warships 
within the ambit of the right of innocent passage, setting forth specific rules for all ships,32 
merchant ships,33 government ships other than warships,34 and warships.35  The existence and 
precise scope of the right of innocent passage for warships under the 1958 treaty is not clear.36  
Although the 1958 treaty does not specifically grant warships the right of innocent passage, 
Article 23 of the treaty implies that such a right exists, since it permits coastal States to 
require warships exercising innocent passage to leave their territorial sea if the warship 
disregards a request for compliance with the coastal State’s regulations regarding such 
passage.37  Thus, a textual interpretation of the treaty supports the conclusion that the right of 
innocent passage through the territorial sea exists for warships pursuant to the 1958 treaty.  
Nevertheless, both State practice and the commentators remain divided with respect to the 
omission in the 1958 treaty of an explicit right of innocent passage for warships.38 
Furthermore, notwithstanding an express inclusion of warships in the regime of 
innocent passage, many coastal States made reservations to the effect that warships must seek 
authorisation prior to passing through the territorial sea.39  This would seem to imply that at 
least those States making such reservations considered warships to be included within the 
scope of the right of innocent passage.40  Moreover, the general section of the treaty dealing 
                                                
 
31
  On innocent passage in general, see Myles McDougal and W. Burke, Public Order of the Oceans, 
(1962), pp. 174 et seq., Colombos, pp. 132-135; Restatement, para. 513(1)(a); William E. Butler, Soviet 
Concepts of Innocent Passage, 7 Harvard JIL 113; William E. Butler, The Soviet Union and the Law of 
the Sea, 1971, pp. 51-70.  
 
32
  1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Sub-section A, Articles 14-17. 
 
33
  Ibid., Sub-section B, Articles 18-20. 
 
34
  Ibid., Sub-section C, Articles 21-22. 
 
35
  Ibid., Sub-section D, Article 23. 
 
36
  See discussion in Oppenheim, Vol. 1, pp. 618-619, para. 201; Lowe July 1986, pp. 173-174; Lowe July 
1988, pp. 289-292; Oxman, pp. 851-855. 
 
37
  Compare with Article 30 of the 1982 LOS Convention, which requires warships in this situation to 
“immediately” leave the territorial sea in the event of non-compliance with the littoral State’s request. 
 
38
  Lowe July 1986, pp. 173-174. 
 
39
  More than 40 States consider the mere passage of warships to be prejudicial and have insisted upon 
prior notification and/or authorisation prior to permitting warships to transit their territorial sea.  1995 
U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, p. 202, Table A2-1. 
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with innocent passage specifically requires submarines to navigate on the surface and display 
their flag while exercising the right of innocent passage.41 
 Like the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, the relevant provisions of the 1982 LOS 
Convention do not expressly provide for a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea 
for warships.42  However, a reasonable reading of Article 19 of the 1982 LOS Convention 
leads to the inescapable conclusion that such a right exists, notwithstanding the lack of an 
explicit reference to such a right.43   
 Copying verbatim Article 14(4) of the 1958 treaty, Article 19(1) of the 1982 LOS 
Convention states, “Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order 
or security of the coastal State.”44  In the Corfu Channel case, the only case in which the ICJ 
has interpreted the right of innocent passage of warships, the court examined the manner in 
which the passage was conducted in order to determine whether it was innocent, while 
indicating that motive was irrelevant.  
 In an apparent attempt to clear up some of the ambiguity of the 1958 treaty, Article 
19(2) of the 1982 LOS Convention, sets forth twelve types of activity that are inconsistent 
with innocent passage, including, inter alia, any threat or use of force against the coastal State 
or in violation of the UN Charter;45 exercises involving any type of weapons;46 intelligence 
gathering;47 the broadcasting of propaganda that affects the security of the littoral State;48 and 
the launching, landing or taking onboard of any aircraft49 or other military device.50  Whether 
                                                                                                                                                   
40
  Slonim, pp. 116-121.  The issue of prior notification or approval for innocent passage through the 
territorial sea was vigorously debated at UNCLOS III.  Oxman, p. 854. 
 
41
  1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 14(6); see also 1982 LOS Convention, Article 20. 
 
42
  Lowe July 1988, p. 289. 
 
43
  The 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 2.3.2.4; Restatement, para. 513(1)(a) and comment 
h; and Robertson, p. 17, clearly take the view that innocent passage by warships through territorial seas 
is legally permissible.  Lowe, however, writing in 1986, stated, “The present position appears to be that 
there is no general agreement upon the right of innocent passage for warships and that consequently the 
rights of passage for such ships turns on the issue of opposability.”  Lowe July 1986, p. 173. 
 
44
 ` This definition may be in the process of becoming customary international law.  Lowe July 1986, p. 
174. 
 
45
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 19(2)(a). 
 
46
  Ibid., Article 19(2)(b). 
 
47
  Ibid., Article 19(2)(c). 
 
48
  Ibid., Article 19(2)(d). 
 
49
  Ibid., Article 19(2)(e). 
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this list is exhaustive or merely illustrative is a matter of some dispute.51  Lowe has written 
that the list of proscribed activities in Article 19 is “remarkably wide,” with the consequence 
that the 1982 LOS Convention may afford coastal States more rights to prevent innocent 
passage than they possessed under either the 1958 treaty or customary law.52 
 Because the law extends the coastal State’s sovereignty over its territorial seas, that 
State may take the necessary steps in the territorial sea action to prevent passage that is not 
innocent,53 including the use of force.54  In 1989, The United States and the Soviet Union, in a 
joint interpretation of international law governing innocent passage, took the position that 
prior to taking action in cases where the innocence of the passage was challenged, the coastal 
State had a duty to:  
 
[I]nform the ship of the reason why it questions the innocence of 
the passage, and provide the ship an opportunity to clarify its 
intentions or correct its conduct in a reasonably short period of 
time.55 
 
 The coastal State retains other rights with respect to warships exercising a right of 
innocent passage.  For example, foreign warships must comply with the laws and regulations 
of the coastal State with respect to, inter alia, safety of navigation (including the use of 
designated sea lanes and traffic separation systems), conservation of sea life; customs, fiscal, 
immigration or sanitary matters; and prevention of collisions at sea.56  In order to protect its 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
50
  Ibid., Article 19(2)(f).  This clause may prove troublesome in that “military device” is not defined. 
 
51
  Compare Uniform Interpretation [of the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] of the 
Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage, reprinted in 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s 
Handbook, p. 161, Annex A2-2, para. 3 (list is exhaustive) and Lowe July 1986, p. 174 (list may be only 
illustrative) with O’Connell Law of the Sea, p. 270 (“This catalogue of non-innocent actions is the 
reflex of the catalogue of subject-matters in respect of which the coastal State may make laws and 
regulations.”) 
 
52
  Lowe July 1986, pp. 174-175. 
 
53
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 25(1); Kinley, “The Law of Self-Defence, Contemporary Naval 
Operations, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” 19 Law of the Sea Institute 
Proceedings 10, pp. 12-15 (1987). 
 
54
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 2.3.2.1. 
 
55
  Uniform Interpretation [of the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] of the Rules of 
International Law Governing Innocent Passage, 23 September 1989, reprinted in 28 ILM, pp 1444-1447 
and 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook as Annex A2-2, p. 161, para. 4.  In this document, the 
two parties also agreed that warships enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial seas 
without prior notification or approval. 
 
56
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 21; 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 17.  Article 236 of the 1982 
LOS Convention exempts warships, auxiliaries and State-owned or operated aircraft from any 
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national security, the littoral State may temporarily suspend the right of innocent passage 
through designated areas of its territorial sea, assuming that such suspension is non-
discriminatory and published.57  
 As noted above, the coastal State may require any warship that fails to comply with 
such laws and regulations and disregards any request for compliance therewith, to leave the 
territorial sea immediately.58  Additionally, in the event the foreign warship causes any loss or 
damage resulting from non-compliance with the laws or regulations of the coastal State 
governing passage through the territorial sea, the flag State shall bear international 
responsibility for such loss or damage.59 
 
V. Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage 
 
 Ships of all States enjoy a right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters, 
subject to the right of the archipelagic State to designate archipelagic sea lanes (and air routes 
thereabove) through which all States enjoy a right of passage.60 Such sea lanes traverse the 
archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea and must include all “normal passage 
routes for international navigation or overflight through or over archipelagic waters” and 
(with respect to vessels) all normal navigational channels.61  Article 53(5) sets forth the 
formula for determining the sea lanes: 
 
Such sea lanes and air routes shall be defined by a series of 
continuous axis lines from the entry points of passage routes to the 
exit points.  Ships and aircraft in archipelagic sea lanes passage 
shall not deviate more than 25 nautical miles to either side of such 
axis lines during passage, provided that such ships and aircraft 
shall not navigate closer to the coasts than 10 per cent of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
provisions of the coastal State’s laws or regulations regarding the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment.  However, the flag State of the warship remains responsible for ensuring that 
reasonable and practicable steps are taken to ensure that their warships act in a manner consistent with 
the 1982 LOS Convention.  1982 LOS Convention, Article 236.  See also Oxman, at pp. 819-821.  The 
1982 LOS Convention sets forth detailed provisions regarding the protection of the marine environment.  
This regime is beyond the scope of the present analysis.  See Sonja Ann Jozef Boelaert-Suominen, 
International Environmental Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and Pollution 
Conventions During International Armed Conflict, Newport Paper No. 15.  
 
57
  1982 LOS Convention ,Article 25(3); 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 16(3). 
 
58
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 30; compare Article 23, 1958 Territorial Sea Convention. 
 
59
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 31. 
 
60
  Ibid., Article 52(1). 
 
61
  Ibid., Article 53(4). 
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distance between the nearest points on islands bordering the sea 
lane.62 
 
Within such sea lanes, the archipelagic State may employ traffic separation schemes for the 
safe passage of ships through narrow channels in such sea lanes.63  In the event that the 
archipelagic State does not designate sea lanes, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may 
be used through the route(s) normally used for international navigation.64 
 Archipelagic sea lanes passage must be made for the purpose of continuous, 
expeditious and unobstructed passage from one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic 
zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.65 
 
VI. Contiguous Zones66 
 
 The next zone seaward from the territorial sea is the contiguous zone, which may not 
extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines delimiting the territorial sea.67  Within this 
zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish violation of 
its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory, including 
its territorial sea.68  Provisions recognising the security rights of the coastal State in the 
contiguous zone were explicitly rejected under both the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and 
the 1982 LOS Convention.69  
 
                                                
 
62
  Ibid., Article 53(5). 
 
63
  Ibid., Article 53(6). 
 
64
  Ibid., Article 53(12). 
 
65
  Ibid., Article 53(3).  The Philippines, one of the primary archipelagic States, has declared that the transit 
passage regime does not apply to straits connecting archipelagic waters with the EEZ or high seas.  5 
UN Law of the Sea Bulletin (July 1985), p. 19.  Lowe characterizes this declaration as “plainly 
inconsistent with the Convention provisions creating a right of archipelagic sea lanes passage.”  Lowe, 
p. 178. 
 
66
  See Churchill and Lowe, pp. 132-140. 
 
67
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 33(2). 
 
68
  Ibid., Article 33(1); 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 24(1). 
 
69
  Robertson, pp. 8-9 and 22-23. 
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VII. Exclusive Economic Zones70 
 
 Exclusive Economic Zones (“EEZs”) are economic resource zones adjacent to the 
territorial sea and thus overlap with the contiguous zone71 and the concept of EEZs has 
“entered the realm of customary practice.”72  States that opt to claim an EEZ may do so, 
provided that the breadth of the EEZ does not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
baseline.73  Approximately one-third of the world’s oceans are subject to being claimed by 
coastal States as an EEZ,74 and the establishment of the concept of the EEZ is often cited as an 
example of the potential for “jurisdiction creep” leading to further erosion of the high seas.75  
 Within the EEZ, the claiming State may exercise certain sovereign rights for the 
limited purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources, and 
with regard to other economic uses, including energy generation.76  Additionally, the coastal 
State has limited jurisdiction in the EEZ in order to establish and use artificial islands, 
installations and structures; to conduct marine scientific research; and to protect and preserve 
the marine environment.77  
 In times of peace, naval forces may conduct exercises or manoeuvres in the EEZs of 
other States, pursuant to 1982 LOS Convention Article 58(1), which states: 
 
In the Exclusive Economic Zone, all States, whether coastal or 
land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant parts of this Convention, 
the freedoms referred to in Article 87 of navigation and overflight 
and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, 
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and 
                                                
 
70
  For a discussion of the evolution of the Exclusive Economic Zone as a legal concept, see Ann L. 
Hollick, The Origins of 200-Mile Offshore Zones, 71 AJIL 494-500 (July 1977).  In general, see also 
Barbara Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea and 
Churchill and Lowe, pp. 160-180. 
 
71
  1982 LOS Convention, Article, 55. 
 
72
  Rose, p. 83. 
 
73
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 57. 
 
74
  Rose, p. 68. 
 
75
  Ibid., p. 79. 
 
76
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 56(1)(a). 
 
77
  Ibid., Article 56(1)(b).  Naval vessels and military aircraft are exempt, pursuant to Article 236 of the 
1982 LOS Convention, from the coastal State’s pollution and maritime environment protection schemes, 
however.  See also Oxman, pp. 819-821 (regarding the effect of Article 236 on warships) and pp. 841-
844 (regarding artificial islands, installations and structures); and fn. 124, supra.   
Appendix: Legal Divisions of the Oceans and Airspace Under the 1982 LOS Convention 
Mundis 255 
submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other 
provisions of this Convention. 
 
The negotiating history of the 1982 LOS Convention and the subsequent State practice 
support the position that the phrase “internationally lawful uses of the sea” permits military 
exercises in the EEZ to the same extent as those exercises would be permitted on the high 
seas.78  That is, such exercises or manoeuvres may be conducted without requiring notice to, 
or authorisation from, the coastal State.  Notwithstanding the unambiguous language of this 
provision, several States79 have announced that they will require such notification and consent 
prior to permitting naval exercises in their EEZs, a position which drew protests by several 
maritime powers and was rejected by the President of UNCLOS III.80  Nevertheless, as 
Professor Oxman has pointed out, “It is essentially a futile exercise to engage in speculation 
as to whether naval manoeuvres and exercises within the economic zone are permissible.”81  
The central remaining issue is thus temporal: may a State assert exclusive control over another 
State’s EEZ for lengthy periods of time in order to conduct extensive naval operations of 
exercises in that EEZ. 
 
VIII. Continental Shelf82 
 
 The continental shelf is the seabed and subsoil of submarine areas that extend beyond 
the territorial sea of a coastal State to the outer edge of the continental margin or to a distance 
of 200 nautical miles from the baseline in instances where the outer edge of the continental 
margin does not extend to that distance.83  Although the littoral State may exercise sovereignty 
over the continental shelf for resource-related purposes, this has no effect on the legal status 
of the waters above the continental shelf,84 and in any event, all States may lay submarine 
                                                
 
78
  Barbara Kwaitkowska, Military Uses in the EEZ—a reply (letter to the editor), 11 Marine Policy, pp. 
249-252 (No. 3, July 1987), p. 249.  See also Vaughan A. Lowe, Rejoinder, 11 Marine Policy, pp. 249-
252 (No. 3, July 1987). 
 
79
  Including Brazil, Cape Verde and Uruguay.  5 UN Law of the Sea Bulletin (July 1985), pp. 6-8, 24.  See 
also Lowe July 1986, p. 179; Rose, p. 73. 
 
80
  See Robertson, p. 26 and the footnotes cited therein. 
 
81
  Oxman, p. 838.  See also Lowe July 1986, p. 179 and letter to the editor and rejoinder in 11 Marine 
Policy, pp. 249-252 (No. 3, July 1987). 
 
82
  See Churchill and Lowe, pp. 141-159. 
 
83
  1958 Continental Shelf Convention, Articles 1-3, 5; 1982 LOS Convention, Article 76(1). 
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cables and pipelines on the continental shelf.85  The coastal State has the same rights with 
respect to artificial islands, installations, structures and marine scientific research on the 
continental shelf as it does in the EEZ.86  
 
IX. High Seas87 
 
 All parts of the sea that are not included in the EEZ, territorial sea, or internal waters 
of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State constitute the high seas.88  The 
high seas regime also applies to the EEZ, at least to the extent that the high seas regime is not 
incompatible with the more detailed provisions governing the EEZ.89  The high seas are open 
to all States, including land-locked States,90 and freedom of the high seas includes, inter alia, 
freedom of navigation91 and overflight.92  For warships, freedom of navigation on the high 
seas has been interpreted to include task force manoeuvring, flight operations, military 
exercises, surveillance and intelligence gathering, and ordnance testing and firing.93  The only 
limitation on the activities of warships on the high seas under the 1982 LOS Convention is 
Article 87(2), which provides that all freedoms on the high seas must be exercised with “due 
regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.”94  On 
the high seas, warships of all States enjoy complete immunity from the jurisdiction of all 
States except the flag State.95 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
84
  1958 Continental Shelf Convention, Article 3. 
 
85
  Ibid., Article 4; 1982 LOS Convention, Article 79(1). 
 
86
  1982 LOS Convention, Articles 80, 346, 248 and 249. 
 
87
  See Churchill and Lowe, pp. 203-222. 
 
88
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 86. 
 
89
  Ibid., Article 58. Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, 24 Virginia JIL, pp. 809-863 (No. 4, Summer 1984), p. 825. 
 
90
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 87(1). 
 
91
  Ibid., Article 87(1)(a). 
 
92
  Ibid., Article 87(1)(b). 
 
93
  1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 2.4.3. 
 
94
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 87(2).   
 
95
  1958 High Seas Convention, Article 8(1); 1982 LOS Convention, Article 95. 
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X. International Straits96 
 
 Part III of the 1982 LOS Convention97 concerns straits used for international 
navigation.  The 1982 LOS Convention makes a distinction between straits used for 
international navigation through the territorial sea between one part of the high seas (or EEZ) 
and another part of the high seas (or EEZ) and those straits used for international navigation in 
which there is not a complete overlapping of the international strait and the territorial sea.  In 
the former situation, the 1982 LOS Convention establishes a regime of transit passage that is 
generally more liberal than the regime of innocent passage.98  In the event the strait connects a 
part of the high seas (or EEZ) with the territorial seas of a coastal State, the regime of 
innocent passage governs99 with one difference: the right of innocent passage through such 
straits may not be suspended.100   
 In situations where a corridor in the high seas (or EEZ) exists through the international 
straits which does not completely overlap with the territorial sea and which is suitable for 
navigation, all States enjoy freedom of navigation through and over such waters, provided 
they remain beyond the territorial sea.101  
 
                                                
 
96
  In general, see Bing Jia, Regime of Straits in International Law and Churchill and Lowe, pp. 102-117. 
 
97
  Articles 34-45. 
 
98
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 37-44.  For a comparison of the rights afforded under transit and 
innocent passage, see Oxman, pp. 856-858.  For an analysis of transit passage through international 
straits by submarines, see Ronald I. Clove, Submarine Navigation in International Straits: A Legal 
Perspective.  39 Naval Law Review 103-116 (1990).  See also W. Michael Reisman, The Regime of 
Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of International Lawmaking, 74 AJIL, pp. 48-76 (Vol. 1, 
January 1980). 
 
99
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 45(1)(a).  In the Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ held that warships had the 
right of innocent passage through territorial seas of international straits.   
 
100
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 45(2).  Compare with 1982 LOS Convention, Article 25(3), governing 
innocent passage through the territorial sea.  See also Article 16(4) of the 1958 Territorial Sea 
Convention and the San Remo Manual, para. 33 (“The right of non-suspendable innocent passage 
ascribed to certain international straits by international law may not be suspended in time of armed 
conflict.”)  Lowe raises certain issues regarding whether Article 16(4) of the 1958 treaty is now 
customary international law, and if so, what is the scope of that customary law.  Lowe July 1988, pp. 
291-292.  
 
101
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 36. 
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XI. Airspace 
 
 Like the seas, airspace may be classified as either national or international, and for the 
present purposes, the law of airspace may be briefly summarised as follows: aircraft over the 
land, internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial seas of a State are subject to the 
jurisdiction of that State, while aircraft in the airspace over contiguous zones, EEZs, the high 
seas, and territory which is not subject to the sovereignty of any State (such as Antarctica),102 
are subject to the jurisdiction of the flag State only.103  Thus, with one notable exception, 
aircraft enjoy the same rights as vessels with respect to operating in marine environments and 
the superjacent airspace.  This exception concerns the right of innocent passage for overflight 
above territorial seas, and unlike ships, aircraft do not enjoy such a right of innocent 
passage.104  
 
 
 
                                                
 
102
  Antarctic Treaty, Article IV. 
 
103
  1982 LOS Convention, Articles 2(2), 49(2), 58(1) and 87(1); 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 2; 
1958 High Seas Convention, Article 2. 
 
104
  1982 LOS Convention, Article 17; 1995 U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook, para. 2.3.2.1. 
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